Anglosphere

Constitutional history in the Anglosphere is a unity, and an ancient unity:

… there is an absolute continuity between medieval and modern constitutionalism. When President Nixon got into his helicopter and left the White House lawn and his office, he did so because he was afraid he would be impeached. Impeachment in the American constitution does not bear an accidental or trivial relationship to that which brought down Michael de la Pole, earl of Suffolk, chancellor of England in 1386. It was the same procedure and the descent can be traced without any shadow of doubt.

James Campbell, The Anglo-Saxon State.

F.W. Maitland noted as long ago as 1888 that impeachment in England had effectively died out. He noted that there had been only one impeachment in the 19th Century, and that back in 1805. The English procedure was akin to that provided in the U.S. Constitution. The House of Commons initiated an action against one of the king’s officers, who was then tried by the full House of Lords, sitting as a court. Unlike impeachment under the U.S. Constitution, which expressly restricts the penalty to removal from office, the English impeachment allowed any penalty the Lords saw fit to impose, including death. As we saw in the Clinton impeachment, the U.S. Senate acted in the unusual capacity of a court, as provided for by the Constitution, a vestige of its origins as an analog of the House of Lords, as the Founders intended.

Maitland noted that:

It seems highly improbable that recourse will again be had to this ancient weapon unless we had a time of revolution before us. If a statesman has really committed a crime then he can be tried like any other criminal: if he has been guilty of some misdoing not a crime, it seems far better that it should go unpunished than that new law should be invented for the occasion, and that by a tribunal of politicians and partisans; for such misdoings disgrace and loss of office are now-a-days sufficient punishments. Lastly a modern House of Commons will hardly be brought to admit that in order to control the king’s advisers it needs the aid of the House of Peers. However, there the old weapon is – an accusation by the commons of England at the bar of the House of Lords.

(Maitland, The Constitutional History of England.) I do not believe there has been any other impeachment in Britain since. So, this “old weapon” has most likely fallen into permanent desuetude. I suppose there is the remote prospect that an appointed House of Lords might be considered a more appropriate venue for an impeachment than a hereditary one, making a reappearance of this practice theoretically possible. Of course, if Britain were to go to an elective House of Lords, any power of impeachment would probably be expressly provided for by the enabling statute or written Constitution, whichever was employed. Retention of the right to summarily impose the death penalty on erring officers of the Crown is unlikely to be provided for, if the current soft-hearted attitudes continue to prevail. Not that there is anything wrong with that.

Our written American Constitution has allowed us to retain more of these ancient vestiges than the English one, curiously enough. The Second Amendment is a good example. The provision in the Bill of Rights of 1689 which it was based on holds that those “…subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law” — is now a dead letter. There is no way for a provision to “drop out” of the U.S. Constitution, short of amendment. A court may say that a provision is obsolete, but a later court may find a use for anything which is still there. “Young” America has a more “Ancient” Constitution than “Old” England, and has retained more of its freedom as a result.

(Cross-posted on Albion’s Seedling.)

Regarding Lex’s entry on the roots of English exceptionalism, here is the Roman historian Tacitus on one of the peculiar habits of the Germanic barbarians:

Affairs of smaller moment the chiefs determine: about matters of
higher consequence the whole nation deliberates; yet in such sort,
that whatever depends upon the pleasure and decision of the people, is
examined and discussed by the chiefs. Where no accident or emergency
intervenes, they assemble upon stated days…
From their extensive liberty this evil and default flows, that they
meet not at once, nor as men commanded and afraid to disobey; so that
often the second day, nay often the third, is consumed through the
slowness of the members in assembling. They sit down as they list,
promiscuously, like a crowd, and all armed. It is by the Priests that
silence is enjoined, and with the power of correction the Priests are
then invested. Then the King or Chief is heard, as are others, each
according to his precedence in age, or in nobility, or in warlike
renown, or in eloquence; and the influence of every speaker proceeds
rather from his ability to persuade than from any authority to
command. If the proposition displease, they reject it by an
inarticulate murmur: if it be pleasing, they brandish their javelins.
The most honourable manner of signifying their assent, is to express
their applause by the sound of their arms.

