7 thoughts on “Our Flawed Military Bureaucracy”

  1. We can buy anything we want, but the CENTCOM CO says no to personal weapons. Espeically the army doggies buy all types of rails and light for thier weapons, which is a good move. The move to ACOG’s is an incredible positive move for the DoD, embracing proven market technology with out all the bogus “testing.” Such as the USMC’s new uniforms… “Gee, lets give the MARINES NON-WATER PROOF BOOTS!!”

    If I get sent over, thhe liquidation of my bank accounts seems like a reasonable exchange for enhanced capabilities for myself : )

  2. Testing is what makes gear that takes a licking and keeps on ticking.

    Sure you can buy a “better” rifle.

    But can you keep it supplied with ammo, spare parts, etc? For 20 years?

    Logistics is a very difficult subject.

    Procurement is only one part of that problem.

    BTW whatever the faults, our logistics are the best in the world.

    Easy to criticize when you do not understand the other guy’s problems.

  3. M. Simon is right. What the soldiers are asking for is procurement of existing systems. What the conference was about was the development of new systems. Different purposes.

    There are indeed major issues involved with deploying any new equipment / ammo, even off the shelf. Users IMO seldom see that half of it, but those responsible for purchasing, deploying and supporting the stuff have to – they’re on the line for those criteria.

  4. I concur with that fact that we we are best in the world, and also that Private Pile shouldn’t be buying whatever off the shelf/hand me down and bring it along patrol, because if the gear isn’t good….

    There are many cases in which it would be fine to bring bring personal gear, but i can see where it could get out of hand for mission essential items.

  5. The matter of personal sidearms going into the theater could be resolved, IMO, if we restored the tradition of officers and NCOs buying their own in the first place. Frequent qualification with sidearms would wring out the ones that don’t work.

    The matter of adopting a new round for the service rifle is thornier. No way in hell CorBon could fill an order for their rounds to replace even a month’s worth of M855 from Lake City; it would take months just to retool Lake City to manufacture the round that CorBon has developed. Then there are the Geneva Protocol issues regarding the lethality of this ammo versus the M855.

    But the more important point is: the problems faced by real troops in real combat today are in part traceable to the poor plan or failure to plan a few years ago. And this is traceable to the failure of planners to listen to the real soldiers of the time, fresh from their experiences in Gulf War I. I am reading USAF Lessons Learned reports from Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom that reiterate, sometimes point for point, the same observations made of gear, procedures, facilities, organization structures engaged in GW I.

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