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  • The Hentsch Mission: 90

    Posted by Chicago Boyz Archive on September 9th, 2004 (All posts by )

    Is history the saga of vast impersonal movements and forces and structures and developments? Yes.

    Is history a tale of individual action and decision, of contingency, with vast consequences depending on who is on the spot and what they decide to do? Again, yes.

    The idea that these two ways of looking at history are poles, or even contrary to each other, rather than both essential parts of a larger unity, is a common intellectual mistake. David Hackett Fischer has made the reuniting of these two perspectives a major theme of his wonderful books, like Washington’s Crossing and Paul Revere’s Ride.

    On September 9, 1914 one man made a decision and gave an order. Maybe it didn’t matter much. Perhaps what ensued was foredoomed. We can never know what would have happened, we can only know what did happen.

    In the simplest possible terms, what was going on was this. World War I began in the West with a German invasion of Belgium, which was quickly overrun, with German armies continuing their march southward on into France. The French had put their main effort into an attack toward the Rhine, where they were bogging down. The vast invasion descending into France from the north came as a surprise. The French rushed troops back by rail to put them into the path of the Germans. The British expeditionary force had landed, marched north, encountered the Germans at Mons, in Belgium, and been driven back. As the Germans marched further and further south into France, the French, under Joffre, were able to assemble sufficient force to counter-attack. This was became known to history as the Battle of the Marne. However, the Germans were not thrown back. Neither army had begun to dig trenches yet. The Germans had overrun a large and valuable chunk of France, and though exhausted by their rapid advance, the French were exhausted too, mostly from retreating. On September 9, 1914, we find the German armies which had invaded France closing on Paris. The outermost army on the right wing, the German 1st Army under General Kluck was less than 30 miles away. At this point Kluck’s army became separated from the army to its left, the German 2nd Army, under General Bulow.

    Again in its simplest terms, what happened next was as follows. The German supreme commander, von Moltke was unable to tell what was happening at the front, he had been shocked by the French counter-attack at the Marne. Looking at his maps he feared Kluck would be cut off, his army destroyed, and a generalized disaster befall the German army. Von Moltke sent a staff officer, Col. Richard Hentsch to the front, to visit the army headquarters of the armies in France, and assess the situation, and to order a retreat if necessary. Von Moltke’s inclination was to halt the, so far successful, German advance, order a retreat and to assume a defensive posture on the Aisne river. Hentsch, went to the front, assessed the situation, and ordered a retreat. The Germans dug a defensive line, and trench warfare with all its bloody, pointless butchery ensued for the next four years.

    The foregoing sketch does not give any idea of the wide variety of interpretations these events have provoked a from historians. On one end of the spectrum, we have Corelli Barnett, in The Swordbearers: Supreme Command in the First World War (1963). He notes that the British thought the gap between Bulow and Kluck was a trap. It was not a real hazard to the Germans since the Allies were not going to exploit it, and in fact there were troops available to fill the gap, an army corps freed up from a successfully completed siege in Belgium. The gap, as Barnett sees it, was an excuse seized upon by men with frazzled nerves. Barnett wrote:

    In fact, therefore, the battle of the Marne was decided not by the brilliant generalship of Joffre or Gallieni, nor by … the ineluctable circumstances of the battlefield. Indeed there was no real battle of the Marne. Before such a battle could be joined, the victory was handed to the French and British by an unjustifiable failure of nerve and resolution on the part of the German command.

    More recently, Robert Citino in Blitzkreig to Desert Storm, the Evolution of Operational Warfare (2004) says that Molke was like a man faced with 300 emails, who cannot process the mass of information coming and “hitting the delete button”, by abdicating his authority and sending Hentsch to, in effect, call off the advance because he was overwhelmed by his inability to control the battle. But the train had left the station and there was no getting off — you can’t opt out of a war you started because you are confused. Martin van Creveld, in Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977) notes that the German frontline troops were in good supply, and fully stocked with ammunition at the time Hentsch arrived. There was nothing from that quarter which required a retreat. However as Creveld and others noted, the scenes of apparent chaos in the rear areas behind the advancing armies seem to have unnerved the already pessimistic Hentsch even more. David Stevenson, in his recent book Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy (2004) (which I haven’t read yet), concludes that “probably there was no need for a retreat”. However, he seems to think this would only have led to a trench stalemate in a different location at a somewhat later date. Michael Howard, in his short book The First World War (2002) merely says that Hentsch found both Bulow and Kluck’s headquarters inclined to retreat, and he gave the order. But others differ about Kluck’s inclinations. Similarly, A.J.P. Taylor, in The First World War: An Illustrated History (1963) notes that Kluck was holding his own, but in danger of being encircled, and so ordered a retreat. In other words, Taylor suggests that this was the proper or at least the most reasonable course. Also similarly, the old U.S. Military Academy textbook A Short Military History of World War I (1954) devotes several pages to Hentsch’s mission. It notes that Hentsch had been informed by Bulow of the presence of British troops in the gap between 1st and 2nd Armies, but that 1st Army’s chief of staff (Kluck was not personally present at the time) “wanted to continue the attack”. Hentsch overruled him, a decision which the West Point history department deemed “the only sensible course. First Army could not fight on alone.” Except, if we believe Barnett and others, there were troops available to fill the gap and First Army would not have had to fight on alone. Barbara Tuchman, in The Guns of August (1962) seems to impute no special importance to Hentsch’s order, focusing more on the French counter-attack. Hentsch’s name does not even appear in the index of Martin Gilbert’s The First World: A Complete History (1994).