Leaving aside the tone of disdain, is it such a great distance between this ancient tribal council and a New England town meeting? Open discussions are held, motions made, and voice votes taken. We tend not to go armed to Town Meeting, though, unless property tax rates are on the agenda.

Jim Bennett has a good piece on assimilation of immigrants in the USA, which gives some idea of how hard this was to do in the past, and what it will take the UK to do the same thing. The fact that the 7/7 suicide bombers were home-grown came as a shock to many in the UK. This shock has set in motion a conversation, which may eventually be fruitful, to try to define what it is that immigrants to the UK should be trying to assimilate to. In other words, before you can say to someone, “if you want to come here, you have to decide to become one of us”, you need to answer the question for yourselves: “who are we?” This is a question many people don’t want to engage with. It leads to further questions, “why are we who we are?” and “is what we are good? Is it worth defending? Worth taking risks for? Worth dying to defend?” One early cut at defining a set of “core values” for Britain was this piece. It is a good list.

Creating a consensus on anything like this is very difficult, especially these days, either in UK, or the USA, and giving affirmative answers to these questions is even harder. The “commanding heights” are held by a news media, an entertainment industry and an academic community which convey a message of disdain for the history of these countries, which see little of value in their past or present, and which are actively opposed to the idea of assimilation.

If you teach generations of people nothing but the crimes of their ancestors and the corruption of their existing institutions, which is an incomplete and hence false depiction, they are unlikely to have the cohesion and confidence needed to insist that immigrants adopt certain base-line values and practices. In ordinary times this deficiency can be “kicked down the road”, since it may not seem urgent. However, it turns out to be a structural weakness when mortal threats arise.

This lack of cultural confidence become apparent when the UK, and to a lesser extent the USA, were faced by the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism. The Islamic radical looks around him in a country like England and sees people who do not respect their own way of life and are apologetic about it. The Islamic radical correctly senses weakness and has contempt for people who do not respect their own country, civilization or way of life. He sees the firmness of his own will and faith, and he discounts his material disadvantages, which he is not necessarily wrong to do. A small number of people with absolute conviction and willing to risk all for a cause can work seeming miracles. Mohammad’s followers came out of nowhere and overran the world, and their descendants never forget it. Closer to our own time, they recall that a superpower invaded Afghanistan, but that mujahideen from around the Muslim Umma rallied to its defense, and the Soviet Union is no more. The soft, comfort-seeking West seems like a much easier target. And like the Soviet Union, it no longer believes in the principles that supposedly animate it. To the outside observer looking at our depraved entertainment products and listening to the self-loathing on the mainstream news, the West must seem to be an animated corpse that will crumble into a putrescent heap if it is struck hard enough.

Weakness in any sphere invites attack, and the realm of cultural confidence and identity is no exception. Morale is more important than arms, and a country that starts out believing it does not really deserve to survive is already beaten. That may be overstating the case for the UK in 2005. However, a country that tries to wage a struggle where many of its most powerful and influential people believe that the moral right resides with their enemies is far weaker than it will appear if you try to add up the tangible assets each side brings to the fray.

Fortunately, the academic and educational and media communities, while still very powerful, are weakening. They are being stripped of their quasi-monopoly positions by advancing technology. A more complete, more affirmative and truer version of Anglo-American freedom can be formulated and disseminated via the new media, the home-schooling movement, and other means. The United States and the rest of the Anglosphere are magnets for immigrants. These people have experienced alternative arrangements up-close. They are likely to see and understand what is good about these communities. All we need to do is regain this understanding ourselves, and make it available for those who want to learn. This will be a difficult challenge in the years ahead. I anticipate that it will be successful, but nothing is inevitable.

