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…at the cellular level.

Boyd was ahead of his time.

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Looking at my own intellectual journey, I find that creativity usually comes in short bursts that punctuate long periods of reading, reflection, and hard work. About two weeks ago the National Security Blogosphere saw a great burst of creativity by the mind of Zenpundit. In this post (read every word!), Zenpundit identified several issues that the last couple of years of operations in Iraq have brought to the fore:

• The importance of policy and doctrine to be meme-ified. This means that all levels of international relations, ranging from high-level grand strategy to the infantry tactics that make COIN operations successful, must be transmittable and digestable by the various power-brokering actors of the global stage. I refer to this as the Meme-ification of Policy.
• The tactical and operational art of COIN are without strategic foundation.

The first issue–the Meme-ification of Policy–has been an issue only since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Prior to the early 1990s and going back to the beginning of the Cold War, the general meme of national security policy, and of grand strategy, was packaged in a single, transmittable word: Containment. The concept of Containment allowed for the transmittal of that grand strategy quickly among elites, who were then able to translate the general concept of Containment into the equivalent of Operational and Tactical decisions in a vast array of disciplines. An American Army general in his headquarters south of the Korean DMZ would be able to translate Containment into military decisions. A diplomat in Moscow, or Beijing, or Ankara, with an understanding Containment, would be able to translate that grand-strategic policy into diplomatic decisions at whatever level the diplomat is working, according to the locality he is operating in. Simply put, these grand-strategic memes allow the “Think Global, Act Local” to operate in the national security realm, from the level of policy and grand strategy, through the levels of strategy, operational art, and tactics.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, American grand strategy has defied meme. Various concepts–globalization, black swans, Y2K, COIN, etc., have managed to spread among elites, but there has been very little coherence among these concepts.

The second issue–that tactical and operational levels of COIN lack a strategic foundation–is even more important. In his post, Zenpundit encapsulated a “Kilcullen Doctrine” with bullets, which may serve as current boilerplate counterinsurgency dogma:

• First, planners should select the lightest, most indirect and least intrusive form of intervention that will achieve the necessary effect.
• Second, policy-makers should work by, with, and through partnerships with local government administrators, civil society leaders, and local security forces whenever possible.
• Third, whenever possible, civilian agencies are preferable to military intervention forces, local nationals to international forces, and long-term, low-profile engagement to short-term, high-profile intervention.

The ideas behind this “Kilcullen Doctrine” are, on the face, unremarkable. One might quibble with ideas here and there–for example, that perhaps large numbers of infantry working intrusively in a foreign society might be preferable to “lighter, less intrusive” methods. Or perhaps that this doctrine gives short shrift to the utility of Direct Action missions against terrorist kingpins. Reasonable and well-respected experts may disagree on these points. But the most damning critique of this Kilcullen Doctrine is levied by Zenpundit himself:

“…Kilcullen’s three principles are an operational and not a genuinely strategic doctrine. In fairness, no major COIN advocate has ever said otherwise and have often emphasized the point. The problem is that a lot of their intended audience – key civilian decision makers and opinion shapers in their 30s-50s often do not understand the difference, except for a minority who have learned from bitter experience. Most of those who have, the Kissingers, Brzezinskis, Shultzes etc. are elder statesmen on the far periphery of policy.”

In fairness to others, Zenpundit hasn’t been the only one making this point. Andrew Exum, of abu muqawama, has been making this point for some time now. In any case, Zen and Ex are right. COIN doctrine is applicable only to the tactical and operational levels of war. As of yet, nobody has created a strategy, let alone a grand strategy, that is capable of being executed and understood up and down the levels of international relations. COIN tactics remain without strategic foundation.

This critique doesn’t only apply to the Kilcullen Doctrine. Such critiques have been very forcefully levied by David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum themselves against the tactic of using unmanned robotic drone aircraft to attack key leaders in the Pakistani Taliban. They argue, essentially, that such attacks are the substitution of technology for strategy, and that such a substitution will ultimately do more harm than good to American interests. Read: Blowback. (It’s good to know that Kilcullen seems to be aware of the problem of a lack of strategy and grand strategy.)

The Kilcullen Doctrine and the Drone Attacks both are cases of Tactics Without Strategy. Some are now looking to Thomas P.M. Barnett to supply the necessary grand strategy to complement the Tactics. Indeed, that is the implicit argument of Tom’s first book on Grand Strategy, The Pentagon’s New Map. The second book, Blueprint For Action, is essentially an amplification of various points and implication of PNM. Barnett’s third book, Great Powers attempts to provide a basis for Barnett’s grand strategy by using certain narratives of American history. (Here I must confess to have only read the first two books of Barnett’s trilogy. GP remains in my anti-library.)