    John Keegan somewhere wrote that the German troops marching through the late Summer heat in August and September 1914, wearing the soles off two pairs of boots, were in the grip of a vision — a super-Austerlitz and the French army demolished, a triumphal march down the Champs Elysees before the leaves turned, home by Christmas. That is the vision that drove the troops on with bloodied feet, southward toward Paris. All I have read suggest they were tired but full of fighting spirit on September 9. After all, a huge chunk of France had fallen into their hands, and Paris was at most two day’s march away. While the French had turned and fought at last, that was bound to happen eventually, and in fact what better place to bring the French to grips and destroy them than at the very gates of Paris? The order to retreat came as a shock to the troops. It provoked consternation, and some disorderly scrambling toward the rear, but it was obeyed and the Germans, unbeaten, dutifully went to ground, strung barbed wire and took up a defensive posture. The soldiers had expected to advance, but their commanders’ nerves had cracked. Morale matters. Beliefs matter. A driving vision matters. Momentum matters. Faith in your cause, your leaders, your mission, matters. When the driving vision is lost, it is like the air going out of a tire. Sustaining this in an army is one of the hardest demands of generalship. Moltke failed his army.

    Hentsch was Hentsch, Moltke was Moltke and they did what their personalities and backgrounds suited them for. Moltke lived in the shadow of his uncle, the great Helmuth von Moltke of Koniggratz and Sedan. Moltke, unlike his uncle, lived in mortal fear of the day when he would have to send Germany’s armies into battle. Moltke had inherited a strategy of brutal, ruthless conquest, of preemptive war, of unprovoked surprise attack on Belgium, and over and through Belgium to get at the real enemy, France. He was constantly tinkering with the strategy, demonstrating that he did not believe in it, showing that he was afraid to put the fate of his country on a single throw of the dice. His private correspondence is filled with dread and indecision. Such a man had a duty to his country to either demand a different strategy, or resign. He did neither. If a man is to direct the army of a nation embarked on a war of conquest, he must be made of sterner stuff than Moltke proved to be. He must be willing to dare all. Moltke wasn’t.

    Similarly, Hentsch was not the man for the hour. For example, it is not really correct for the West Point professors to call Hentsch’s decision “sensible”. It is only “sensible” if looked at microscopically. Change the focus and you see that the entire German enterprise was anything but “sensible”. It was an immoral and maybe even deranged war of aggression. That is the context. If you are embarked on a murderous, unprovoked onslaught on your neighbors, with the general aim of European and then Global Hegemony, then you are embarked on a truly insane course. That doesn’t mean you might not succeed. Utter audacity and the shock of your victims may carry you through. But you cannot succeed in such a grandiose and violent design if you keep having fits of common sense in the middle of it.

    Let us speculate for a minute about what might have happened if Hentsch had been a different man. Or let us imagine that Hentsch had been unavailable and someone of simpler, more daring perhaps more brutal disposition — someone like Ludendorff — had gone in his place. Imagine further that he saw the opportunity to plug the gap between 1st and 2nd Armies, and saw that Kluck’s men, though fatigued, still had fight in them. Imagine that the possibility of a once in a century victory took possession of him, and the vision of Paris just over the horizon almost within range of their artillery. And imagine that this Col. Not-Hentsch had ordered a further advance against the French. This is not wholly beyond what might conceivably have happened.

