‘When the crocus blossoms,’ hiss the women in Berlin,
‘He will press the button, and the battle will begin.
When the crocus blossoms, up the German knights will go,
And flame and fume and filthiness will terminate the foe…
When the crocus blossoms, not a neutral will remain.’
(A P Herbert, Spring Song, quoted in To Lose a Battle, by Alistair Horne)
On May 10, 1940, German forces launched an attack against Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Few people among the Allies imagined that France would collapse in only six weeks: Churchill, for example, had a high opinion of the fighting qualities of the French army. But collapse is what happened, of course, and we are still all living with the consequences. General Andre Beaufre, who in 1940 was a young Captain on the French staff, wrote in 1967:
The collapse of the French Army is the most important event of the twentieth century.
If it’s an exaggeration, it’s not much of one. If France had held up to the German assault as effectively as it was expected to do, World War II would probably have never reached the nightmare levels that it in fact did reach. The Hitler regime might well have fallen. The Holocaust would never have happened. Most likely, there would have been no Communist takeover of Eastern Europe.
This campaign has never received much attention in America; it tends to be regarded as something that happened before the “real” war started. Indeed, many denizens of the Anglosphere seem to believe that the French basically gave up without a fight–which is a considerable exaggeration given the French casualties of around 90,000 killed and 200,000 wounded. But I think the fall of France deserves serious study, and that some of the root causes of the defeat are scarily relevant to today’s world.
First, I will very briefly summarize the campaign from a military standpoint, and will then shift focus to the social and political factors involved in the defeat.
France’s border can be thought of in terms of three sectors. In the north, the border with Belgium. Early French military planning had been based on the idea of a strong cooperative relationship with Belgium; however, in the years immediately prior to 1940, that country had adopted a position of neutrality and had refused to do any joint military planning with France. In the south, the border was protected by the forts of the Maginot Line (the southern flank of which was anchored by mountainous territory bordering on Switzerland and Italy). In between these regions was the country of the Ardennes. It was heavily wooded and with few roads, and the French high command did not believe it was a feasible attack route for strong forces. Hence, the Maginot Line had not been extended to cover it, and the border here was protected only with field fortifications.
The French plan was based on the assumption that the main German attack would come through Belgium. Following the expected request from the Belgian government for assistance, strong French forces were to advance into that country and counterattack the Germans. In the Maginot and Ardennes sectors, holding actions only were envisaged. While the troops manning the Maginot Line were of high quality, the Ardennes forces included a large proportion of middle-aged reservists, and had been designated as lower-class units.
The opening moves seemed to fit expectations. The Germans launched a powerful attack through Belgium, and the Belgian government made the expected requests for help. Andre Beaufre:
Doumenc sent me at once to Vincennes to report to General Gamelin (the French supreme commander). I arrived at 6.30 AM at the moment when the order had just been given for the huge machine to go into operation: the advance into Belgium. Gamelin was striding up and down the corridor in his fort, humming, with a pleased and martial air which I had never seen before. It has been said since that he expected defeat, but I could see no evidence of it at the time.
There was heavy fighting in Belgium…but the German attack on this country had served to mask their real point of maximum effort. Early in the morning of the 13th, it became clear that massive German forces were moving through the Ardennes, which had turned out to not be so impassable after all. A massive German air attack paved the way for a crossing of the Meuse river and the capture of the town of Sedan. French officers were stunned by the speed of the German advance–they had expected delays while the Germans brought up heavy artillery, not understanding that dive bombers could play a role similar to that traditionally played by artillery. And the bombing was psychologically-shattering, especially for inexperienced troops. The famous historian Marc Bloch had been exposed to many artillery barrages while fighting in the First World War: in reflecting on his service in 1940, he observed that he found aerial bombing much more frightening even though it was, objectively, probably less dangerous. (Bloch later joined the Resistance and was captured by the Germans and shot.)