In PNM, Barnett very slickly attempted to build a possible grand strategy for post-Cold War America. The starting point was a political map of the world, with points plotted for the several military operations undertaken since the Cold War had ended (PDF). The points were then connected, thereby outlining two regions of the world: The Functioning Core and the Non-Integrating Gap. Barnett believes the Gap to be the source of instability of the world, and consequently American grand strategy ought to be focused on integrating the Gap into the Functioning Core–the areas of the world that Barnett believes to be globalizing, trading, integrating, growing economically, and stabilizing populations.

Barnett's Core-Gap Globe

Let us go back to Barnett’s starting point: the plotting of American military operations from 1990-2003. Does anybody not see a problem with this starting point? I certainly do, on several bases:

• The plotted military operations were drawn from the time period from the fall of the Soviet Empire through the date of publication of PNM (1990-2003, specifically). This was the precise period when America was lacking a grand strategy to govern whether a given military operation should occur. Instead, operations seemed to be undertaken on an ad hoc basis. Such a basis cannot reasonably be used to discern a grand strategy. There was certainly more to determining whether a given operation would occur than the occurance of something undesirable in the Gap. How else to explain Core action in the 1991 Gulf War, and Core inaction during the Rwandan genocide?
• In taking tactical and operational military cases, and then using those cases to discern a grand strategy, Barnett put the tactical cart before the strategic horse. Policy should drive Grand Strategy, which should drive Strategy, which should drive Operational Art and Tactics. Barnett instead uses Tactics to drive Grand Strategy. This is the most grievous and most fundamental error he makes.

The effects of that fundamental error are many: they force the grand strategist to steer by the wake of the ship, rather than by steer from cues in the grand strategic environment, knowledge of himself as a global power, and knowledge of actual interests. They also cause the grand strategist to assume that the types of operations that America ought to prepare for in the future are more of what happened in the 1990s. Even more important, those tactical and operational COIN aficionados who look to Barnett to supply the strategic and grand-strategic foundations for their operations should realize that whatever basis Barnett supplies is only a tautology: COIN tacticians look to Barnett to supply a strategic foundation. The foundation of Barnett’s grand strategy are tactical operations. Tactical COIN and Barnett’s Grand Strategy combine to make a self-licking ice cream cone!

Barnett would probably reply to my critique using a well-worn, and well-understood line of argument he often uses with military professionals: Military thinkers need to learn to see war in terms of everything else, as opposed to seeing everything else in terms of war. As a Clausewitzian who believes that war ought never be an end by itself, I heartily agree. Grand Strategy exists to serve policy. That is precisely why I see the Pentagon’s New Map as a poor basis for a grand strategy.

Furthermore, Barnett has remarked numerous times on his blog how various non-military world maps resemble the Pentagon’s New Map. Though such maps cannot be discounted on the basis of putting the tactical cart before the strategic horse, but they can be easily discounted on the basis that they force the grand strategist to steer by the wake of the ship. Such maps are more in the realm of gimmickry, not grand strategy.

Now, before I go further, let me state that I like Barnett, personally. He is highly engaging and very persuasive. He adores the Green Bay Packers, as I do! And strategically speaking, there is still a lot to Barnett. He is one of the few grand strategists to have a good understanding of the intersection between economics and other forms of power. And if you embrace his (flawed) assumptions, his grand strategy seems to make a good deal of sense.

But where Barnett deserves the most credit in the area of meme-ification of his grand strategy. Zenpundit alludes to this:

“Dr. Barnett’s public example of intellectual proselytizing and briefing to normal people outside of the beltway is even more important.”

And Zenpundit is absolutely correct. Barnett has managed to create an (albeit flawed) grand strategy that is easily digestable. It has its own easily-understood logic, its own glossary of terms, and as Boyd would put it, its own (flawed) Orientation (PPT). That Orientation is capable of being transmitted from person to person, is highly persuasive, and provides the capability for “Think Global, Act Local” action by myriad sorts of actors: diplomats, military officers, financial wizards, corporate tycoons, media personalities, private citizens, etc. Barnett deserves the highest praise for this! Indeed, it is very difficult to critique Barnett without resorting to using the very lexicon he created!

So, where does this leave us?

We are left where we began:

• We need a new grand strategy–one that doesn’t rely on past tactical actions for its basis.
• We need to adopt Barnett’s method of proselytizing. His translation of (flawed) grand strategy into a meme that is capable of viral transmittal to elites of all power-brokering disciplines must be emulated.

I will address a possible new basis for grand strategy in future posts.

Semper Fidelis.

Cross-posted at Smitten Eagle.

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I have written before on the nature of my personal reading program. Since I published that post I have received email and blog comments (both at my personal blog, and at Chicago Boyz) from various people requesting a copy of my reading list.

