Month: July 2006

What Does It Take to Win?

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I’ve stated before that I’m not adverse to use of massive force:

I think reasonable people can disagree as to whether the Israeli response is “disproportionate”. I myself have no qualms about destroying an enemy’s infrastructure if civilian deaths can be kept to a minimum and the payoff in psychological damage to the enemy is great enough (think about General William T. Sherman’s March to the Sea).

I went a little deeper into this in response recently to a comment from someone:

I don’t want to sound like a “make love not war” type of guy, but come on, dropping bombs with that might … is a bit of an “over kill” literally …. It’s like a little kid goes to a football player (Defense) and kicks him in the knee, which makes the football player rip him apart

My response:

Without supporting or protesting any specific Israeli tactics, I would pose the following question: What does it take to win? In your analogy, the stakes aren’t very high; probably a bruised ego at best. But in the actual war between Israel and Hezbollah, the stakes are the very survival of Israel. Sure, Hezbollah does not currently have the wherewithal to wipe Israel off the map, as long as there’s a little more than token resistance on the part of Israel. But asking Israel to do no more than that is essentially to say to Israel to grab her ankles.

Personally I’m in favor of General Sherman’s idea of total war: Destroy the infrastructure. I grant that General Sherman’s methods may not entirely apply here, because unlike the Union occupation of the South after the American Civil War, Israel’s not likely to occupy even just southern Lebanon after the conflict, with an eye toward annexation.

So, back to the question: What does it take to win? Israel has nuclear weapons. If all it wanted was to be rid of Hezbollah, why not just nuke the frontier areas? Goodbye south Lebanon, goodbye Gaza. But the international relations repercussions of such an activity, to say nothing of the moral repercussions, argue against such a tactic.

Thus I think I have established that merely putting up token resistance, or nuking Hezbollah, are extreme solutions that are non-starters. What does it take to win?

The kind of power politics we’re used to seeing, which has developed over the Cold War era, is that the international system does not want any party to a conflict to win outright. While it’s easy for remote adversaries to come to a ceasefire agreement (North Korea/United States), or even to declare a winner (United States > North Vietnam, United Kingdom > Argentina, etc.), it is far more difficult for neighbors to live with the sense that one side or another has “won” (Iraq v. Iran, Iraq v. Kuwait, Somalia v. Somalia, Ethiopia v. Eritrea), much less a convincing victory (Israel > Egypt + Jordan + Iraq + Syria + Saudi Arabia). More times than often, one neighbor complete absorbs the other (North Vietnam > South Vietnam). In fact, outside of the Americas and most of Europe, neighbors often exist alongside each other with some unease (North Korea v. South Korea, Japan v. North Korea + South Korea + China, Vietnam v. China, China v. India, Cambodia v. Vietnam, Indonesia v. East Timor, India v. Pakistan, Iran v. Iraq, Serbia v. Croatia, to list just a few outside the Middle East).

In fact, the international system as it currently exists tends to support the underdog blindly. In some case, this may be good, if the underdog was attacked (Bosnia, Kuwait, and Egypt in 1956); in others, it’s probably not good, if the underdog is the aggressor (the occasional incursions by Pakistan). The only exception to this rule is that when Israel is the underdog but not the aggressor, it is not supported (1967, 1973).

A system which applies pressure for war to cease before a workable peace is possible merely buys time for the side that was about to lose. This is not to say whether that’s good or bad, but at least in the case of post-1967 Israel, we’re not talking any longer about states rubbing up against each other, jostling for land and/or resources. No, we’re talking now about an enemy that intends for the complete and irrevocable eradication, not only of the Jewish state, but of any Jewish blood in the Middle East. Against that backdrop, a system that does not allow one side or the other to win is actually a way to lengthen the conflict, not to ameliorate it.

We go to great lengths to say that we want the war to stop because innocents are getting killed. But what we end up doing is forcing the parties to refight the same war every few years. When you add it up, the civilian casualties turn out greater than if we were to let the parties have a free-for-all, last man standing.

If you don’t mind keeping the conflict simmering, then Israel is “overreacting”. But keep in mind that essentially what you’re supporting in this conflict by limiting Israeli options is the continued existence of Hezbollah.

If you want a real end, let Israel do what it must, and punish it later for its excesses.

I’m sure some of the dates can be cleaned up, but overall I think this is a pretty good representation of the current international system, which is in fact a rather “reactionary” one, a truly “conservative” system.

[Cross-posted at Between Worlds]

Quote of the Day

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Among many activists, regulators and legislators, there is a pervasive myth that a little overregulation never hurt anyone. But a “little” here and a “little” there add up. The reality is that regulation exacts societal costs whose magnitude is almost unimaginable.

According to the Competitive Enterprise Institute, U.S. regulatory costs in 2005 were $1.13 trillion, equal to almost half of all of the government’s discretionary, entitlement and interest spending, and much larger than the sum of all corporate pretax profits — $874 billion. Much of the expenditure on regulation is ill-spent on the most expensive cures that do the least good.

-Henry I. Miller, Investor’s Business Daily op-ed page, July 11

Democrats, Republicans, Libertarians, Religious Conservatives — and Governing Coalitions

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Here’s the text of an email conversation that Lex and I had recently:

Me: Link

This argument isn’t new but I think it’s essentially valid, and it’s presented well in this article.

Lex: Any successful party is a coalition. If it is successful long enough the members of the coalition start to grumble that they are not getting enough of what they want. I think there is a decent chance that the elements of the GOP coalition can fragment. The wishes of libertarians for a more libertarian approach will be dashed. The hopes of the Christian Right, which is actually what I am when you get down to it, for a more culturally conservative approach, will also be dashed. Neither group has enough numbers to get any of what it wants without being part of a coalition. The Religious Right is also generally for small government, so they are less likely to see anything at all to like about the Democrats. The libertarians may like the fact that the Democrats are for gay marriage, pornography and abortion and also drug legalization. Glenn Reynolds is very clear that he is against the GOP mainstream on these issues, for example, as one would expect of a professional academic. However, the core libertarian view has always been smaller government, and a key element of that has been gun rights. The Democrats have absolutely nothing to offer on these issues. However, libertarian voters are fickle and perfectionistic. So, they may vote for socialism to get pornography, for at least one election. I have never been a libertarian. Still, I am just not worried about the GOP coalition breaking up when (1) the Democrats seem not to have much to offer to anyone outside their current core constituencies, and (2) national security is a major issue and the Democrats are incoherent. The idea that the current Democrat leadership has the wit to “reach out” to libertarians is almost funny. Libertarian wishful thinking. If they do very badly in 2006 they may wake up and get their shit together in time for 2008. We’ll see what happens.

Me: A successful coalition has the largest amount of both members and dissatisfaction.

I agree with you mostly. The Dems are in a bind, because they can’t offer the libertarians or religious conservatives much of value without giving up their core socialism and control-freakiness.

There are lots of different value mixes among libertarians. I am pretty libertarian but I’m also opposed to gay marriage and favor substantial restrictions on abortion. The deal-killers for me with the Democrats are guns and, even more, the Democrats’ class envy and hostility to small business. I suspect that the issue that best encapsulates the ideological divide here is the death tax.

Realism from the Anglosphere

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My colleague on EUReferendum is an expert on what I blithely refer to as “toys”. The subject is of great importance to all those interested in the Anglosphere and his recent piece bears reading and discussing. Alas, the conclusions he comes to with regard to Britain are very depressing.