The French command never really recovered from the unexpected thrust through the Ardennes and the fall of Sedan. Beginning on May 27, the British evacuated their troops at Dunkirk. On June 14, Prime Minister Paul Reynaud resigned. He was succeeded by Philippe Petain, a hero of the First World War, who immediately sought terms with the Germans. The “armistice”–basically a surrender–was signed on June 20. By Hitler’s order, it was signed in the same railway car where the armistice of 1918 had been signed. Hitler was present in person for the ceremony: William Shirer was fifty yards away, and was studying his expression through binoculars: It is afire with scorn, anger, hate, revenge, triumph.
Many military factors were involved in the defeat–obsolete doctrine on armored forces, inadequate use of radio communications, a strange and cumbersome military organization structure, and a rigid and formalistic attitude among the members of the General Staff. But the roots of the 1940 debacle are not to be found only, or perhaps even primarily, in strictly military matters. A major role was played by certain characteristics of French society and politics of the time, and some of these factors are spookily similar to things that are going on in America today.
In her autobiography, Simone de Beauvoir reflects on the attitude of the French Left (of which she was a part) toward the rise of Nazi Germany…“there was no threat to peace; the only danger was the panic that the Right was attempting to spread in France with the aim of dragging us into war.” (Horne) A constant thread that runs through France in the 1930s is the extreme factionalism, often resulting in more fear and distrust of other Frenchmen than of the rising external enemy.
This was not only a phenomenon of the Left. Among conservative elites, for example, the phrase Better Hitler than Blum was popular. Leon Blum (Premier 1936-37) was a fairly mild Socialist, best known for his advocacy of the 5-day week. Something about him inspired crazed hatred on the part of French Conservatives and Rightists. “A man to shoot in the back,” wrote Charles Maurras, and he was by no means alone in such sentiments. As Julian Jackson puts it in his book The Fall of France: “Politics in France in the 1930s had reached a pitch of violence that had something of the atmosphere of civil war.”
Nor did the factionalism stop on May 10, 1940. Georges Mandel, the courageous Minister of the Interior, observed a Deputy (legislator) whose district had been bombed by the enemy…he went about the lobbies (of the Chamber of Deputies), screaming “I will interpellate the government on this outrage as soon as the Chamber meets!” Mandel remarked to his friend, the English General Edward Spears, about the disconnect of this behavior from reality. “Paris is bombed by the Germans? Let’s shake our fists at our own Government.”
It is virtually impossible to win a war when politics is being conducted in such a manner…when the “enemy” across the aisle is hated more than the enemy in the bombers overhead. And can anyone doubt that a military attack or a major terrorist attack today would meet with considerable political response mirroring that of the French Deputy quoted by Mandel?
The tendency to view everything through the lens of domestic politics certainly had a malign influence on French military preparedness. Consider, for example, the matter of aircraft production. When the aggressive Guy La Chambre took over as Air Minister (in January 1938), he reputedly “found nothing but a disheartened industry of small workshops of which only one factory alone was equipped for mass production. As war approached and the production gap with the Luftwaffe appeared hopelessly wide, he tried to fill it by means of large-scale purchases from the United States; but even this measure of desperation met with intense opposition from the French aircraft manufacturers lobby.” (Horne) At roughly the same time, the Left was objecting to the restoration of a longer work week in order to increase armaments production. (In the event, some aircraft orders were placed in the US, but not nearly on the scale needed, and the work week was lengthened, but not without an epidemic of disruptive strikes.)
The 1930s were a time of frequent financial/political scandals. The most famous of these was the Stavisky affair: Serge Alexander Stavisky was able to sell bonds worth 200 million francs based on the assets of Bayonne’s municipal pawnshop. His political connections assisted him both in pulling off the scam and in getting his trial postponed 19 times. The result was a considerable weakening of confidence in France’s governing institutions. Similarities to the situation in America today are obvious and disturbing.
It is worth noting that there were divisions in France that had originated at the time of the Revolution, and had persisted. The hostility between anti-Clericals and Catholics was one of the most significant of these. See Lead and Gold for a discussion of how this played out in the First World War: “As absurd as it sounds, the political and intellectual classes in France feared the Catholic church more than the armies of the Kaiser.” Our political divisions in America today don’t go back nearly as far–but are they as serious, and becoming as entrenched?