I have, until now, failed to produce the copy for electronic dissemination. That was partly because of the nature of my list–specifically, it’s a constant work-in-progress. My reading list is actually a compilation of several reading programs, starting with the various US armed forces reading programs. It also includes the reading lists of various military experts and officers, the reading lists of various institutions of learning, and even a few noteworthy reading lists from the blogosphere. This list is lengthy…over 4900 books, articles, films, monographs, and other media, and it’s compilation has taken place over the last six years.

This list was, and continues to be a massive effort on my part, but this effort is worth the trouble. In constructing this list I am able to see with great breadth the nature of writing within my profession. With understanding of the breadth of the scholarship of my profession, I am able to more easily study in depth a given subject area, as well as study tangential subject areas.

I have not really left any subject area out of this list. This program is obviously dominated by works directly related to armed conflict, since that is my profession. But works of broader history, as well as sociology, political science, economics, psychology, business management, philosophy, biography, literature, the hard sciences, and foreign area studies all have their places within this list.

Here are a few meta-notes on the list. It is a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The first two columns are the title and author (if any) of the work. The next column (green) specifies the media used. The next three (yellow) columns contain any pertinant notes relating to the work. The next column (cyan) contains any related internet URLs. The next two columns (blue) allow the user to annotate whether the work has been purchased or downloaded, and whether the work has been read. The next column (gray) specifies the number of occurances that particular work has in the reading lists.

The remaining columns contain the individual lists that are compiled into my reading list.

Since the list is stored in an Excel file, the list may be easily sorted by author, title, etc.

SE’s Reading List can be downloaded from this page.

Cross-posted at Antilibrary, Chicago Boyz, and Smitten Eagle.

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There are three types of Republicans in the world:

1) Northeastern. These are the Rockefeller Republicans. They tend to be internationalists and fiscally conservative. This movement is all but dead. They were compelled to leave the party by the much more socially conservative Southern Republicans. George H.W. Bush was a NE Republican.

2) Southern. These are the social conservatives. They tend to support a strong national defense. Fiscal discipline is only a talking point.  This movement is still alive, but was repudiated both in the congressional elections in 2006, as well as the general elections of 2008. George W. Bush was a Southern Republican.

3) Western. The Western Republican is the Republican of libertarian leanings, generally favoring non-intrusive government in terms of social issues, and also favoring fiscal discipline. They tend to oppose nationalization of anything. They often, but not always, favor a strong national defense. Reagan was a western republican. This is the future of the Republican party, because the Western Republican can capitalize on the whims of the Independent Voter, who is usually fiscally conservative, libertarian socially, and for a strong national defense.

The Northeastern Republican was the type of Republican your grandfather was.  The Southern Republican was just beat up in a brawl yesterday and is on life support.

The Western Republican is the Republican of the future.  When the Obama-Reid-Pelosi troika overplay their hand in the next 2-4 years, conservatives and conservate-leaning libertarians will strike, and will reestablish a mandate to govern.

Crossposted at Smitten Eagle.

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(I wrote this post for my personal blog, but Lexington Green requested that it be crossposted here. Here it is, in full, with update. There is a discussion already going at personal blog, so check it out there, too.)

I have written on the nature of Professionalism. An element to true Professionalism is the maintenance of a course of independent, continual study. Here I will speak to my personal reading program, which is a core part of my Professional military education.

I started, naturally, with the Marine Reading Program when I was a Marine-Option Midshipman in Naval ROTC. The books on the Marine list were generally pretty good, and I learned a great deal. There were some books that probably didn’t belong on the Marine Reading List, like Rifleman Dodd (by C.S. Forester). At the time the Marine Reading Program was rank-based, meaning that your mandated reading list was determined by your rank. Rifleman Dodd was a book for newer Marines (like me), but frankly, I can’t understand why that book was on the list. It was a boring, slow book about a British Private soldier stranded in Spain fighting a Continental Army allied with Napoleon. The book was included in the list presumably because it was a ham-fisted way to imbue on young Marines the tendency to never give up in dire circumstances. The book is probably good for this, as I very nearly gave up reading the book several times, but persevered. Had I had the attention span of a video-game addict, I probably would have failed in reading the book. (As an aside, Rifleman Dodd is probably better for young officers, as it did show how to fight a conventional army as an insurgent, a concept that might be useful one day.)

After a couple of years of dutifully reading books on the Marine List, I found that my curiosity in military subjects started to move beyond the confines of the Marine List. I found the Army’s reading list, and other lists, and began to read from them. After commissioning as a Second Lieutenant of Marines, initial Marine Corps schooling, and leading my first platoon in a garrison setting, I deployed to Afghanistan in 2004. Deployments can have long stretches of boredom and down-time, during which I read a number of books. After months of muddling through with no real reading strategy I resolved to give form to the conglomeration of reading lists, and actually build a reading program suitable to my needs.

