Yes, it would be interesting if this threat of political disaster was never removed. What if the army came home to a political situation in which neither side, of the political system inside Greece, could even raise an army? What would happen if, the condition at home was so bad that the people of the army, under Xenophon, couldn’t find a job or worse, sold into slavery, as, if I remember correctly, many were made slaves any way?

I guess the real question would be: would they install Xenophon as king, or switch sides? They had quite a reputation in Persia; maybe the Persians would join them as they sacked Greece.

Xenophon attempts to describe the art of generalship (or of the popular ruler of a political/military community) as he sees it. The actions of the Strategos (army commander) is of course where we get the term “strategy”. Xenophon is most successful where the relationship between political purpose (basically survival of the political community in this instance), military strategy and tactics all are very closely bound together, where a tactical mistake can lead to political annihilation, that is tactical effect leading to strategic and political effect in short order. Xenophon starts having more difficulties when the threat of political disaster is removed, when the threat is not so well perceived and the politics become much more murky, the connections between political purpose and military means become unclear, as in intra-Greek politicial dynamics. In this regard we see a very clear connection with Clausewitz.

I would add that Xenophon’s handling of intelligence is also Clausewitzian in certain respects, as in the distrust of intelligence information and the reliance on intelligence analysis/product (if we can consider his libations to the gods as his version of the intelligence cycle) . . .

Well said!

Gracias! I think that is a good plan. That kind of literature was once considered foundational, now it is read primarily by adults (!)

Hi Dr. Weevil,

Excellent question.

I’ve read On War and I have not read the The Cavalry Commander. From quickly looking at the link that you provided, it does seem to be oriented toward “practical” advice. CvC was not attempting to offer formulas or basic field instruction for junior officers or some kind of handbook.

Clauswitz was trying to explain the nature of war. I am doubtful that it would have ever occurred to Xenophon to frame his thinking in the fashion of Clausewitz, even with the experience of the Pelopponesian War behind him. Clausewitz was applying a kind of exacting mental rigor to his examination of war that was, in part, a product of familiarity with the scientific revolution. The Greeks were exceptionally curious and creative but outside of mathematics they were more speculative and frankly, tolerant of sophistry than moderns. At the more abstract, Xenophon probably would have thought in terms of “waging war noblely” but that’s not what Clausewitz was contemplating.

Interested in hearing what the other Clausewitz RT participants who were in the Xenophon RT have to say on this score. Seydlitz89 has a deep knowledge of CvC, maybe he will weigh in on your question. Lex, HG99 what do you two think ?

F*** me. Most of my life’s been an uphill climb already. Enough! All I need now some genuine success.

ummm….my previous comment should have read “….I strongly agree with you about Ambler”. Not implying HG99 is Wayne Ambler :)

You are welcome Jose! Glad you enjoyed the RT

“One can find lessons on leadership, human nature, psychology and always and above all, politics in Xenophon’s march upcountry.”

A fitting close, that explains the true measure of this work. One hopes that we have stimulated some to take the time to go up country inside the pages of Dr. Ambler’s translation. I guarantee they will not be disappointed.