    Three possible outcomes are apparent. First, what we could call the deterministic outcome is that the two armies collide, and simply entrench in a slightly different place, and trench warfare begins, on cue, as a result of technological inevitability. This is the doomed, tragic vision — machine guns and barbed wire meant trench warfare and nothing could stop it from happening. Second, the armies meet in the open, and the Germans are driven off, or worse for them, Kluck’s army is cut off and destroyed. What then? A general retreat, probably, to a line much farther in the rear than the Aisne. Or, perhaps an even worse defeat with the German army routed. In other words, yet another location for trench warfare if the German attack failed. Or, just possibly a major defeat leading to a negotiated peace settlement. Third, French defeat in the field, the British Expeditionary Force falls back toward the Channel, which it was prepared to do. Paris falls, or is besieged. In this third scenario, a re-run of 1870, a German victory and a negotiated settlement would have been almost certain.

    So, Moltke and Hentsch fecklessly tossed aside a real but unquantifiable chance to spare their country from eventual defeat in a war of attrition. More importantly, they lost the only chance to make the First World War the short war that the generals in all armies hoped and believed it would be. This opens up a lost world of might-have-beens. No four years of trench warfare. No casualties in the millions. No destruction of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and German empires. No destruction of the liberal world trading and financial order which existed under British auspices. No Russian Revolution, no Soviet Union, no Gulag. No Nazi Germany, no Holocaust, no World War II. This better world was foreclosed because two men who were supposed to be warriors and leaders of warriors, at the moment of truth, took counsel of their fears. They failed to follow through on the course they had chosen, to act consistently with the logic of the course they had chosen.

    Significant, long-term unintended consequences are the one thing you can count on when a country and its army roll the iron dice of war. This course should never be taken lightly. And if a country does embark on war, timidity and half-heartedness and second-guessing are always the source of more death and misery than decisiveness and ruthlessness and forcing things to a conclusion.

     

    8 Responses to “The Hentsch Mission: 90”

    1. incognito Says:

      Excellent post Lex, very educational.

    2. Michael Hiteshew Says:

      You stop short of saying what should be concluded. Hindsight is 20-20. Future-vision is a blur of possible outcomes, from triumph to despair.

      If we stop short of taking down Syria,Iran and Lebannon, does Bush become the 21st century’s von Moltke and do the borders of Iraq become the new trench lines?

      Should Truman have widened the Korean war to include China, as MacArthur suggested? Truman decided for trench warfare across the 38th parallel rather than risk a pan-Asiatic war. In the end it worked out, though it took 40 years. North Korea is still hanging in there, yet East Asia in general has progressed dramatically.

      I’ll take the plunge. My instincts tell me we should not widen the war, at least not yet. We’ve taken two big bites out of the gap: Afghanistan and Iraq. For the moment – meaning five or ten years – we should consolidate those gains. It’s going to be all we can handle to keep those two countries stabiliized while they stand up solid governments. Afghanistan is well on the way, despite what Zarqawi says. Iraq is still wobbley. It’s government and institutions are in their infancy. If we were to withdraw substantial troops, the entire country could fall into chaos.

      Were I Bush, I would spend the next four years coordinating with the the Russians and others to find a common Iranian policy.

      I predict France and Germany will do little or nothing to help. Anything that makes things difficult for America is a net plus from their perspective. Old fashioned power politics. Our loss is their gain. Russia has been playing that game too, wrt to Iran. That policy may come back to hurt them in indirect ways. Still, we need to try to enlist their help, maybe in return for help in stabilizing the Caucasus.

    3. jim Says:

      IT WORKED OUT??? I didn’t realize it had!

      MacArthur was a genius and recognized that Europe was a dying continent and Asia was the future. Truman was a great president, but his handling of the Korea situation will one day be considered a big mistake.

    4. Lex Says:

      Michael, even hindsight isn’t 20/20. The historians don’t agree on all various significant details of what happened on 9/9/14. But that actually supports your larger point.

      But you are correct that this post is more about the GWOT than about WWI. I don’t know what it would take for Bush to be the Moltke of the 21st century. I hope that doesn’t happen. I do know that selecting a bold and difficulty strategy then balking and wavering when a crisis occurs, or seeking some illusory half-a-loaf is not going to be the right way forward. If you believe in your model, and you believe in your strategy, then go where its logic takes you. If you don’t believe in your model change it. If you need a new strategy adopt one. Your proposed course of action may be fully consistent with Bush’s strategy. It seems plausible enough to me. But the main thing is once you have committed yourself to a war, and ordered people to kill and to die, you have a moral obligation to be serious and to push it to a conclusion. You can’t dick around. And, critically, you can’t panic at the first sign that everything is not going perfectly. That path is the sure path to disaster. And yes there is a partisan element here — Kerry seems to me to be the kind of guy who only knows how to dick around. Bush, whether right or wrong in how he views the world or the strategy he has adopted, is serious.

