One of the fallacies of studying history and interpreting historical events is that:
1) you look at the course of events that occurred and assume that they mostly would follow a similar narrative with different variables
2) you ignore what might have happened that is significantly out-of-the-box or the “black swans” that could have resulted in radically different outcomes.
I discussed this here with equity markets by country; while we talk about the “long term” and staying with stocks since they generally rise, we ignore that for most countries there have been “liquidation events” that wiped out all the players who remained in the markets (of their stockholdings, at least).
For instance, in the course of WW2, there has been much discussion of whether or not the Germans would have won had they attempted a sea-landing of England. The much more important train of thought, however, is what might have happened had Churchill not been the Prime Minister of England during those critical hours. Many, many lesser men would have capitulated in that time of crisis.
On the Russian front, in 1941, Russia likely came within a hair’s breadth of moral and system-wide collapse after their frontier armies were annihilated and the Germans began driving across the steppe. The fact that they were able to sacrifice armies for time and keep some semblance of discipline is taken as a given, but likely if the world ran that as a true Monte Carlo simulation over and over again that outcome is rare.
A third WW2 example is “what would have happened had the US Navy lost at Midway” which was what the odds said would have occurred. It is true that in the end US material advantages would vastly outstrip Japan, but another issue is “if we didn’t have victories, would the US political system have produced an isolationist president who would have sued for peace?” FDR was an ill man and could have conceivably died anytime from 1940 onward. Even today, looking back, I am amazed that so many US servicemen were preparing to invade Japan at the end of the war, a task that would have led to virtually certain death or injury (for the lucky ones) for tens of thousands without some sort of riots or desertion given the immense casualties and deaths the US faced at Okinawa and Iwo Jima. Today we lack the social cohesion to attempt anything so disruptive and likely to result in mass casualties.
It is important to remember that historians and prognosticators are notoriously bad at predicting events – even on topics that they are intimately close to. For example, few saw the collapse of the USSR in 1989 and the entire “Arab Spring” that began with a vendor self-immolating in Tunisia swept the world with surprise. It isn’t that in hindsight many showed the “rot” of these decaying systems, but that they couldn’t predict the “triggers” that would set off the maelstrom.