The Cuban Missile Crisis, as Viewed From a Soviet Launch Facility


This month marks the 52nd anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world dangerously close to thermonuclear war.

A couple of years ago,  I read  Rockets and People, the totally fascinating memoir of Soviet rocket developer Boris Chertok, which I’m still hoping to get around to reviewing one of these days.

Chertok’s career encompassed both military and space-exploration projects, and in late October 1962 he was focused on preparations for launching a Mars probe. On the morning of Oct 27, he was awakened by “a strange uneasiness.” After a quick breakfast, he headed for the missile assembly building, known as the MIK.

At the gatehouse, there was usually a lone soldier on duty who would give my pass a cursory glance. Now suddenly I saw a group of soldiers wielding sub-machine guns, and they thoroughly scrutinized my pass. Finally they admitted me to the facility grounds and there, to my surprise, I again saw sub-machine-gun-wielding soldiers who had climbed up the fire escape to the roof of the MIK. Other groups of soldiers in full combat gear, even wearing gas masks, were running about the periphery of the secure area. When I stopped in at the MIK, I immediately saw that the “duty” R-7A combat missile, which had always been covered and standing up against the wall, which we had always ignored, was uncovered.

Chertok was greeted by his friend Colonel Kirillov, who was in charge of this launch facility. Kirollov did not greet Chertok with his usual genial smile, but with a “somber, melancholy expression.”

Without releasing my hand that I’d extended for our handshake, he quietly said: “Boris Yevseyevich, I have something of urgent importance I must tell you”…We went into his office on the second floor. Here, visibly upset, Kirillov told me: “Last night I was summoned to headquarters to see the chief of the [Tyura-Tam] firing range. The chiefs of the directorates and commanders of the troop units were gathered there. We were told that the firing range must be brought into a state of battle readiness immediately. Due to the events in Cuba, air attacks, bombardment, and even U.S. airborne assaults are possible. All Air Defense Troops assets have already been put into combat readiness. Flights of our transport airplanes are forbidden. All facilities and launch sites have been put under heightened security. Highway transport is drastically restricted. But most important—I received the order to open an envelope that has been stored in a special safe and to act in accordance with its contents. According to the order, I must immediately prepare the duty combat missile at the engineering facility and mate the warhead located in a special depot, roll the missile out to the launch site, position it, test it, fuel it, aim it, and wait for a special launch command. All of this has already been executed at Site No. 31. I have also given all the necessary commands here at Site No. 2. Therefore, the crews have been removed from the Mars shot and shifted over to preparation of the combat missile. The nosecone and warhead will be delivered here in 2 hours.

Chertok, who at this point was apparently viewing the Cuban affair as a flash in the pan that would be resolved short of war, was concerned that moving the Mars rocket would cause them to miss their October 29 launch date, and suggested that the swap of the rockets be delayed for a few hours. Kirillov told him that this was impossible, and that he should go to the “Marshal’s cottage,” where some of his associates wanted to see him. Chertok’s response:

Yes, sir! You’re in charge! But, Anatoliy Semyonovich! Just between you and me—do you have the courage to give the ‘Launch!’ command, knowing full well that this means not just the death of hundreds of thousands from that specific thermonuclear warhead, but perhaps the beginning of the end for everyone? You commanded a battery at the front, and when you shouted ‘Fire!’ that was quite another matter.


There’s no need to torment me. I am a soldier now; I carry out an order just as I did at the front. A missile officer just like me, not a Kirillov, but some Jones or other, is standing at a periscope and waiting for the order to give the ‘Launch!’ command against Moscow or our firing range. Therefore, I advise you to hurry over to the cottage.

At the cottage, four men were seated at a table playing cards while a fifth was trying to glean the latest news from a radio and Lena, the housekeeper, was in the kitchen drying wine glasses. It was suggested that since Chertok didn’t like playing cards, he should help Lena fix the drinks. This involved a watermelon and lots of cognac.

I took the enormous watermelon and two bottles of cognac out of the fridge. When everything was ready, we heard a report that U.N. Secretary General U Thant had sent personal messages to Khrushchev and Kennedy. Once again, Voskresenskiy took the initiative and proposed the first toast: “To the health of U Thant, and may God grant that this not be our last drink!” This time we all drank down our toast in silence and very solemnly, realizing how close we now were to a situation in which this cognac and this watermelon could be our last.

Still hoping to avoid the cancellation of the Mars mission, Chertok went to another cottage and, with considerable difficulty, made a forbidden call to S P Korolev, overall head of the Soviet rocket program, who was then in Moscow. Korolev told him that things were being taken care of and not to worry.