    5. Ken Says:

      “I’ll take the plunge. My instincts tell me we should not widen the war, at least not yet. We’ve taken two big bites out of the gap: Afghanistan and Iraq. For the moment – meaning five or ten years – we should consolidate those gains.”

      Aren’t the Iranians going to get nukes before then? If they do, how are we going to consolidate our gains with the Iranians able to attack our positions (or even our homeland) more-or-less openly and with relative impunity? And how could we possibly bring anything to a conclusion from there if the Iranians get a nuclear deterrent?

      “It’s going to be all we can handle to keep those two countries stabiliized while they stand up solid governments. Afghanistan is well on the way, despite what Zarqawi says. Iraq is still wobbley. It’s government and institutions are in their infancy. If we were to withdraw substantial troops, the entire country could fall into chaos.”

      If, on the other hand, we retask them to knocking over the regime that’s been backing many of the troublemakers in the first place, I think they’ll do all right.

    6. Michael Hiteshew Says:

      seeking some illusory half-a-loaf is not going to be the right way forward./i>

      Sounds like an endorsement for the ‘wider war’ strategy to me. Iran and Syria next? Simultaneously or sequentially? What do you propose?

      I worry about rising levels of resistence. What bothers me is the specter of pushing the region over the tipping point into a generalized consensus that the US must be opposed at all costs. We could end up fighting folks streaming in to fight in large numbers.

      I’m very leary of assuming that the Iranian or Syrian populace would support an invasion. There’s a whole toolbox of measures we can take against them short of invasion. One of the prime reasons we’re succeeding so well in Afghanistan is that we have a large majority in active support of what we’ve done and are doing. To a large degree that’s true in Iraq but slightly less so. We also have Iran and Syria throwing as much fuel on the fire as they can reach, obviously. That needs to be dealt with.

      We need a strategy. It needs to be annunciated. We need to bring our regional allies into the game and get them to sign on. Something as simple as getting everyone to sign up to a zero tolerance for terrorism agenda would be a huge step forward.

      Aren’t the Iranians going to get nukes before then?

      I agree. That’s a huge problem. My biggest fear is a nuke loaded onto a boat or into a truck and driven to Tel Aviv or New York or London. Or all three simultaneously. We need to enlist the Russians in helping us shut down the Iranian nuke program. Other than Britian, the Europeans are going to hide under the blankets and criticize whatever do or don’t do. That’s a given.

      If, on the other hand, we retask them…

      How many dominoes are you willing to take down? Lebannon? Egypt? Uzbekistan? Turkmenistan?

      My point is, we need to get these folks onboard with the anti-terrorist program, not simply overthrow them all. We need to bring pressure to bear on the Syria-Iran-Lebannon triangle, which is the main source of the problem. We also need to get the Saudis to kick more ass in KSA.

    7. Lex Says:

      “What do you propose?”

      I don’t really propose any strategy. Formulating one would take time and information I don’t have, and would be useless anyway since I’m not Bush or Rumsfeld. I do think Bush needs to articulate something below 40,000 feet, i.e. spreading God-given liberty. OK, fine. Groovy. But we have to go forward from where we are. I am afraid that we have over-committed our immensely powerful but finite landpower assets to Iraq. This limits our ability to make credible threats against the more dangerous enemy, Iran. How to deal with Iran? I’m not sure. The only way we could be sure about destroying their nuclear program would be to occupy the place. I don’t think this is currently a practical possibility. Anyway, I hope we don’t get in the habit of conquering a lot of places. Too hard, too expensive, too destructive, too risky. I am also afraid we have failed to understand the true nature of al Qaeda and Islamism more generally, which means that much of what the Bush administration is doing and saying may well be misconceived and even counterproductive. I do think Bush has balked too much in Iraq, being willing to use massive force to depose Saddam, but unwilling to use adequate force to occupy and pacify the country, which has led to more and more prolonged suffering and violence, has signalled weakness to our enemies and thereby cast aside much of the benefit we might have obtained by conquering the place. So to the extent I would like to see policy changes, I am advocating not so much a widening as a deepening of the war effort. Greater commitment to pacifying and rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.

    8. Michael Hiteshew Says:

      I am advocating not so much a widening as a deepening of the war effort. Greater commitment to pacifying and rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.

      I agree with that completely, absolutely, 100%.