Comments on: Simulation, Training, and Reality

By: Whitehall

Whitehall — Fri, 14 Dec 2012 18:48:14 +0000

Having spent a couple of years perfecting a nuclear power plant simulator for Asia and a decade on the emergency response team at a domestic reactor AND being full time since Fukushima on improvements to nukes based on lessons learned there, I agree.

We can model most hardware phenomena pretty well but the exercise of command and control – and diagnosis – is more difficult.

During the Fukushima event, the prime minister called the control room and started to give orders to the plant manager. He was ignored, thankfully.

Imagine Joe Biden doing the same in the US! He would be hung-up on and our people at the plants know it. The professionals at the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission know that their statutory authority does NOT extend to real-time management of events at a nuclear site. They’ll hang you if you blow it but that’s after the fact, but they won’t give you a direct order.

By: David Foster

David Foster — Fri, 14 Dec 2012 01:21:02 +0000

I meant to also link my post On Trusting Experts–And which Experts to Trust:

http://photoncourier.blogspot.com/2006_06_01_photoncourier_archive.html#115004341046075924

…which is also a story about decision-making in an organizational context.

By: VSSC

VSSC — Thu, 13 Dec 2012 13:00:48 +0000

If you want to understand how decisions are made in modern war, read Bing West’s “The Strongest Tribe”.

Pay particular attention to the role of the Lawyers, ROE and the catch and release policy towards insurgents.

That’s the reality of modern war.

By: IGotBupkis, Legally Defined Cyberbully in All 57 States

IGotBupkis, Legally Defined Cyberbully in All 57 States — Thu, 13 Dec 2012 05:07:23 +0000

}}} Simulation-based training, like classroom-based training, can be of great value, but there are important aspects of decision-making that it cannot readily encapsulate.

Proper simulations can encapsulate the decision-making process. They can’t really encapsulate the full gravitas of error, but they can certainly put one in the position described, and place pressure for a decision. More critically, the decision’s worst-case scenario can become “true”, laying the sense of responsibility at the feet of the decisionmaker, which is a large, if not critically, important part of the whole D Tree.

By: Mike K

Mike K — Thu, 13 Dec 2012 01:56:59 +0000

The Iowa disaster was related to a senior master chief who was a favorite of the captain. Wiki actually does have the story.

In January 1989 Iowa’s Master Chief Fire Controlman, Stephen Skelley, and Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Michael Costigan, persuaded Moosally to allow them to experiment with increasing the range of the main guns using “supercharged” powder bags and specially designed shells. Moosally was led to believe, falsely, that top officials from Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) had authorized the experiments. In fact, John McEachren, a mid-level bureaucrat with NAVSEA, had given the go-ahead to conduct the experiments even though he had no authority to do so. McEachren concealed his approval of the gunnery experiments from his superiors.[12]

Several of the officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of the main gun turret crews believed that Skelley’s and Costigan’s proposed experiments were dangerous, especially because of the age of, and numerous maintenance problems with, the main guns and gun turrets. Meyer complained to Commander Robert John Kissinger, Iowa’s chief weapons officer, about the proposed experiments, but Kissinger refused to convey the concerns to Moosally or halt the experiments.[13]

On 20 January 1989, off Vieques Island, Iowa’s Turret One fired six of the experimental shells using the supercharged powder bags. Skelley claimed that one of the 16 inch shells traveled 23.4 nautical miles (40 km), setting a record for the longest conventional 16 inch (406.4mm) shell ever fired. Although the shells had been fired without serious incident, Meyer and Petty Officer First Class Dale Eugene Mortensen, gun chief for Turret One, told Skelley that they would no longer participate in his experiments. Skelley asked Turret Two’s gun chief, Senior Chief Reggie Ziegler, if he could use Turret Two for his experiments; Ziegler refused. Skelley then asked Lieutenant Phil Buch, Turret Two’s officer in charge, and Buch acquiesced.[

The Iowa is now in Los Angeles harbor in San Pedro and I toured it with my son and grandson. The turret #2 is not open to the public.