It was already dark when I returned to the Marshal’s cottage. On the road, a Gazik came to an abrupt halt. Kirillov jumped out of it, saw me, swept me up in a hug, and practically screamed: “All clear!” We burst into the cottage and demanded that they pour “not our last drink,” but alas! The bottles were empty. While everyone excitedly discussed the historic significance of the “All clear” command, Lena brought out a bottle of “three star” cognac from some secret stash. Once again the Mars rockets were waiting for us at the launch site and in the MIK.

Reflecting on the crisis many years later, Chertok wrote:

Few had been aware of the actual threat of a potential nuclear missile war at that time. In any event, one did not see the usual lines for salt, matches, and kerosene that form during the threat of war. Life continued with its usual day-to-day joys, woes, and cares. When the world really was on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe, only a very small number of people in the USSR and the United States realized it. Khrushchev and Kennedy exercised restraint and did not give in to their emotions. Moreover, the military leaders of both sides did not display any independent initiative nor did they deviate at all from the orders of their respective heads of state. Very likely, Khrushchev wasn’t just guided by the pursuit of peace “at any cost.” He knew that the U.S. nuclear arsenal was many times greater than ours. The Cubans did not know this and viewed Moscow’s order to call off missile preparation and dismantle the launch sites as a betrayal of Cuba’s interests. President Kennedy had no doubt as to the United States’ nuclear supremacy. The possibility of a single nuclear warhead striking New York kept him from starting a nuclear war. Indeed, this could have been the warhead on the R-7A missile that they didn’t roll out of the MIK to the pad at Site No. 1.

7 thoughts on “The Cuban Missile Crisis, as Viewed From a Soviet Launch Facility”

  1. Kennedy was about as weak as Obama but it was not widely known. Khrushchev realized it at Vienna and decided to capitalize. The main reason the Soviets backed down, I have read, is that they decided that the US would have a military coup if Kennedy gave in. Robert Kennedy gave them the out with the missiles in Turkey.

    Today, our military has been so neutered by Vietnam and the political process that no one fears a revolt. Obama is free to destroy what he wishes.

  2. Thus are the endlessly derided, satirized, and condemned policies of nuclear superiority and MAD justified, and clearly shown to have accomplished exactly what they were intended to do.

    Soon Iran will be in the position the USSR was then, at least to some degree. One can only hope that the leader of the current regime and his criminal gang of cronies are long gone by then, and the position occupied by someone who actually has American interests in mind instead of a hostile ideology.

  3. Personally, I’m glad I didn’t die that day. I expect we all are. And I’m glad there wasn’t a nuclear exchange either. I’m glad they worked it out.

  4. Kennedy was about as weak as Obama but it was not widely known. Khrushchev realized it at Vienna and decided to capitalize. The main reason the Soviets backed down, I have read, is that they decided that the US would have a military coup if Kennedy gave in. Robert Kennedy gave them the out with the missiles in Turkey.

    I suppose that this is one explanation.

    Another is that the Soviets were scared witless by Kennedy, who had campaigned on missile gap claims and then when he found out the truth (the Soviets were incredibly far behind the US ) persisted on ramping up missile production to a tune of 10 to 1 – meaning, “the United States could absorb a full-scale Soviet missile attack and still have more than enough nuclear missiles to destroy 100 Soviet cities, kill 100 million Soviet citizens and destroy 80 percent of that country’s industrial capacity in a few hours.”

    And perhaps the Soviets were well aware that the United States had already tried to overthrow the Cuban government, and that throughout the year bombings and attacks and attempted assassinations had appeared on Cuban soil, and that an invasion from the United States seemed plausible. Or that the USSR’s hesitance to get buddy-buddy with the Cubans made them look weak, and questioned their status as a global super power and trusted leader of international communism.

    Or we could just blame it on Kennedy being like Obama. Whatever floats your boat.

  5. Kennedy was no Obama. Not Camelot but no Obama. For one thing Kennedy was a patriot, and Obama has no interest whatsoever, no connection with us at all.
    We’re a vehicle for his interests.

    And Obama would be on vacation in Hawaii, golfing and those missiles would still be in Cuba.

  6. “We’re a vehicle for his interests.”

    I think this an important insight into Obama. Kennedy wanted the job and was weak but he had our best interests at heart. He did decline intelligence briefings that would have shown him his rhetoric about “the missile gap” was not true but maybe he believed it anyway.

  7. The most stark difference between the Cuban missile situation and Iranian pursuit of nukes isn’t just JFK vs. Obama. It is that Khrushchev was mostly a rational actor, especially in this particular “game.” The mullahs of Iran are not rational…their cult truly desires a global nuclear war. You can’t appease and compromise with them, because they only want us dead, regardless of the collateral damage and fallout. Obama and his ideological fiends are endangering all of civilization when they disregard Iranian intentions.

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