There was rising xenophobia and anti-Semitism. With onset of the Depression (which came later in France than in the US and Britain), immigrants were viewed as competitors for jobs (even though France was in a demographic crisis, with both a low birth rate and the effects of the horrendous casualties of 1914-1918), and became targets of violence. France was faced with half a million refugees from Spain following Franco’s defeat of Republican forces in that country, and there were also refugees from other Nazi and Fascist countries. (Despite the xenophobia, “it must be said that France was more generous in providing asylum than any other European country or than the United States.” (Piers Brendon, The Dark Valley)
In the period just before Munich, fears of war were very strong, and many people chose to blame the Czechs…and the Jews. In Paris, Strasbourg, Dijon and elsewhere mobs attacked Jews and looted their shops, shouting: “Down with the Jewish war.” (Brendon)
By 1939, many Frenchmen had had enough of Hitler’s threats, and support for resistance against further aggression was growing…but there were still strong voices for appeasement. And these was a pervasive sense that something was deeply wrong with French society. Jean Renoir’s film La Regle du Jeu, opened in July 1939 but banned as “too demoralizing” by September, portrayed, in Brendon’s words, “a corrupt and disintegrating society held together only by deception. ‘We live at a time when everyone lies,’ says one of the characters, ‘drug ads, governments, radio, movies, newspaper.’”
The most splendid Parisian ball of the 1939 season took place on a warm July night at the Polish embassy. Brendon describes the scene:
Ministers and diplomats sipped champagne while an orchestra played and beautiful women in frothy gowns waltzed with military officers. “In the gardens white marble sphinxes gleamed beneath the stars…and pots of red fire threw on the scene the glow of a conflagration.” The Polish Ambassador, Julius Lukasziewicz, believed that Bonnet was “definitely seeking some legally valid escape” from French obligations, news of which accounted for increased “blustering” in Berlin. The shadows quivered. All thought war imminent and some were reminded of the ball “given by Wellington on the eve of Waterloo.” Watching a mazurka, Reynaud (who became Prime Minister just before the attack of 1940-ed) remarked: “it is scarcely enough to say that they are dancing on a volcano. For what is an eruption of Vesuvius compared to the cataclysm which is forming under our feet?”
(This is a rerun, with updates, of a piece that I’ve previously posted several times previously, most recently this post in 2023, where there is a good discussion in comments.)
See also my post When Formalism Kills, which cites Andre Beaufre on the mental world of the French General Staff of the time, and a related observation from Picasso. Also The French Army in 1940..and the American CDC in 2021.
Some other relevant reading/watching:
The writer & aviator Antoine de St-Exupery was a reconnaissance pilot in 1940. His book ‘Flight to Arras’ is a vivid portrayal of his experiences and emotions, concentrated into a single flight from which he did not expect to return alive.
The French TV series ‘A French Village’ is an outstanding drama of life under the Occupation and the Vichy Regime that followed from the defeat of 1940. I reviewed it here:
https://chicagoboyz.net/archives/72710.html
Great post, thanks for updating it from a few years ago.
I found it quite timely as my thinking about May 1940 has changed over the past few years as I have been studying maneuver warfare theory and especially Boyd, I agree with many of the points you make but something overall about that time period and the way the established wisdom of historical community unsettles me.
I’ll go back to something I originally touched-on as a comment to the 2023-version of the post which is a comparison to the French experience before WW I and during the first few months. There are eerie similarities. France was an extremely divided society in 1914 and war was seen as a liberation from the civic strife, antisemitism, socialist unrest, antirepublican movements. French doctrine – all the way from the tactical to the strategic level – was completely inadequate to combat the Germans in 1914. Also the French army was on the verge of collapse by end of August, having been routed from the field .
The French strategic plan in 1940 was far more sound than that in 1914. It was to hold the French-German border in place through fortifications (Maginot Line) held by second-rate troops while the more elite formations including the tanks (which were much better machines than the German Mk. II and III)went north; this follows modern fortification theory which is that a position doesn’t act so much to stop an enemy dead in its tracks but it serves as a version of the infantry tactic of establishing a base of fire and maneuver, that is here it allows the French to establish a base of fire along the German border while allowing mobile units to operate in Belgium
Ask the Germans in Kursk’43 how well that worked for the Soviets.