I decided I needed my own list, and it had to have these features:

• It had to integrate the existing military reading lists into a single document.
• It had to cover more than just military-related subjects, although military subjects would predominate.
• The list would have to provide a means to a continuing liberal education.
• There would be no limit on the types of media on the list: Books, movies, monographs, poetry, could all make it onto the list.

I then assembled as many military reading lists as I could and collated them into a single document. The Marines, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard all maintain reading programs, along with most of the career- and intermediate-level military schools (Army Command & Staff College, Naval War College, etc.) Microsoft Excel wound up being my (very crude) database. Some of the lists allowed for simple reformatting, followed by cutting and pasting the entries into the database. Some lists required hand entry, which was tedious. Tedium was a cost I was willing to pay, because I wanted a high-quality list that would help me guide my reading decisions. The result was an Excel database of the universe of military reading as seen from an early 21st century American.

The database is still incomplete, as I found that entering footnoted books and bibliographies was also worthwhile. As it currently stands, it has some 5000 entries, each of which I intend to read. This may seem like too many books for a single man to read, but I am heartened that Marine leaders like Gen. Mattis maintain libraries of thousands of volumes (scroll down through half of the AFJ article for a profile of Mattis).

I will leave you with some general guidelines on how I execute my personal reading program:

• Reading requires discipline. It requires using every possible day to read. Occasionally operations, exercises, training get in the way of such reading–that is life, but it’s not an excuse. Make time to read.
• Though reading does require discipline, if a book is beyond your level of understanding, there is no shame in putting that volume down and selecting another work. If a book only brings you difficulty, perhaps now is not the time to read it, and you should consider picking up that book once your mind a bit more leavened. The books you read should reinforce your discipline, and your discipline should reinforce your reading.
• Reading pays dividends. Reading a single book or a few books pays a small dividend, but the knowledge gained by a disciplined approach to reading makes you incredibly rich, not only in knowledge, but also in Professional reputation. You become someone who is “well-read.” People seek you out for knowledge. Apprentices see you as a leader because you have the discipline to train your mind. Enlisted men speak behind your back about how you’re one of the “smart officers.” You become able to converse with superiors.
• Buying books today is expensive, but it need not be. Nonetheless there are great deals out there. Check out the “Bargain” areas of your local chain bookstore. You’ll often find decent books there for 50-70% below the list price. Also, online used-book retailers like Alibris and Abebooks provide similar savings on used books in good condition. Libraries that are looking to reduce their inventory are also sources for inexpensive books.
• When you see a good book, buy it, even if you don’t intend to read it for some time. This is a good way to quickly build a library, and it gives you options later. Having books available on your bookshelf makes deciding what to read much easier.
• Don’t limit yourself to a single genre or media. Some of the best works relating to war and peace are fiction, or poetry. These works can speak to the warrior’s soul as much as reading about the woes of the entrenched Stormtroopers of the 1918 Summer Offensive.
• Read broadly. My military education so far has included general history, biographies, economics, philosophy, The Classics, political science, sociology, religion, and physics, in addition to military history and theory. The world is amazingly complicated, and neglecting the broad, liberal foundation on which military art and science rest is foolish.
• Don’t limit yourself to a single reading list. Each service maintains a reading list, and some are better than others. Likewise, some commands, blogs, schools, and even congressmen maintain reading lists. Use them, too.
• Make it a habit to carry a book with you wherever you go. It is amazing how much decent reading time is available when in waiting rooms, standing in lines, during field exercises, and on lunchbreaks.
• Don’t loan out your books. You will never get them back.
• Buy your books, don’t borrow them. This is the only way to build a library, and it allows you to take notes in the margins of the books.
• Don’t take flak from your peers and superiors on your reading habits. If they are dumb enough to use anti-intellectualism as a weapon, their professional ethic is suspect.
• Have fun. Your Profession should give you pride. Pride comes from discipline. Discipline manifests itself in many ways, including your study habits.

ZenPundit and others have written about their Anti-Libraries (the books they own but have not yet read). I will do the same. I will also publish a list of books I own and have read.

Feel free to comment your your reading habits.

