I, of course, know about the Church’s laws against consanguinity. I didn’t, however, think that they are relevant to this discussion because the prohibition against first cousins’ marrying was (and is) NOT absolute. The only prohibitions against marrying, based upon consanguinity, that are absolute are the prohibition against marrying in any degree of the direct line (i.e. parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, great-grandparents and great-grandchildren, etc.) and the prohibition against marrying in the first degree of the collateral line (i.e. brothers and sisters). The prohibition against first cousins’ marrying, or even uncles marrying nieces and aunts marrying nephews, may be dispensed by the local bishop.

Though the prohibition against uncles marrying nieces and aunts marrying nephews, in practice, is never dispensed, dispensations of the prohibition against first cousins’ marrying are, while uncommon, not unheard of. Indeed, in a rural community near my hometown, there is a substantial group of Catholics of Polish heritage. It’s my understanding that, in this community, marriage between first cousins in the first years after emigration from Poland was not uncommon because the émigrés wanted to make sure all the land they had acquired would remain “all in the family.” This is why, to this day, there are relatively few different Polish surnames in this substantial community.

Apropos of Shannon’s point about class, I suspect that, in Europe, the prohibition against first cousin marriage was dispensed often for the nobility and royalty. As far the lower classes, well, I suspect that, in medieval times, the priests were not always as diligent as your husband’s relatives’ priest because the prohibition against first cousin marriage was, as stated, not absolute. Still, one of the main reasons for the requirement that the bands of marriage be read at three successive Sunday Masses before a wedding could take place was to inquire whether the couple planning marriage had any problems with consanguinity.

In the end, I suppose we can say that the Church’s frowning on first cousins’ marrying contributed to Europe’s relatively less clannishness vis a vis the Middle East, but the factors you and Shannon discuss helped to make America much less clannish than Europe, especially Continental Europe. As Jonathan points out, however, it’s probably true that a lack of strong civil society is more a cause of clannishness than a lack of taboos against consanguinity; indeed, the lack of such society might also help explain the lack of such taboos. What’s more, the lack of strong civil society is more likely the cause of clannishness than the converse, but it’s also true that, once it is present, clannishness can impede the development of a strong civil society.

Anecdote: After posting this last night, today we went to one of my husband’s numerous relatives 50th Anniversary. As the husband described their courtship, he joked about the village priest, who had dug out his papers and traced their relation to one another. Only when he saw they were third cousins and had no closer auxilliary relations was he willing to perform the service. My husband (raised Catholic) noted what I’m surprised neither Lex nor Scotus jumped on–and I’m sure both know it better than my googling found. Still, the Catholic injunctions go back to at least the eighth century.

Catholic Encyclopedia:

The Church was prompted by various reasons first to recognize the prohibitive legislation of the Roman State and then to extend the impediment of consanguinity beyond the limits of the civil legislation. The welfare of the social order, according to St. Augustine (De Civ. Dei, XV, xvi) and St. Thomas (Suppl. Q. liii, a. 3), demanded the widest possible extension of friendship and love among all humankind, to which desirable aim the intermarriage of close blood-relations was opposed; this was especially true in the first half of the Middle Ages, when the best interests of society required the unification of the numerous tribes and peoples which had settled on the soil of the Roman Empire.

Of course, this follows the central impulse of Christianity that all men should be seen as brothers, as part of the Christian family.

In my opinion, the two types of cultures described above constitute “strange attractors” in chaos theory terms. The two cultures compete against each other, since it is difficult for them both to survive simultaneously in the same place.

In the absence of secure property rights, rule of law and enforceable contracts, individuals will deal, except on issues of slight value, only with other individuals whom they trust. Thus the main form of business organization in such societies is family- or clan-based: the Chinese business family, the European banking family, the Arab tribe, etc.

These organizational patterns work, but they are ultimately limiting because they make it difficult to raise large amounts of investment capital or to offset risk beyond the family group.

Societies that have thrived in the modern world typically are politically and legally stable and have developed various mechanisms to facilitate dealing safely with strangers and to encourage business risk taking on a large scale. Principle among these mechanisms are insurance, limited-liability corporations and public capital markets. Much of the Arab world remains backward WRT such issues.

Political stability and accountable government are probably prerequisites for further social and economic development in the Arab world. It seems likely, if Iraq becomes democratic and reasonably stable, that its trust-based tribal culture will eventually weaken. However the converse is not necessarily true: absent an appreciation of the incentives underlying Iraq’s traditional tribal culture, attempts to weaken that culture will probably not by themselves improve Iraq’s social or democratic outlook.

Partially, this is the result of the breaking up of extended families in the emigration process. Extended families did no immigrate in mass but often in sub-units down to the level of nuclear family or unmarried individuals. As a result, people were forced to marry outside their families.

Class mobility also played a role. In Europe, extended families tended to belong in on class (indeed classes are really just groups of extended families). Indeed, maintaining a family’s status was a primary driver of close marriages. In America, a person born in poor could find themselves wealthy by the time they married. They could marry a stranger from their new social class. Also, there was less resistance to a poor person “marrying up.”

Our present since of revulsion at the thought of cousin marriages however, is the result of an extensive public education campaign in the late 19th and early 20th century carried out in main by people following eugenicist doctrines. Before then Americans evinced no particular aversion to the practice even if they engaged in it far less than others.

But before that, Americans still managed to transcend tribal loyalty and embrace a patriotism to their nation (or half-nation in one case) much like we do. Were Americans before that movement still less prone to consanguinous marriages than modern-day Arabs?

Before that time cousin-to-cousin marriages where common in America, although probably less common than anywhere else.

While most of what eugenic movement advocated was scientific crap they did occasionally get something right.

The transfer of loyalty from an extended family group to an abstract entity like a nation state is in my opinion THE major cultural element that separates the West from the other cultures of the world.

One advantage that we have in Iraq is that nobody in the past had is that in the contemporary world, democracy is the only alternative accepted by most people. The people of Iraq may have little loyalty outside their extended families but they understand that democratic Iraq will benefit those they care for more than any other likely outcome.