War can often be explained (and taught) through a series of tactical and operational problems presented as illustrations of larger problems.
To flip the perspective, what the Germans were attempting was extremely risky. The Schlieffen Plan faced the insurmountable problem that the combat power needed to defeat the Allies in August 1914 could not be supplied through the Belgian transportation network. Now the Germans were going to try the same basic operational problem but run its initial supply lines through the far worse network of Luxembourg. To top it while the Schlieffen Plan had the benefit of securing its right (north) flank along the neutral Dutch border, Plan Gelb had both flanks – including its lines of communications – exposed to the enemy.
If the Germans did not secure a breakthrough quickly it would be caught in a vise and destroyed. The problem with flank attacks as basic infantry school teaches is that while you are on the enemy flanks, he is also on yours and you better be quick about it.
In December 1944 during a similar German offensive through the Ardennes, Patton recognized the opportunity immediately with his remark “Brad, the Kraut’s stuck his head in a meat grinder and this time I have hold of the handle.” What happened in 1944 was what didn’t happen in 1940, the Germans weren’t able to push through sufficient combat power in time to the Meuse and got caught with its flanks exposed. Part of that was the weather; however, if the Germans were similarly delayed in 1940 it would have been just as catastrophic
The other side of it was that of course there was no Patton in 1940. That’s not a problem exclusively for the French, neither we nor the British had implemented armor doctrine by that time. Really the only ones doing it were the Germans and the Soviets.
The Germans of course had been working secretly with the Soviets in the 1920s on Blitzkrieg doctrine and operations. However the basic concepts were developed earlier with the Sturmtruppen of 1917-1918 and the concept of using highly mobile units with a high degree of operational autonomy (Fingerspitzengefühl) to pierce front lines in order to maneuver and disintegrate enemy formations. Blitzkrieg was simply a follow-on of that doctrine using internal combustion engines and propellers (though of course at a geometric increase in at-point combat power)
The technology was available to everyone so why didn’t the French and British exploit it? Really the bigger question was why were the Germans able to do so. All militaries, and especially their political overseers, are bumbling masses of incompetents when it comes to recognizing and implementing new doctrines. The Germans were able to because 1) They were inspired to innovate by losing WW I 2) They had a willing partner to help them in 1920s – the USSR and 3) Their thinking on the matter stemmed from 1917.
Military bureaucratic incompetence, internal political division and a host of other “friction” points are the natural terrain a leadership team must navigate in order to implement a successful military doctrine
Perhaps the pre-war demoralization of French society played a part in the collapse after the fall of Paris when Petain came to office determined to reach an armistice rather than withdrawing south or to the colonies to fight on. Certainly the German use of armor in 1940 shrunk France’s strategic depth that it had in 1914 and gave it less chance to recover. Even still the depth could have been recovered with basically a mobile reserve (though less than the infamous lack of a strategic reserve) at the initial battle of the crossing of the Meuse. The Germans didn’t need to be stopped, only delayed, for the roof to cave in and it was a close-run thing there.
My guess is that if the German attack got stuck, it would not have resulted in the post-1914 war of attrition but rather the destruction of a big chunk of the German army and I don’t think Hitler would have survived the inevitable coup.
The larger issue is that this isn’t mere historical nitpicking but has application to today to western countries, especially Europe which seems to have thrown in the towel. Whether we will do like will depend on what happens after 2028.
Let’s not forget the Phony War. While it is easy to blame Hitler for everything, remember it was actually the French (along with perfidious Albion) who declared war on Germany in September 1939 — and then sat on their hands and did virtually nothing to follow up on throwing down that deadly gauntlet. By May 1940, after nearly 9 months of this French/English non-war, Germany had grown tired and attacked the countries which had declared war on them.
There is a plausible argument that if the French/English had not declared war on Germany, then Germany would have focused its military attentions solely on the USSR in the East. One of the lessons for Germany from WWI was not to end up with active fronts on both East & West, so Germany had to take out the French frontier before turning to attack the USSR.
