Afghanistan 2050: Tribes vs. Networks

Here’s my one-paragraph contribution to your roundtable speculations about the view from 2050, as requested.

“Because of the way U.S. forces pulled back in the Teens and wars ensued in the 20s and 30s, debates continue as to whether we won or lost over there. Yet, what matters more for this quadriform theory of social evolution is the following: The persistent grip of the tribal form of organization — and thus local resistance to allowing the institutional (statist) and market forms to take hold properly — explains what unfolded in the region and why so little could be changed. At least we finally stemmed the jihadis efforts to spread their monoform religious tribalism elsewhere. But we’ve done less well at our deeper challenge here at home and abroad: adapting to the wrenching rise of the newest of the four forms — the information-age network form. Though we are decades into it, our leaders are still so prone to emphasizing established state and market factors — a legacy of our society’s triformist phases — that they still haven’t allowed the new form to express its key strength: letting a commons-based “social sector” emerge, so that we develop a truly quadriform society. Yes, it’s happening in fits and starts, and we got past the debasing of our polity by revanchist retro-tribal movements on our Right and Left. Yet, it’s disheartening that America’s efforts to use the network form in combination with the other three forms has led not so much to a revitalization of our democratic and entrepreneurial potentials, as to the consolidation of a hyper-surveilling cybercratic security state. This has kept our homeland guardedly open and safe since our pull-backs decades ago — a valid strategic trade-off, since neither Mahdista Momentum nor Xyber-Op LiberTAZ infiltrated to damage more in the 30s and 40s than Al Qaeda used to. But this twist in America’s evolution has knotted-up our ability to compete and cooperate with partners near and far. Indeed, China’s hybrid triform system is now in a stronger strategic position than any of the world’s few national efforts to create quadriform systems that function powerfully. Even so, time is on evolution’s side; it’s normal for the rise of a major new form of organization to take several generations to mature.”

[Purportedly based on “Tribes, Institutions, Markets, and Networks: A Theory of Social Evolution — Past, Present, and Future” (rev. ed., 2050).]

Many thanks for including me. My paragraph is too long, congested, and tendentious, and reflects present fears more than future hopes. But it contains a singular theoretical thread that may prove to have high tensile strength over the long run.

For clarification, visit Visions from Two Theories and see past posts about TIMN.

Onward.

Afghanistan 2050: Effects of the US Conflict

American forces withdrew at the end of 2015, leaving only a token force for training oversight. A short bloody civil war ensued with a faction of the Islamic extremists affiliated with the original Taliban quickly retaking the government. They consolidated their power over the next five years, bringing isolated tribal groups under control with an extreme interpretation of sharì’a law. Afghans see this turn of events not as a return to a life of repression, or even a triumph for Islam, but as a victory over another in a series of invading states and the triumph of nationalists over subjugation to a foreign nation under the regime of a puppet government. The current government was officially recognized by the United Nations in 2035, however the United States has only limited diplomatic relations to this day.

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Frustration, Apathy, and Futility

Are the real reasons that great powers quit Afghanistan.

This is an especially hard, but important lesson to learn. Like many lessons of military history, it is best learned vicariously.

The current US situation in Afghanistan sheds a bright light on the Soviet experience, and transforms a different narrative from implausible to obvious.

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Dr. Steven Metz on Afghanistan: “…America’s Afghanistan strategy, with its flawed assumptions, is badly out of balance.”

[The following is the contribution to our Roundtable discussion by Dr. Steven Metz, of the Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College. Dr. Metz is the author of Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy. ChicagoBoyz thanks Dr. Metz for his participation. ]

I’m currently reading Andrew Bacevich’s new book Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War. He contends that at the end of Vietnam, there was a moment when the United States could have veered away from the “Washington rules” which had developed since the 1940smilitarism, the definition of instability anywhere as a threat to American security, a poor understanding of non-Western cultures, and so forth. But it didn’t.

I truly believe that Afghanistan, coming on the heels of Iraq, will provide another such moment. And I hope we take it.

Current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is, I believe, built on strawmen and flawed assumptions. Both the Bush and Obama strategies assume that al Qaeda needs state support or sanctuary. That, after all, is the fundamental rationale for continued American involvement in Afghanistan. But throughout the “war on terror,” no one has made a persuasive case that the September 11 attacks would not have happened had al Qaeda not had bases in Afghanistan. While it may take meetings and phone calls to plot terrorism, these can be done from nearly anywhere. Al Qaeda’s Afghanistan sanctuary was a convenience, not a necessity. Destroying the sanctuary has not stopped bin Laden and his henchmen from plotting new attacks.