Update: Upon reflecting on my bullet list of reading program guidelines, I recognize that I neglected a couple points:

• Read deeply. When you read on a subject, read multiple works concerning the same topic. This works especially well with biographies and memoirs. Interested in Erwin Rommel? Read Knight’s Cross, by Fraser, which is probably the best biography about the man. In your reading, you find that Rommel was a maneuverist of the highest caliber. Is that because of his infantry training? Personal study habits? Or were German officers all exceptional maneuverists? You might find answers in Panzer Battles, by von Mellenthin, who was a less-known but equally successful Wehrmacht general. Other pairs of biographies worth reading together are: 1) It Doesn’t Take a Hero, by Schwarzkopf & Petre, and Into the Storm, by GEN Fred (not Tommy) Franks & Clancy, and 2) Boyd, by Coram, and The Mind of War, by Hammond.
• As I said earlier, books are expensive, but they need not be. This is true, however, some books and monographs are expensive because they are out-of-print classics, and are worth reading. Sometimes you have to bite the bullet and spend $90 for a 300-page volume, because it’s worth it. And some works are in print, and expensive, and worth the money. An example is the 31-page monograph by Edward Tufte called The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint ($7, about 23 cents/page). My only advice for these is: caveat emptor. Know what you’re about to buy! (The PowerPoint monograph is first-rate, by the way).

I will add more points as I think of them.

Update II: Crossposted at Smitten Eagle.

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Col Mike Wyly, of the Marines, has written a piece in Armed Forces Journal on the nature of Professionalism, using Boyd as the exemplar of the subject. The article is completely correct, and is worthy of reading by all military men.

One of my pet peeves regarding “Professionalism” is the supreme misunderstanding of what the term implies. On the eve of my first deployment in 2004, my detachment Officer-in-Charge, a Major, took the 43-Marine detachment aside and told us his expectations, which he said could be summarized on two words: “Be Professional.” Unstated were what his ideas of what professionalism entailed. To him, Professionalism meant keeping the appearance of a Marine, combined with a touch of CYA: Keep hair short, uniforms serviceable, be tactful, and do what you need to do to keep the detachment out of trouble.

This conception of Professionalism is wrong.

Professionalism is not something you admonish your detachment to BE on the eve of a deployment. Professionalism is something you DO. It is Professing a solemn vow to keep fidelity to the ideals of the occupation. Professing implies:

• Continual study
• Gaining and maintaining the respect of your peers
• Policing your peers, and working to fix their shortcomings
• Developing the next generation of practitioners of the profession
• Holding superiors accountable
• Upholding the Oaths and ethics of the profession
• Ensuring a favorable view of the profession by the public

Professionalism does not have anything to do with haircuts, boot polishing, or even tact. Externalities, like personal appearance do matter, but only to the extent that it promotes or impedes your abilities as a Professional. For example, poor field hygiene can imperil the health of a unit, and therefore impede its combat effectiveness. This is contrary to military discipline, and is therefore not Professional. Personal appearance may enhance the elan of a combat unit, and therefore it could be a benefit to promote the appearance of your troops. However, personal appearance is not, in and of itself, the mark of a Professional.

It may be unpopular for today’s officer to say so, but I question the ability of many Second Lieutenants, Privates, and Lance Corporals to actually be “Professional.” This is not bad, as they are but juniors to the craft of war, and many of them will not measure up to the standards that Professionalism implies. Yet the Major’s admonishing to be professional fell on deaf ears, as most of the troops had no concept, or perhaps a mistaken concept, of what Professionalism is. Second Lieutenants and Lance Corporals ought to be treated as apprentices: willing, but unable, to keep the vows of the professional. With time, mentorship, and leadership, they may realize the extent of their responsibilities and will therefore undertake the duties required by their self-Professing of their vows.

Professionalism is deeper than appearance. It is the stuff of habit and deed. Its impetus is personal, and internally-driven.

The professionalism of the officers and NCOs, and Staff NCOs of the military is crucial to the safety of the Republic and the Constitution. Through our study, ethics, and the respect of our peers, we work to uphold the safety and honor of the Constitution in the domains of war and peace. Our craft as military professionals may bring untold pain to the Republic should we fail in our obligations.

Crossposted at Smitten Eagle.

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Thomas PM Barnett:

“Bottom line: mature democracies trust populists more, while authoritarian states like fellow rightists.”

I like Barnett, and many of his ideas.  However, quotes like this that make me think that he belongs in a cloistered think tank deep in the beltway, where his thoughts would probably have less impact than they currently do.

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What is sustainability? It seems to be a term that has been loaded with additional baggage since the Progressives have reappropriated the term for their own use. It seems to be a word used to describe the longevity of a given system, usually in an ecological context. Yet, as with many ideological terms of the left, it manages to translate itself into virtually every facet of human life. For example, sustainability encompasses what kind of house you live in, the food you eat, the types of vacations you go on, the politicians you elect, your choice to have children (or not), the types of investments you make, and many other aspects. But what is sustainability with regard to politics? (I am not speaking of sustainability policy–I’m speaking of the longevity associated with political constituencies.)

