I think you overstate the case. Why pick on Germany since there was plenty of “strategic insanity” to go around? Had Germany had a stable political system, had the German middle class been prepared to take power from the Junkers over the course of the 1870s to 1910, had the Pan-German movement not had as much political influcence as it did, had Germany not built a High Seas Fleet, or made a series of diplomatic blunders prior to 1914, that would have only removed one set of causes of the First World War. We would still have to deal with those associated with Russia, Austria and France, not to mention Britain which usually comes out of this line up looking pretty sound, that is in comparison.

We would have to consider what exactly was the political purpose behind Britain’s policy of conquest in the Middle East under Allenby in Palestine and Syria, (not to mention Iraq which came under the command of the “Indian Army”) – a series of moves the consequences of which we are still dealing with today.

I think the tendency is to look at the Great War not in terms of what happened prior to 1914, or during the conflict, but rather in terms of what happened after 1918. . .

There was no good military solution to Germany’s problem of being “surrounded”.

Building the High Seas Fleet was an act of absolute madness. Germany was facing a hostile France and a hostile Russia — this last also their own fault, since they let their treaty with Russia lapse. Yet there was a solution. Create an entente, or even an alliance with their enemies’ enemy: Britain. Britain was afraid of Russian encroachment in central Asia and Persia, and of France in Africa and in Southeast Asia. Britain was facing a rising USA and Japan. Britain wanted a diplomatic resolution in Europe. This opportunity was squandered by outrageous stupidity and half-witted social-Darwinian thinking. Germany could have become an economic colossus in alliance with Britain. It chose instead to make enemies out of everyone. That is what you get when you have a hereditary monarchy with actual rather than ceremonial power, amongst other major deficiencies.

By the time the Summer of 1914 rolled around, it would have taken a miracle to get Germany’s head out of the noose. Yet, even then, if the military actions had been accompanied by hard terms, but terms commensurate with Germany’s military successes, it probably could have pulled off a bloody but limited war for limited gains and called it a “victory”. In particular, if it had stood on the defensive with its gains in France, and hammered Russia to death, it might have been able to gain major annexations in the East, and get the status quo ante bellum in the West.

But, no.

Clausewitz surely looked down on the pitiful scene, with Bismarck and the Elder von Moltke and sadly concluded that their successors had forgotten all the most important things about waging war: That it is not an end in itself, that it can gain nothing of value out of its own course and its own logic, that it must have an achievable aim, that if conditions change, then aims must change so that a resolution can be achieved.

The Germans displayed something like genius from time to time on the tactical level, something like competence on the operational level, mediocrity to stupidity on the strategic level, and outright stupidity at the highest levels of decision-making.

The penalty for stupidity is often death in the real, hard world.

In retrospect a defensive strategy in the West and limited movements in the East, attempting to come to terms with first Russia, and then France, probably would have been Germany’s best strategy, the military playing a secondary role to diplomacy, this in line with Clausewitz since the simultaneous defeat of France, Britain, Russia and a host of other states was beyond Germany’s military capabilities, that is was not a rational military aim (as recognized by Falkenhayn). Unfortunately strategic theory influencing policy did not fit the nature of the times (does it ever?). All major belligerents (with the exception of Britain) started the war on the offensive, since the quest for decisive victory was universal. Falkenhayn never had much of a chance of changing Germany’s war strategy in mid-stream although he tried. As to the responsibility of the politicians, Moltke had refused the Kaiser’s order to stop the Western offensive as “impossible” in 1914 and Ludendorff was essentially the military dictator of Germany by 1917 . . .

As I mentioned the Balkans strategy is not mine, but rather Alexander Svechin’s who served as a Russian General Staff officer in the Great War and wrote perhaps the best art of war of the 20th Century, that of course seen from the perspective of the general theory.

Obviously enough.

Falkenhayn’s failure was deeper than you suggest. He should not have attacked in the West at all. No matter what his supposed strategy was, the reality was going to attritional warfare at enormous cost. The Germans were holding a big and valuable chunk of France. They should have stood on the offensive in France and driven Russia out of the war in 1916. That may have opened up the prospect of a negotiated peace. I do not think the Balkan alternative you propose was workable. the Balkans, which were known as the Near East, and had been part of the Ottoman Empire only a few years before, were a dirt-poor area with bad or nonexistent road and rail and river transport. If “Belgium is freedom”, then “the Balkans are a prison cell.” The Germans could have gotten in there from the North and blocked up the few avenues out, just as the (less skillful, less well-equipped) Turks blocked up the landings on the Dardennelles.