The analogy to today is obvious. The EuroScum leadership is dead set on having their kind of war on Russia while hoping (ha!) to keep it limited to the Ukraine and points East, while the US Deep State is intent on provoking a war with China which supplies the essential components for the US war machine. Democracy has failed, and we in the West are screwed — and this time the Continental US will be on the front lines.
Not really on the main topic, but…
One of the French compromises made to get their improved armor and bigger guns was to mount a turret that didn’t have enough space for both a gunner and a commander, which meant that one man had to fill both roles.
So, yes, the French tanks had better armor and bigger guns… but the Panzer III had a gunner and a commander rather than one soldier attempting to fill both roles simultaneously, which is probably more important.
French tanks mostly did not have radios; indeed, the entire French Army was not well-equipped with radios.
Apparently the organization structure was such that requests from infantry for air support had to go through several levels before being carried out.
Gavin..”There is a plausible argument that if the French/English had not declared war on Germany, then Germany would have focused its military attentions solely on the USSR in the East.”
Maybe initially. But after gaining control of Russia and its resources, would Hitler had been content to turn his focus to the arts of peace? Seems most unlikely.
Two books which provide an interesting look at French society during this period are:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yellow_Tapers_for_Paris
and
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suite_fran%C3%A7aise_(N%C3%A9mirovsky_novel)
The 1940 Battle of the Ardennes should properly be called the First, so as not to be confused with the Second at the end of 1944, commonly called the Battle of the Bulge. While it eventually is classed as an Allied victory, the “surprise” came at a very high price. 25,000 dead in just the first three days. A defeat at Sedan also figured heavily in the Franco Prussian War of 1970.
We are in the midst of a paradigm shift that probably combines all the elements that differentiated wars in the 20th century from before 1900. In the last three years, drones have taken the place of artillery, tactical air, armor, infantry and naval assault. Trent, among others has been documenting this. The U.S. military industrial establishment is meeting this challenge forthwith. Studies are underway, as we speak, that will, sometime in the next decade, point toward designs to counter this development. We have the best people on it. While Ukraine is building about 100,000 drones a month.
@MCS: remember Sir Humphrey:
We are doing all we can, Minister. We have set up three committees.
I’ve never understood how the French army could simply deem the Ardennes impassible to tanks. Did they undertake no exercises to test the notion?
David F: “Maybe initially. But after gaining control of Russia and its resources, would Hitler had been content to turn his focus to the arts of peace? Seems most unlikely.”
Well, that is assuming Germany would have defeated the USSR — which might have been possible if Germany was not having its industry continuously bombed by the Allies and if the US had not been feeding immense quantities of materiel to the Soviets.
But given the sheer physical size of the USSR, even a German “victory” would most likely have amounted to a difficult contested occupation of the USSR east of the Ural mountains and a continuing war with a rump USSR west of the Urals. It is quite likely that “success” against the USSR would have left Germany too exhausted and distracted to have made it feasible for them then to attack France.
To return to the main point, the foolish French/English initiation of war against Germany over the issue of Poland was what today we would call “virtue signaling”. It made those French/English leaders feel good about themselves and got them some positive media coverage, but it did absolutely nothing to help the Poles. And at the conclusion of WWII, those English leaders abandoned Poland to Communism. Not a proud record!
Today’s EuroScum support for Zelensky (“Let’s you and him fight”) seems analogously to be a similar kind of pointless virtue signaling — with a potential outcome for European citizens much worse than their predecessors pointless virtue signaling over plucky little Poland.
well Hitler seemed more focused on killing than simple conquest, the World seems to be like that which Robert Harris, depicted in Fatherland, there was also a scenario in James Hogan’s Proteus Operation, cutting across the Caucasus would have lead to the Middle East, the senior Shah, had German sympathies, unllikely they might have made it as far as India, from that Turtledove tale, where Gandhi is confronted by General Model, or more likely, the Japanese puppit Army of Bhose would settle the matter, they figure in Scott’s Palace series,
> Democracy has failed, and we in the West are screwed — and this time the Continental US will be on the front lines.