Update: See Helen Szamuelly’s post from the EU Referendum blog. She paints a dire picture of how bad things have gotten in the UK. (You can only start rebuilding from where you are, says I.)

Update II: “If we lose faith in our values, we will lose the war on terrorism.” Michael Barone quotes the President of the Italian Senate, making a similar point.

Heads up — Jim Bennett is going to be turning his blog, which was pretty much inactive, into a group blog, starting with a core group of interesting and knowledgeable people. I’ll be posting on there from time to time, on Anglospheric matters, once I get set up. I will also continue my contributions here on the Boyz. I’ll probably cross-post any substantial ones from there over here, anyway. Switching to a group blog will, I trust, get a steady level of posting going on Jim’s blog, on many fascinating issues. More news as all this develops.

Jim Bennett sent some comments about my earlier post about the Dutch influence in New York, which I pass along, slightly edited, with his permission.

… I have just read [Lex]’s post on Dutch New York, etc., which is good timing since I had picked up [Russell] Shorto’s book (Island at the Center of the World) for on the road reading. I’m about halfway through. I very much agree that New York City is sui generis, outside of Fischer‘s framework, as Fischer himself admits. I also agree that it is a freestanding major influence on the US. Incidentally, another good treatment on this theme is Joel Garreau’s Nine Nations of North America, which also treates NYC as an outlier.

I also agree that FDR was more Hudson Valley patroon than New England Yankee. I suspect some of the paternalism of the New Deal comes from landlord-tenant relations in the valley; it’s almost like a Tory Wet paternalistic attitude. These are entirely distinct cultures. The difference between the Hudson Valley Dutch and the Yankees (and the “no love lost” attitude between them) was also the basis for Washington Irving’s Legend of Sleepy Hollow, with its hilarious caricature of the New Englander Ichabod Crane. (As for Brom Bones, he would be perfectly at home today with a muscle car and a backwards-turned baseball cap.)

Although I have not finished the Shorto, I am continually annoyed by him. He acts as if William Penn and Roger Williams never existed. There are plenty of English-speaking sources of principled tolerance in colonial America. In fact, their tolerance was more principled than the Dutch, who were mostly tolerant out of opportunism, not that there’s anything wrong with that. And his treatment of the Puritans is simplistic. Shorto confuses Puritan and Victorian attitudes about sexuality. In fact most of Dutch tolerance as he discusses is boils down to religious indifference and toleration of prostitution. Has he never read a history of Virginia? Perhaps the latter is an example of toleration, but I suspect New England was less tolerant of prostitution primarily because women had some say in the running of the community there.

Shorto’s point about the singularity of New York and the importance of the Nieuw Amsterdam archives is right on target. But his lack of corresponding knowledge about the Anglo-American colonies renders his speculations of little value. Not only is he making an apples-to-oranges comparison, but he is using a sort of rude sketch of an apple to do it with.

What I also see is that the Dutch, unlike the English, had a great deal of trouble extending the self-governance of medieval constitutionalism to the New World, even though it existed quite healthily in the Netherlands itself. Compare this to the English experience, where just about every colony of settlement has some sort of assembly in short order. Perhaps this was because the English had a ready-made model of settler self-governing institutions dating from English emigration to Wales and Ireland. By the time they got to Virginia they were quite used to setting up counties and electing sheriffs and bailiffs. Whereas the Dutch tried to suppress settler self-governance both in America and in South Africa.

On the counterfactual question of what a Dutch-founded city would have looked like instead of French-founded New Orleans, Jim commented that “[a] Dutch New Orleans would probably have some of the flavor of Curacao. It would undoubtedly be better run than the current French version.”

Jim and I were both a little tough on Shorto. The book is good and interesting when he is talking about the founding era of Nieuw Amsterdam. It gets weak when he tries to project the story down the centuries to the present, a much more difficult task. The book’s merits are real, and the need for someone to do a full-blown, scholarly study of the influence of the Dutch settlement is highlighted by Shorto’s effort.