It was not up to the generals to see “the whole”, it was up to the politicians to do that. The generals fought the war they were given. Even then, the Generals, particularly the British Generals, fought with the “whole” in mind more often than they are given credit for. For example the otherwise unaccountable persistence in the Ypres offensive, is usually dismissed as boneheaded butchery. But it only looks that way if it is looked at in isolation. The explanation lies in the French Army mutinies and the Revolution in Russia and the brewing disorder there, and with even the Italians being broken like sticks. Haig is looking at his all of his allies crumbling to nothing, and the Americans nowhere to be seen yet. The war is on the verge of being lost. All he can do is draw off the Germans by attacking. So he did. I see no other way of looking at it. Could it have been handled better? From the comfort of my chair 92 years later it is easy to say so. Still, Haig knew how much his army could stand. Only his never broke. The French, Russians and Germans all broke. Clausewitz tells us that the successful General must be hard enough to demand inhuman hardship, depriviation, suffering, wounds and death from his men. Haig did that, and ultimately his army took the offensive and won the war.

“I do not agree. The commanders in World War I in the West (not so much in the East) were confronted with a set of problems — strategic, tactical and technical — were virtually insoluble.”

I think this was precisely the problem from a strategic theory perspective, that is they were focused on tactics and not on strategy. Since the strategic problems seemed overwhelming (and brought up very difficult political questions best avoided) they focused on tactics, and we know the rest of the story.

Both sides saw a complete military victory as the military aim, providing the situation where the victors could dictate peace to the vanquished. However neither side had or could achieve operational mobility which would have allowed for the type of decisive victory necessary for a strategy of destruction (we would only see this much later, in 1939). Instead a strategy of attrition would have been necessary, and this strategy would have dictated a quite different approach. I can provide two examples of this:

First, Erich von Falkenhayn in 1915-6 wished to go over to a strategy of attrition knowing that Germany could not win a war based on a strategy of destruction. Successfully ending to war on good terms for Germany required a political settlement with one side or the other. Verdun was meant to be a battle on these terms with the intention of wearing down the French with the purpose of making them more amendable to a separate peace. The intention was not to break through and capture Verdun, but rather capture the heights around the city and force the French to defend it at an unacceptable cost, breaking their moral will to continue the fight. The problem was that rain delayed the initial offensive robbing the Germans of operational surprise and allowed the French to reinforce. More importantly, the German field commanders could not break with the old strategy of destruction, breaking through and capturing the city in a massive victory. Falkenhayn recognized the right strategy, but was unable to implement it and left his position as Chief of the General Staff in disgrace, to the disaster of Germany. Robert Foley describes this very well in his book, “German Strategy and the Path to Verdun”.

Second, from this perspective the best option for the Allies would have been a Balkan strategy in 1915 rather than conducting a series of fruitless “local battles” on the Western Front. Local battles is a term for engagements in which the tactical considerations are played out as not part of a broader operational plan or strategy, but rather simply devolving into contests of mutual material destruction.

Had the French and British landed significant forces in Greece and pushed north into Bulgaria they could have turned Bulgaria into an ally, brought Romania into the war a year earlier, isolated Turkey and threatened Austria-Hungary and kept Serbia in the war. The route to defeating Germany was not through the Western Front, but via the Balkans and to Vienna, knocking Austria out of the war in 1916 would have made Germany’s position untenable. This is btw Svechin’s argument.

I didn’t refer to them as “donkeys”, rather just well-intentioned men of their epoch who could not consider “the whole” which seems far from a unique situation.

“The decline of strategic thought after Clausewitz was not inevitable but was conditioned by social and political conditions.”

I do not agree. The commanders in World War I in the West (not so much in the East) were confronted with a set of problems — strategic, tactical and technical — were virtually insoluble. The confrontation took on the character of a gigantic linear battle with no flanks, with overwhelming firepower and the attacker at a historical low in terms of his power to penetrate the enemy line and exploit an penetration.

However, both sides were aware of the challenge, and tried to innovate. The Germans tried to modify their artillery tactics and tried to use the so-called Hutier tactics, to effect penetrations. The British tried to use tanks, as well as tactical changes in the equipping and use of infantry, as well as refinements in the use of artillery. By the end, the Western Front had entered the final “pursuit” phase, with the 100 days campaign.

I do not see anything which makes me think the problem was intellectual deficiency on the part of the commanders. Haig and his subordinates were not donkeys.

The situation was tragic in the strict sense. There was no way to overcome the circumstances of the Western Front without trial and error, and developing tactics and equipment which could not be conceived of until the demands of the war made the particular needs apparent.