Scenarios, please. From which direction will the invasion come? Amphibious landing by the PLA on the West Coast? Russians swooping down from the Arctic? The Mexican army crossing the Rio Grande? Cuba pushing into South Florida? Canada attempting to turn the U.S. into the 11th province? Palestinian sleeper cells on campuses nationwide? All of the above in a massive anti-American allied push to take the war to the Continental US? Extra credit for assigning probabilities.
Lucretius: “From which direction will the invasion come?”
From the skies, man! From the skies! If the US got involved in the EuroScums’ war on Russia, or if the US insanely started an unnecessary war with China, that conflict would inevitably go nuclear — and US cities would find themselves on the front lines of a global thermonuclear war.
That should be obvious to everyone! The days are long gone when the Continental US was too far away from any conflict to suffer direct attack.
Aha, we don’t usually think of raining nukes on another country as establishing a front *line*, but that helps clarify things. Thanks!
Scenarios, please. From which direction will the invasion come?
It’s already here. There are millions of unknown foreigners inside the US courtesy of the formerly open border. If you can smuggle millions of people into the country you can also smuggle a wide variety of weaponry, no doubt including drones.
How hard would it be to use those drones to destroy every substation at every refinery and power plant in the United States? Hmmm…
Meanwhile, the Deep State is striving mightily to get rid of Pete Hegseth, one of the few high-ranking people in government who seems to have noticed something is wrong and is attempting to do something about it.
I have an ugly suspicion that if the US gets into a real war anytime soon history will regard the present American regime much less favorably than that of 1940 France.
One aspect of France’s situation in 1940 that should serve as a cautionary tale for the US today: in 1939, the French licensed the design of the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine (the engine that powered the Spitfire and Hurricane, among other airplane) and contracted with the Ford Motor Company to manufacture these engines.
But when war was declared on September 3 of that year, Henry Ford–who had strong neutrality and ‘antiwar’ beliefs–pulled the Ford equipment and people.
Sleazy of Ford to accept a military contract and then pull out when it becomes clear that the products made under that contract will be used for actual…military purposes…but also, a warning that dependency on even a nominally-friendly foreign country can have its dangers.
https://chicagoboyz.net/archives/66842.html
See also Turks and Chinese, Help Us Make the Ammunition:
https://chicagoboyz.net/archives/71147.html
Perhaps the date that exposed the rot of French society and its military wasn’t May 10, but rather June 16, 1940 when Pétain was appointed Prime Minister of France; Pétain was selected in order to obtain an armistice from the Germans.
While it may seem natural that the French would seek terms given that over the past 5 weeks it suffered a calamitous defeat with losing Paris and its best parts of the military smashed, to sue for terms was in fact a choice. It still had a large part of the country to fall back into for strategic depth and if the loss of the industrial regions made such an active defense impossible it could still retreat into North African colonies protected by the fleet.
While that would mean that the Germans would militarily occupy the entire country (as opposed to just the northern half), it would also mean that the Germans would HAVE to occupy the entire, now hostile country (as opposed to half of an acquiescent one)
What made the decision to seek terms from the Germans even more shocking was that Petain and the entire elite of France were not only in the recent history of the death struggle of WW I, but all grew up in the shadow of the Franco-Prussian War, the loss subsequent loss of Alsace and Lorraine, and the unremitting struggle. Alas even to that mortal foe, France had no Churchill (De Gaulle was still a somewhat lowly general) and so it threw in towel
Military reform efforts take enormous amount of energy and the Second Law of Thermodynamics apply, the initial energy applied soon dissipates and needs to be renewed. The problem for the people pushing the reform strategy is that they have more interests than just military reform and if the recalcitrants can just hold out the pro-reformers will be distracted. That;s why such reforms are easier to do after a military defeat because both the recalcitrants are weakened and the push for reform is tronger and more focused.
A good example of a failed reform efforts was the Russian effort after the nearly disastrous 2008 war in South Ossetia. There was a concerted effort to get rid of corruption and build professionalization but after a number of years the pushback from a key part of Putin’s support had him ditch it, The underlying problem is one of timing, the benefits of reform may only manifest itself years or decades later while the costs are immediate.