Victor Hanson wrote at his Works and Days blog about the sustainability of San Fransisco–no, not the ecological sustainability, but rather the sustainability of the (strongly-Democratic) human population:

I spent some time speaking in San Francisco recently… There are smartly dressed yuppies, wealthy gays, and chic business people everywhere downtown, along with affluent tourists, all juxtaposed with hordes of street people and a legion of young service workers at Starbucks, restaurants, etc. What is missing are school children, middle class couples with strollers, and any sense the city has a vibrant foundation of working-class, successful families of all races and backgrounds. For all its veneer of liberalism, it seems a static city of winners and losers, victory defined perhaps by getting into a spruced up Victorian versus renting in a bad district, getting paid a lot to manage something, versus very little to serve something. All in all, I got a strange creepy feeling that whatever was going on, it was unsustainable–sort of like an encapsulated Europe within an American city. The city seems to exist on tourism, and people who daily come into the city to provide a service, get paid–and leave….
 
I remember SF in the late 1950s and early 1960s as a kid visiting with his parents. A much different place altogether of affordable homes, vibrant docks, lots of construction—and children everywhere.

This is the future of the Democratic Party: “smartly dressed yuppies, wealthy gays, chic business people.” Child rearing is generally not high on the list of priorities of such people, and consequently the future looks bleak for that demographic. Even the babbling Paul Begala caricatured the Obama coalition as “eggheads and African-Americans,” and lamented that the Democratic Party is losing touch with its working-class, child rearing base (who often “cling” to religion and guns.”)

The Republican Party, as well as most conservatives, are not viewed as in support of sustainability, at least as far as the left has defined the term. Yet Republicans have dominated in so-called Jesusland, where incomes are a bit lower, and the people work in manufacturing, farming, the military, and extractive industries, and most importantly, families are a bit larger.

As the old cliche goes, the future belongs to our children. And conservatives have more of them. Indeed, if you look at this table, you can see that the Blue States tend toward the bottom of the list in terms of birth rate, with California being the lone exception. Red States dominate with higher birth rates.

Perhaps we ought to redefine what sustainability is. It ought not mean organic soy milk, fair-trade coffee, the Toyota Prius, or voting for Obama along with the rest of your sorority. It should be more radical than that. It should be an unabashedly pro-human philosophy, as we should recognize that sustaining humanity is our top mission, not sustaining nature. This means using nature for human benefit, not Gaia’s. It means giving economic vitality to humans by creating trade pacts where they can export to the world market. It means opposing autarky. It means recognizing that human life is more important than nature, and affirming humans’ mastery of nature. This sustainability is really humanism, and is the stuff of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, and the Globalization, where in each case people have created systems to increase fertility, wealth, and freedom.

Sustainability, as the Progressives understand it, places nature as the master of humanity. (Indeed, Michael Crichton has commented on how environmentalism has become a religion in the postmodern parts of the world.)

So who should own sustainability now? The party of Progressive (extinction), or the pro-live-birth conservatives?

Crossposted at Smitten Eagle.

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You saw it first here. The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, the Stalinist and terrorist government which controls the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, is online. There are other web sites maintained by the DPRK here and here. (Note: I have checked the sites for viruses. The sites appear to be clean.)

As can be expected, the web sites are as cryptic as the North Korean government itself. They are half propaganda, denouncing the “imperialist Yankees,” and half groveling attempts at separating businessmen from their capital.

There are photo galleries of the various business and tourist trips sponsored by the Korean Friendship Association, the organization that has cognizance of the website.

There is a tourism section on the website too. The tourist trips to North Korea, “have become popular amongst our KFA members as well as other people, who are welcome to join, to experience North Korea outside the tourist trail and have interaction with North Korean citizens first hand.”

(I didn’t know there was a tourist trail north of the DMZ. Will wonders never cease?!)

Crossposted at Smitten Eagle.

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In a recent post on the Thomas PM Barnett Weblog, Tom laments the Irish people voting against the Lisbon Treaty:

It is weird how the EU can let one country decide to run a plebiscite and then kill a treaty.  Better is majority like we did with the Constitution.

(I might add that the Constitution wasn’t adopted by the United States by way of a majority; it required consensus of all thirteen states under the Articles of Confederation.  Tom is correct, however, in that Treaty ratification today requires the consent of the Senate, which is not unanimity.  But I digress…)

Tom’s view seems to fall in line with his views on forms of governance around the world:  In the first of his books he discusses the concept of the Rule Set:

A collection of rules (both formal and informal) that delineates how some activity normally unfolds.

