Perhaps there’s something in the water in Germany that breeds tactical and grand-tactical/operational genius (and perhaps strategic idiocy too). Mannerheim was a Finn descended from German immigrants. I am also familiar with Lettow-Vorbeck, and he certainly deserves an honorable mention.

Von Lossberg also figures prominently in If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West by Graeme Chamley Wynne,which also came out in 1939. It is analysis of German defensive warfare in World War I, and is very interesting and worth reading.

Another one that is pretty obscure is Von Lettow-Vorbeck who ran the African campaign in WW1, but he accomplished a lot with almost nothing.

Need to consider Yamammoto here… his attack on Pearl Harbor (yes the British attacked Taranto previously) could have really been smashing had the US aircraft carriers been there, and with Midway was a hairs-breadth away from victory (YOU try to win as the Americans with those balances of forces). He did not push for this war, but tried his best to win it.

As far as great leaders, there is Mannerheim of Finland…

“Stalin told a Finnish delegation in Moscow in 1947 that the Finns have a great indebtedness to their old Marshal. Due to him Finland was not occupied.” – this is from Wikipedia, but I have seen it elsewhere.

To not be occupied by the Soviets was the greatest gift a leader could give to his peoples. There is no statue of “the unknown rapist” in Helinski…

And luck. Napoleon legendarily asked “is he lucky?” before promoting a man to be a general. “Luck” in this setting is a way of saying that things seem to go well when this person is in command, and even if you cannot articulate why, if he has been at it long enough to be up for general, in some intangible way, which he may not understand himself, he is making his own luck.

This means that any system must tolerate a certain amount of judgment on the part of the people making promotions, a reliance on their “gut”. If it is just a matter of collecting checked boxes on pre-printed forms, you will not get what you need. Napoleon and George Marshall both exercised ruthless culling of subordinate officers, and very rapid promotion of those who were proving themselves worthy. They both tolerated odd personalities if the person could deliver on the battlefield (Patton, Murat). But they were operating under the stress and at the tempo of major war. How, in peacetime do you identify, cultivate, train, and promote such people? How do you protect them from their own personality flaws, which all talented people have, in peacetime, so that in wartime when their talents can shine, they are available?

All very difficult things to do.

The Prusso-German system seems to have done the best at this. But the old British system, with its purchased commissions, and family connections, and favoritism, still produced some extraordinary commanders. If you looked at it on paper, you would say, this could never work. But it produced Marlborough and Wellington.

Some random thoughts. This is a very good subject.

“This is a very large question. I respectfully suggest that it is too big for this comment thread!”

It is a big question…and I’m working up a post for that. But I’m happy to solicit input in the meantime.

Montgomery’s genius was understanding the limitations of his army. It could not fight in the German style. It had to wage a materialschlacht because it lacked the competence to fight in any other way. So, his approach was to pin the enemy, then pulverize him, then grind forward. All the Allied armies used a variant of this approach. You never got into a fair fight with the Germans, because they would beat you. Ultimately, this method worked.

I request that you start your next post with this question, and a sketch of your own answer, then we shall see what the rest of the crew here comes up with in response.

One theory, which I think is likely, is that FDR was holding Marshall in reserve in case Overlord failed, which everyone believed was possible. In that case, FDR would have cashiered Eisenhower, and sent Marshall to Britain to pick up the pieces and start preparing for a second try. No one else would have had the personal authority after the disaster. Only Marshall could have rebuilt the material and moral foundations of the Allies, from Churchill down to the youngest private.

FDR always had a few cards in reserve, in any situation.

Incidentally, Churchill found him indispensible as well.

Did he move regiments around on a set piece battlefield? No. He formed and directed the most astonishing military force in history, engaged on a global scale, in three dimensions, and deservedly was considered indispensible by the supreme political animal of the 20th century, FDR, who famously said he couldn’t allow Marshall to take command of Overlord because “I can’t sleep when Gen Marshall is out of the country.”

Finally, there is more to leadership than exercising command authority. There is steadfast devotion to duty.

I know of no other national commander in history who would have quietly stood by when the political leader suddenly died in the midst of the conflict, and allowed a minor figure like Harry Truman to assume command of the most powerful military complex in history.

Marshall’s repeated attempts to retire after the end of WW2, and be relieved of the burdens of public life, to me, only enhance his honorable service.

We had Cinncinatus in our midst, and we did not see him for the treasure that he truly was. I would place him with Washington as the most complete example of the truly American military commander, and statesman, in our history.

I’ll make a few comments:

1) Virtually everyone included a large number of “Maneuverist” type generals, meaning they sought to place the enemy in a POSITION of disadvantage, vice using purely superior force protection and firepower. These types seem to win with a smaller emphasis on logistics.

2) There are few non-Maneuverist (Attritionist) generals. These include Bernard Law Montgomery. It is worth noting that these types seem to only win when superior logistics favor them.

With these thoughts in mind, what kinds of institutions do you think are worth having to create the type of general you favor?

Shannon, good point. Three examples come to mind.

Henri Guisan. He led the Swiss Army during World War II. The Germans never invaded, despite numerous threats and scares. Deterrance held, in large part because the Swiss were ready to fight. A huge achievement, too little known.

Curtis LeMay. By making SAC into a supremely efficient and disciplined organization, he made deterrance totally credible during the worst years of the Cold War. The Soviets could never doubt for a second that SAC could and would turn them into smoldering, irradiated rubble if they ever crossed the line scratched in the sand. Peace was his profession.

Francisco Franco. He placated the Germans while they were winning, but did not get sucked into the war. Then he let himself be coopted by the Allies. All the while, he kept both sides at bay and prevented his country from getting invaded. In fact, Spain managed to make money on the war.

There must be other examples, not including the ones we will never know about … .

How about Timur?

Additional possibilities for runner-up or honorable mention: Bolivar, Shaka, Zizka.

Sun Tzu and Reagan?

Everybody wants to grow up to be a fireman, no one wants to grow up to be a fire safety inspector.

Perhaps it might be a good exercise to try to think of military leaders who won without actually fighting. I suppose most of those would be actual military leaders. For example, John Von Neuman invented the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) that prevented nuclear war. George Kennan created the doctrine of containment.

and I also throw in for Zhukov, starting with his tank victories over the Japanese to his direction over the greatest land front in history (until the next big Asian conflagration).

As for an American general, I am partial to Grant.