Iraq

Tuesday night, on the Lehrer show, Frank Gaffney made a clear and powerful argument for the war in Iraq. (The kind, frankly, I wish Bush would make— publicly, clearly, and often.) Ironically, the context was a dialogue on the Sheehan encampment, where his view was countered by Joan Walsh, of Salon, who spoke of Bush as clueless and callous, of Sheehan as of “open heart” and an “open approach.” Gaffney countered with policy, with reasoning. In general, he spoke with understanding of what we all (including the Muslims) are up against. Like all “true believers” and absolute tyrants, the bin Ladens and Saddam Husseins will first and last eat their own.

The dialogue was pointless, although a rich example of contrasts – the man and the woman, the head and the heart, the rational and the emotional, the public and the personal, the general and the specific. We found this also distinguished the hawks from the doves, the right from the left. When it comes to a mother’s grief, Walsh captures it better. But policy shouldn’t be based on the personal—the side with the most moving story is not necessarily the one with the best argument. And in terms of policy, of analysis, of proportionality – well, Gaffney wins hands down. His was the big picture. And, an educated heart energizes the head – his sympathy was for those under the Taliban, under Saddam Hussein, under the rule of a law we find draconian and fearsome – as well, of course, as sympathy for those killed in Bali and Madrid, London and Africa, Beirut and on the Cole, New York and Washington. On one level, this is a contrast between revenge and justice and on another between populist sentiment and reasoned policy. He demonstrates what we often describe as “being Christian” – thinking in terms of others different from the self.

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Reuel Marc Gerecht evaluates Iraq’s constitutional prospects in an August 8 WSJ op-ed:

The secularization of religious discussions in Iraq is already very far advanced–just compare the Iraqi clerical discussion of constitutional government at the time of Iran’s 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution with the debate today and you will quickly see how successfully Western ideas, first and foremost democracy, have redefined or submerged older Islamic ideals hostile to representative government. The democratic government Iraqis are trying to build will have much more real-world appeal and traction in today’s Middle East than the very liberal democracy that many Americans in the occupation’s Coalition Provisional Authority and in Washington wanted to build in 2003.

The Arabs imported fascism — a significant component of Baathism, pan-Arabism and today’s Islamic fundamentalist imperialism — from the West. Why should we assume they are incapable of importing democracy?

Gerecht’s column is worth reading in full.

(via Clive Davis)

Responses to the attack on London, after sympathetic murmurs, swiftly turned to support for previously held positions. Some were heartening. We admire the Brits’ stiff uppper lip. Their history bucks them up; they demonstrate a point we’ve made before on this blog: history gives us spine and self-respect, narratives with which we interpret experience. Their constant references to World War II and the Blitz seemed old; when one host drew out his World War II propaganda collection after inviting two Germans (one my son-in-law) to dinner, I was appalled. Perhaps on 7/7, smugness became a virtue and such history gave strength. Reliving so often their courage during the blitz, last week they reached back to Mrs. Miniver. Andrew Roberts notes:

If the elderly lady I overheard in a small crowd watching the events on TV through the windows of an electrical goods store in the King’s Road, Chelsea, is anything to go by, the general attitude is: “It’s ridiculous not being able to take trains home. If we didn’t kowtow to Hitler, why should we to this lot?”

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Wretchard comments:

Although Ignatieff plainly wants to see freedom spread, one of the sources of his unease is the role of God, or something like it, in the missionary endeavor. How much better it would be, he seems to ask, if any claims to universality or transcendence could be kept out it.

A commentator notes that Ignatieff’s Canadian background may lead him to misunderstand American history and the vision of the early Americans. Central was an assumption about the universality of human nature and a desire for freedom; it underlies the arguments, concessions, and finally agreements that made up our early laws and built our early identity. Most believed in a Providential order and liberty – however varied their sectarian allegiances (and doubts). (Of course, this misunderstanding is not unknown in American classrooms.)

The Belmont Club comments are extensive and often thoughtful. Ignatieff clearly understands that Americans are idealistic about ends he respects. He recognizes (if not perhaps understands) the power these old ideas still have for Americans:

As it turned out, the American electorate seemed to know only too well how high the price was in Iraq, and it still chose the gambler over the realist. In 2004, the Jefferson dream won decisively over American prudence.

Does he think people take great risks for paltry ends? And prudence prompts some of us (impetuous & perhaps border types) to think of Chamberlain and Vichy. He may consider this criticism but we are less likely to take it that way.

The most sensible argument for the invasion was not that Hussein was about to strike the United States or anyone else with a nuclear bomb. It was that containment could not be preserved indefinitely, that Hussein was repeatedly defying the international community and that his defiance appeared to both the Clinton and Bush administrations to be gradually succeeding.

–Robert Kagan

(Kagan’s argument is limited in scope, perhaps due to the size constraints of a newspaper column. I would add to his points this one: in the sewer of middle-eastern Islamist nationalism that produced terror attacks culminating in Sept. 11, the US needed to start reversing the process by making an example of one of our enemies. Afghanistan was the right place to start, since the Sept. 11 terrorists came from there, but having subdued Afghanistan we needed to make clear that we saw what we were doing as more than a police action against Al Qaeda. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq made perfect sense as our next objective, due to its combination of persistent belligerence toward us, a history of external aggression and extreme brutality, and WMD use and possession.)

(Kagan link via Martin Devon.)