Another example of an “unexpected defeat” is the British loss of Singapore in 1942. In a way it was even worse than France 1940 because the British lost an inferior expeditionary force in the hinterlands of their “Gibraltar of the East.” Not were they completely unprepared to fight in terrain they held for decades but they in their sortieing of Repulse and Prince of Wales without air cover they had acted as if the previous two years of war and the associated experiences never happened.
It’s not just the enormous amount of energy that it takes for reform but also imagination. What ultimately sunk the French by late May 1940 was the lack of a strategic reserve with sufficient mobility and striking power to exploit the opportunities the Germans presented. Percival showed a cimplete lack of imagination in his defense of Singapore
You can make an argument that the problems in the American military are due to division in American society. The post-Iraq military reform movement manifested itself not in a manner of the post-Vietnam rethink but in an ideological purge by Obama of the war fighters. This “reform” was manifest in 2021 when the survivors of that purge (Milley, Austin, and various 3 and 4-stars) pushed DEI and purging of white extremism.
Then again the problems in the military go back further than Obama and ideological purges. In the post Cold War world the Navy has failed to deploy a new successful surface warfare class in 30+ years: LCS, CG(X), Zumwalt…. Then there are Joint-Strike, M10 Booker, and…..
of an acquiescent one) ) it would
DavidF: “Sleazy of Ford to accept a military contract and then pull out when it becomes clear that the products made under that contract will be used for actual…military purposes ..”
We don’t have to go back to the 1930s to see that risk. In the Gulf War, the Swiss manufacturer of components for (guided) smart bombs tried to pull out. But perhaps that points to a bigger issue — why was Congress spending US taxpayer funds to offshore critical manufacturing to Switzerland? Just as today, one might ask why Congress is killing jobs & manufacturing in the US by relying on Chinese manufacturers for literally hundreds of components in US planes, missiles, and ships which are supposed to protect the US from … China. It is almost like Congress has been bought by the Chinese government.
I agree with Xennady — history will not be kind to the Swamp Creatures.
Gavin…IIRC, the components coming from Switzerland (Swatch, to be specific) were crystals, which are used for timing and frequency control. They are also used for electronic watches, which is surely why Swatch was using them. This points out the coupling between military-used items and civil-use items.
1940 was an immensely important event not only for the substantive result – the sudden defeat of France and Britain – but also for the meta-result.
Before the campaign, nobody except perhaps the most optimistic German panzer commanders expected German victory.
The French and British didn’t attack during the “Phony War” because they thought they had the Germans in a box, and that Germans have would have to give in or make an odds-on attack.
Many Germans thought so too. In November 1939, von Brauchitsch (army C-in-c) and Halder (chief of the General Staff) discussed the strategic situation; it looked so ugly that they seriously considered a coup d’état against Hitler. When von Manstein proposed the Ardennes attack, Halder supported it because he thought it was the only plan with _any_ chance of success.
But when the Germans attacked, they succeeded beyond all expectations.
The meta-lesson from that was: nobody really knows anything in war until it actually happens. All the established knowledge can be overturned just like that. Ever since 1940, all strategic planners have been haunted by that thought.
It’s not really true though. 1940 was a “black swan” event. Nothing comparable has happened since.
@ Gavin Longmuir Re: “Phony War”….it can be argued it goes even earlier, when Hitler decided to re-militarize the Rhineland in 1936, a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. It was a small, token force but the total inaction by the Allies showed Hitler they weren’t serious about a response. That, along with the Phony War, gave time for Germany to amass the strength to pull off Fall Gelb. Yeah, yeah, hindsight and all that….but a little fortitude by the Allies in 1936 might have prevented the later madness….
rondo: “… Hitler decided to re-militarize the Rhineland in 1936, a violation of the Treaty of Versailles.”
Yes, history could have taken very different directions — but maybe still have ended up at the same destination?
There is a huge difference between the French & English ignoring a minor violation of the Treaty of Versailles – which most people were coming to see as a gross inequity imposed by bitter French politicians aided by a totally unrealistic President Wilson — and actually formally declaring war on another country … and then demonstrating to the world that they had no clue about what to do next, and no real desire to do anything to back up their empty words.