In his post Tom made a comparison between the treaty ratification Rule Sets of two world powers, the US and the EU.  His criticism was that a democratic majority in a given EU member state was able to parry an attempt by the cloistered bureaucratic and political classes of the EU to seize the sovereignty of a nation state, while the other states that made up the EU avoided such referenda to preclude the possibility that (gasp!) the people might like to retain their sovereignty.  Based on this, it would appear that Tom prefers more bureaucratically-acceptable Rule Sets to democratic Rule Sets.  (It is true that the American treaty-ratification Rule Set does not require unanimity in the Senate, but the reality of the Senate being an elected body renders that fact moot.  Few democracies in Europe are remotely as democratic as the Senate, as generally cloistered political parties hold the seats, not elected politicians).

So, on one hand we have a democratic Senate in the US that ratifies treaties.  And on the other we have the EU with its highly-insulated political parties in the business of treaty ratification, with the sole exception being the democracy in Ireland.  Tom seems to disapprove of the will of the  Irish people when it comes to their own sovereignty.

In this is one of my criticisms of Barnett’s thoughts:  Sometimes his Rule Sets are anti-democratic.  Tom seems to prefer only sufficient Rule Sets for the given tasks of governance, but does not seem to care much about the nature of those Rule Sets.  Specifically, are those Rule Sets democratic in nature?

Cross posted at Smitten Eagle.

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Abu Muqawama is an excellent blog that is on my daily blog reading list.  It focuses on counterinsurgency issues, as well as wider issues in military affairs.  I tend to favor it because of the humility of the authors.  Often they comment on issues, and are authoritative, yet allow for the fact that ladies and gentlemen may have legitimate disagreements.

Unfortunately, The Abu Muqawama has revealed his identity as Andrew Exum and has stated that he will no longer be blogging regularly.  Instead his co-bloggers, Erin “Charlie” Simpson, Dr. iRack, and Londonstani, among others, will continue where Abu Muqawama leaves off.

Andrew Exum will be missed, but the blog will continue.  Good luck to Andrew in is intellectual endeavors.

I nonetheless look forward to the new Abu Muqawama blog.

Zen comments as well.

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Grand Theft Auto has nothing on this.

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@ SmallWarsJournal Blog.

To service the warrior scholar and the future warrior society needs to provide an educational framework of humanities and liberal arts that provide the essence of classical philosophy. Less, we create Ludites a good understanding of engineering and technology is of special importance. The officer cadre must have at least a passing understanding and awareness of the classical literature of conflict. The enlisted men should have a vocational understanding of the world prior to today and how it shaped whatever they are looking at.

I certainly agree.

Discuss.

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This is the first post in an occasional series on learning to how to fly as a Marine.

I am a Marine pilot, and this is the journey I took after I earned my gold bars as a Second Lieutenant of Marines to become a Marine aviator.

In this post I will address the ethos of the Marine aviator.

Marines are Marines first. Being a Marine is synonymous with being a Rifleman, and being a Marine Officer implies being a Provisional Rifle Platoon Commander first. Secondarily Marines whatever their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS–their day to day job). Therefore I’m a Marine Officer first. A pilot a distant second. Go ahead and take away my aviator’s wings, so long as I can keep the Eagle, Globe and Anchor emblem of the Marine.

This ethos is not common to all military aviators. Many Navy aviators are pilots first. Indeed, even enlisted sailors of are known by their Rate–their job. A Marine is a Marine, and you may address him as such, or perhaps by his rank. A sailor is a Boatswain’s Mate 3rd Class, or a Quartermaster 2nd Class, or perhaps a Signalman Chief Petty Officer. A sailor is his job first.

Next, the Marine aviator is almost completely oriented toward supporting the Ground Combat Element–that unit of infantrymen reinforced with tanks, artillery, amphibious assault vehicles, etc. The premier missions for the Marine aviator are Assault Support–carrying Marines and their stuff, and Air Support–dropping bombs and shooting guns in support of those ground Marines. Marine aviators also do other missions–aerial reconnaissance, anti-air warfare, electronic warfare, and command & control missions, but their heart is being there when it counts to help out the Lance Corporal with a rifle.

The Marine Corps is expeditionary in nature. This is an outgrowth of the role played by Marines as essentially colonial infantry, and being a force in readiness able to deploy at a moment’s notice. This attribute is expressed in a “Bag’s Packed” mentality, meaning that on an individual level, the Marine awaits only orders to march. I have spent many days on a 24-hour recall tether to maintain the required level of readiness. In 2004, my unit went from duty in garrison to conducting combat operations north of Kandahar in 19 days. Imagine yourself playing croquet in your backyard–and looking less than three weeks into your future at the peaks of the Hindu Kush. Yes, the Marine Corps can function as a second land army, but that is not where it’s strength lies.