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Afghanistan 2050: A Travel Guide

Southwest China: Lhasa to Kabul (Rough Planet TravelWikiTI, 2050 edition)

It is possible to fly on the Lhasa-Kabul leg of the journey, although expensive, but to fly would be to miss the wonderment of taking what is perhaps the most exciting train ride left on the planet the Lhasa-Kabul Express. Not only is the scenery fantastic, and unviewable by any other means, and the engineering of the Karakoram Tunnel and the amazing bridges leading up to its portals a modern Wonder of the World, but the sociological aspect of the ride is unbeatable. Hard class, although not recommended for the novice rough traveler, has all the excitement of the wagon trains and emigrant ships of the Nineteenth Century, packed with a nation on the move, as migrants from the more northern and eastern parts of China come to try their luck in the Southwest. Soft class is more advisable, and from your comfortable sleeping compartment you can sip tea or maotai and watching the pageant of timeless, yet changing China unfold past your wide plate-glass window. We watched in fascination as other emigrant trains passed in the opposite direction, taking migrants also on the move, in this case members of Southwest China’s colorful national minorities headed toward the Voluntary Resettlements in the less crowded lands of the Tibetan Plateau. A nation on the move! Our guide and translator, the ever-helpful Miss Chen, explained that the armed guards on the train were there to protect the voluntary settlers from the occasional bands of bandits that still remain from the Times of Troubles before Southwest China was restored to its rightful historical status as part of the Chinese nation. Similarly, the many long eastbound freight trains of minerals speak to the massive economic development that has transformed Southwest China since the end of the Time of Troubles and reunification.

Arrival in storied Kabul was exciting, but, on walkabout, the first impression of the city was a bit of a letdown. So much of it has been rebuilt since the Times of Troubles that it now for the most part resembles any other Chinese city, and the crowds on the busy streets generally have the faces you would see in Shanghai, Beijing, or Lhasa. Indeed, if you are looking for the famous veiled faces or turban-clad national minorities, you must go to the Minorities Quarter, where several blocks have been restored in the traditional minority style even a mosque! (Although the call to prayer was merely an automatic sound file played by a helpful policeman-guide.) Ironically, you will see more Tibetans on the streets than Pashtuns, since many Tibetans have taken advantage of the lower altitudes and cheap housing available in Kabul these days. It is easier to get good Tibetan momo dumplings now in Kabul than the traditional lamb and rice dishes associated with the area, although a convincing version of the latter can be found at the restaurant of the Kabul Sheraton. However, as a consolation, the conventional Chinese food is ubiquitous and good; we especially grew fond of the barbecued pork buns sold by street vendors on almost every corner.

The Minorities Quarter is also recommended for finding those unique local arts and crafts, which have been carefully preserved by the Ministry of Chinese Minority Cultures. One novel gift is the replica firearms (non-working, of course) made in the traditional manner by local gunsmiths, several dozen of whom still work in the Minorities Quarter. The more expensive versions are purported to have been fabricated from the remains of Soviet and western armored vehicles destroyed in the Times of Troubles, although such claims may be taken with a grain of salt — or two! Authentic minority dancing shows are put on several times daily, see the Ministry site for times.

Travel outside of Kabul is limited and inadvisable, both because modern infrastructure is still under construction, and because police permits for such travel are still difficult to obtain, due to some remaining bandit activity. We did make a visit by air to Khandahar, which has been rebuilt along similar lines to Kabul, but frankly less interesting, with no Minorities Quarter or handicraft shops. The guide was proud to show us the new pork packing plant in central Khandahar, on the site of the former mosque, but frankly, if you’ve seen one light industrial facility, you’ve seen them all. The air trip to see the restored Bamyan Buddhas (see below) is also said to be worthwhile; no special permit is needed if you fly.

One word of caution to travelers it is easy to offend local sensibilities by discussing politics and repeating ill-informed stories spread by Sinophobic elements in those few irresponsible nations that still unfortunately permit such gossip. All responsible academic experts now agree that Southwest China has always been part of China, and its national minorities have always been part of the greater Chinese family. The Bamyan Buddhas, destroyed by Sinophobic separatists and now carefully restored, demonstrate the influence of Chinese Buddhist missionaries and the ties that have always existed between the various parts of China. Separatist activity has virtually ceased, outside of a few exile organizations, and, just as with the Tibetan region, over time the natural mixing of population and the acceptance of reunification by the world community has laid separatist fantasies to rest. Be particularly aware that the use of the former purported name for the Far Southwestern Region (“A*********n”) is considered Sinophobic.

For return travel, we would suggest air travel back to central China for those who can afford it, and a ride back on the train for those on a more limited budget. Air links to the east and west are few and permits for travel on them are generally restricted to government officials on priority business. It is possible to travel by bus east to Quetta or west to Herat, and thence onward to other Indian or Iranian destinations. However, visas and travel permits are difficult to obtain and the trips themselves, over not-yet-improved roads, are tedious. If you do wish to pursue this option, the Imperial Iranian consulate is on Sun Yixian Avenue, and the Union of India consulate is on May Fourth Boulevard. Be aware that dosimeters must be worn on bus travel through (or more accurately, around) Quetta and other Reconstruction Zones, by order of the Indian Military Administrator.

The authors would like to acknowledge the generous grant of the Southwest China Development Railway Authority that underwrote the research for this article.