The Phony War ought to be one of the main lessons from WWII — along with the perfidious English abandoning Poland at the end of the war when supporting Poland had been their whole excuse for starting that war in the first place. The big lesson for the US should be to stay out of pointless European wars — a lesson it looks like Our Betters have still not learned.
Rhineland incursion…Andre Beaufre says the factors involved in the decision not to intervene were:
–desire not to disrupt the financial recovery which was then apparently beginning to happen
–fear that France would be accused of being an aggressor by neutrals, especially the US
–British disinterest in a joint operation
–The fact that the only military planning that had been done was based on complete mobilization, including requisition of civilian vehicles, etc…highly disruptive and not politically-acceptable.
Then as now: “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”
Things will happen that are not within the control of multiple governments.
They can do two things to minimize effect:
1) prepare countermeasures that make the most effective use of available resources.
2)engage in discussion with the prospective opponent, to learn as much as possible about their objectves and their plans for conquest.
Somehow the treaty that caused France & UK to declare on Germany when Poland was invaded seemed to be forgotten post April 1945, Russia got not only both halves of Poland, but the Eastern chunk of Germany. I suspect UK post April was unwilling to enforce their position in re Polish defense. Actually, I know nothing of planning or conducting war, so ignoring the post is quite reasonable.
tommy: “I suspect UK post April [1945] was unwilling to enforce their position in re Polish defense.”
Yes, unwilling — and totally unable — to fulfill their commitment to Poland. Since the USSR was by that stage in control of most of eastern Europe, the only way gallant England could have lived up to its promise to Holy Poland would have been to declare war on the USSR. It is rumored that Churchill wanted to do just that … but the British voters kicked him out before he could continue the war.
People like former President Hoover had been preaching for years before WWII that war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable — and poor Poland happened to be caught in the middle. The English & French should have thought more carefully before making their foolish declaration of war on Germany, because the risks were known. Just as today, we should all recognize that if the West ever succeeds in helping Zelensky come close to defeating Russia, Europe & North America will disappear in a thermonuclear flash.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechelen_incident
I’ll spare everyone my banal thoughts on the end of the Third Republic, but I note that the Germans apparently changed their invasion plan based upon the event above when the Belgians captured documents detailing the original. That change led to the successful invasion through the Ardennes.
I find it an interesting counterfactual to ponder what would have happened if the Germans had held on to their original, which supposedly would have resembled the WWI Schlieffen Plan.
It’s at least possible that France would not have fallen, which would have obviously had major consequences for world history.
”Just as today, we should all recognize that if the West ever succeeds in helping Zelensky come close to defeating Russia, Europe & North America will disappear in a thermonuclear flash.”
Ahhh, yes. Because if Putin is defeated in Ukraine he’ll decide to commit suicide of himself, his family, his oligarchs, and all of Russia. Most logical.
mkent: “Because if Putin is defeated in Ukraine he’ll decide to commit suicide of himself …”
You are not paying attention to reality. The proxy war in the Ukraine is not about the Ukraine — it is about the belligerence of the Ruling Class of the so-called “democracies” of the West.
The Russians understand that if the NATO-driven assault in the Ukraine were to succeed in re-occupying the Crimea and driving Russia back to its borders, Our Betters would not stop there. The Russian publicly-stated belief is that the West would continue to drive into Russia to occupy and destroy the country. The Russian choice would be to die fighting or die on their knees. They have clearly stated what their choice would be.
Fortunately, the Western “democracies” have shown themselves to be paper tigers, and their proxy Zelensky cannot win.
To paraphrase George Pickett: ” I think the Germans had something to do with it”
Specifically, the creative disobedience of orders by Guderian. After his breakthrough at Sedan, the French withdrew South from whence they had come, leaving a vacuum all the way to the Channel behind the Anglo-French armies responding to the German feint in Belgium. When he moved to exploit this, the German high command panicked and ordered him to stop. After much drama, including appeals to Hitler and Guderian’s resignation, a compromise was reached allowing Guderian to conduct a reconnaissance in force to the West. His implementation of that was to leave his signal’s battallion where it was and head for the Channel with the rest of his Panzer Corps.