The Marine Corps is Naval in character, and therefore Marine Aviators are Naval Aviators. (As an aside, the Marines are a separate Naval service that reports to the Secretary of the Navy. Marines do NOT work for the Navy–at least on an organizational level. There may be Marines assigned to Navy units, and there are Sailors assigned to Marine units. But those Marine units are not administratively responsible to any Navy Admiral.) The Marines are a Naval service, not a Navy service. This means that we ought to get used to the confines of a troopship, understand Naval lingo, and remember that sea duty is a Marine duty. I personally have transited the Suez Canal, and visited perhaps a dozen Mediterranean ports. I have practiced amphibious assaults, and have coordinated naval guns firing at land-based targets.

I would summarize the Marine ethos as being:

• Rifleman First, and oriented toward supporting the Rifleman
• Expeditionary in Nature
• Naval in Character

Instilling this ethos requires the proper training prior to flight school, and that is the role of The Basic School (TBS), in Quantico, Virginia.

TBS is a post-commissioning school that imbues the Marine ethos into the officer corps, giving each officer a common starting point, and inculcating specific Marine attitudes, doctrine, tactics, and procedures. Just as importantly, it allows Marine officers to get to know each other, and lends confidence that no matter the MOS of that officer–he could be a box-kicking Supply Officer, that he will be able to at least be familiar with the problems, virtues, vices, and strengths of ground combat.

Officer Candidates School and the Naval Academy provide the bulk of the new Lieutenants to TBS, although the purpose of these commissioning sources is not to instill the ethos and doctrine of the Marines; rather they are screening processes to ensure only quality officers are commissioned into the Marines.

The TBS curriculum imbues the Marine ethos through cultural immersion in an austere, warrior like setting. Newly minted Lieutenants are organized into companies, which break into platoons, sections, squads, and teams for sand table exercises, field problems, and Tactical Evolutions Without Troops. Approximately one third of the instruction is in garrison, and the remainder is in the field, so there is a significant about of time of marching with a pack, digging fighting positions, and employing weapons from the M-16 through the M2 .50 Cal machine gun. All Marine officers learn to call for artillery and mortar fire, and are given cursory training on employment of aviation. Land navigation is done with a map, compass, and pace counts. It is a demanding course–it is not uncommon to have higher-ranking junior officers, like First Lieutenants, from allied countries go through the TBS Basic Officer Course as their advanced infantry training course.

Following TBS the young Marine officers continue to more specialized training for their particular MOS, and ultimately will move to a unit in the operating forces, such as an infantry battalion, helicopter or fighter/attack jet squadron, or perhaps a logistics battalion. The next stage for most*** future Marine aviators is Introductory Flight Screening, and Aviation Preflight Indoctrination at Naval Air Station Pensacola. And that is where I will begin the second part of this occasional series.

*** Some Marine Officers may serve a tour or two as a ground officer, and then apply to flight school later. These officers typically go through flight school as senior First Lieutenants and Captains, and are relatively rare. Typically less than five such officers are selected for this coveted assignment each year.

Recommended Reading:

• One Bullet Away, by Nathaniel Fick
• First to Fight, by Krulak

Links:

• Class 186: The Making of a Marine Officer

Videos: (With a hat tip to Blue Falcon, whoever you are. Blue Falcon’s videos are a bit tongue-in-cheek, but provide a fairly good view into what activities are involved at The Basic School.)

• TBS: Part I
• TBS: Part II
• How Not to Debark a 7-Ton (TBS is also a place to make mistakes. Making mistakes may be embarrassing or fatal if made in the presence of enlisted Marines and the enemy.)

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There has been quite a discussion on the nature of scholarship and generalship here, here, here, and here. Much of the discussion related to the utility of having a corpus of military history knowledge, and on the utility of having our military professionals and foreign policy wonks reading that corpus.

It might be instructive to see who we think is worthy of making our collective list. List in hand, we might be able to deduce a few defining qualities that make for superior generalship, and whether the victor in battle is also the scholar.

Granted, no list can ever be exhaustive, but such lists can be instructive, and fun (I like thinking about these things, anyways).

First, a couple of guidelines:

1) No fictional generals. (I’m a huge fan of Sam Damon and Ender Wiggins, but let’s keep it real.)

2) Other ranks are fair game: Go ahead and mention the Air Vice Marshalls, Crown Princes, and Dukes of Earl.

My list:

1. Alexander the Great
2. Belisarius
3. Mao & Giap
4. Napoleon
5. Rommel, tied with von Mellenthin
6. Hannibal Barca
7. Washington, FDR, Truman
8. Grant, Lincoln
9. Douglas MacArthur
10. Matthew Ridgway

Honorable Mentions: Patton, Nimitz, Bradley, Eisenhower, Zukhov, HM Smith, Alexander Vandegrift, Spruance, Mitscher, LeMay, Pershing, Lewis Puller, OP Smith, Geiger, Zinni, Mattis, Petraeus

Crossposted at Smitten Eagle.