Turkey blackmailed?

Glenn Reynolds links to this article by Michael Leeden and quotes this passage:

The leaders insisted on a disciplined “no” vote because of pressure – some would call it blackmail – from France and Germany. The French and German governments informed the Turkish opposition parties that if they voted to help the Coalition war effort, Turkey would be locked out of Europe for a generation. As one Turkish leader put it, “there were no promises, only threats.” One can describe this behavior on the part of our erstwhile Old Europe allies only as a deliberate act of sabotage against America in time of war. I think that when the events of the past few months are sorted out, we will find that French actions constitute the diplomatic equivalent of chemical and biological warfare. Monsieur Chirac has stopped at nothing to try to prevent the defeat of Saddam Hussein, no matter how many American lives it cost. And, more often than not, the Germans tagged along for the ride.
Please note that Leeden doesn’t offer any evidence for these serious allegations. Such blatant dealings would also become public very quickly. If Leeden really knew about them, the Bush Administration would also have to know, by leaks or intelligence services. And if that were the case there already would have been an enormous public stink about it. The Turks also would never meekly submit to such pressure, as can be seen by past behavior and the way they presently refuse to give way before American pressure. Their intention to place troops in Northern Iraq also can’t be explained by French-German pressure; to the contrary, both countries have urged Turkey to stay out. In a nutshell, if Leeden can’t back his accusations up with evidence, this is nothing more than a conspiracy-theory. I can only wonder why Reynolds accepted it so uncritically.

Fatal Priorities

It seems as if attorney general Ashcroft is putting more effort into fighting drug-use than terrorism, and this shortly before a war on a Muslim country. This isn’t just a misallocation of resources, it also sends the wrong signal to federal law-enforcement agencies. During the the decades-long war on drugs promotions were mostly awarded based on the number of drug-related arrests an agent made. Due to institutional inertia it is to be expected that agencies as well as individual agents will continue to give the war on drugs preference over the war on terror; field agents have to know that lip-service to fighting terrorism aside, their superiors will continue to make drug-related arrests the main yardstick for evaluating their performance. Resources and personnel assigned to counter-terrorism had been inadequate for years, leading to such failures like this and this. If only one of these leads had been properly been followed, 911 could arguably have been prevented, but the FBI lacked the manpower. To avoid repeating those mistakes, Ashcroft presently needs not only to increase resources and personnel for fighting terrorism, he also has to make sure that they aren’t shifted towards busting drug-rings. Bureaucrats who won’t get with the program should be weeded out. But instead he emphasizes the importance of fighting drugs, positively encouraging to continue the misallocation of resources. If the pre-911 failures are replicated and the terrorists manage to pull off some large-scale attacks the Bush Administration will have to accept the lion’s share of the blame.