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  • The Cuban Missile Crisis, as Viewed from a Soviet Launch Facility (rerun)

    Posted by David Foster on October 23rd, 2017 (All posts by )

    This month marks the 55th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world dangerously close to thermonuclear war.

    Several years ago,  I read  Rockets and People, the totally fascinating memoir of Soviet rocket developer Boris Chertok, which I reviewed here.

    Chertok’s career encompassed both military and space-exploration projects, and in late October 1962 he was focused on preparations for launching a Mars probe. On the morning of Oct 27, he was awakened by “a strange uneasiness.” After a quick breakfast, he headed for the missile assembly building, known as the MIK.

    At the gatehouse, there was usually a lone soldier on duty who would give my pass a cursory glance. Now suddenly I saw a group of soldiers wielding sub-machine guns, and they thoroughly scrutinized my pass. Finally they admitted me to the facility grounds and there, to my surprise, I again saw sub-machine-gun-wielding soldiers who had climbed up the fire escape to the roof of the MIK. Other groups of soldiers in full combat gear, even wearing gas masks, were running about the periphery of the secure area. When I stopped in at the MIK, I immediately saw that the “duty” R-7A combat missile, which had always been covered and standing up against the wall, which we had always ignored, was uncovered.

    Chertok was greeted by his friend Colonel Kirillov, who was in charge of this launch facility. Kirollov did not greet Chertok with his usual genial smile, but with a “somber, melancholy expression.”

    Without releasing my hand that I’d extended for our handshake, he quietly said: “Boris Yevseyevich, I have something of urgent importance I must tell you”…We went into his office on the second floor. Here, visibly upset, Kirillov told me: “Last night I was summoned to headquarters to see the chief of the [Tyura-Tam] firing range. The chiefs of the directorates and commanders of the troop units were gathered there. We were told that the firing range must be brought into a state of battle readiness immediately. Due to the events in Cuba, air attacks, bombardment, and even U.S. airborne assaults are possible. All Air Defense Troops assets have already been put into combat readiness. Flights of our transport airplanes are forbidden. All facilities and launch sites have been put under heightened security. Highway transport is drastically restricted. But most important—I received the order to open an envelope that has been stored in a special safe and to act in accordance with its contents. According to the order, I must immediately prepare the duty combat missile at the engineering facility and mate the warhead located in a special depot, roll the missile out to the launch site, position it, test it, fuel it, aim it, and wait for a special launch command. All of this has already been executed at Site No. 31. I have also given all the necessary commands here at Site No. 2. Therefore, the crews have been removed from the Mars shot and shifted over to preparation of the combat missile. The nosecone and warhead will be delivered here in 2 hours.

     

    Chertok, who at this point was apparently viewing the Cuban affair as a flash in the pan that would be resolved short of war, was concerned that moving the Mars rocket would cause them to miss their October 29 launch date, and suggested that the swap of the rockets be delayed for a few hours. Kirillov told him that this was impossible, and that he should go to the “Marshal’s cottage,” where some of his associates wanted to see him. Chertok’s response:

    Yes, sir! You’re in charge! But, Anatoliy Semyonovich! Just between you and me do you have the courage to give the ‘Launch!’ command, knowing full well that this means not just the death of hundreds of thousands from that specific thermonuclear warhead, but perhaps the beginning of the end for everyone? You commanded a battery at the front, and when you shouted  ‘Fire!’  that was quite another matter.

    Kirillov:

    There’s no need to torment me. I am a soldier now; I carry out an order just as I did at the front. A missile officer just like me, not a Kirillov, but some Jones or other, is standing at a periscope and waiting for the order to give the ‘Launch’ command against Moscow or our firing range. Therefore, I advise you to hurry over to the cottage.

    At the cottage, four men were seated at a table playing cards while a fifth was trying to glean the latest news from a radio and Lena, the housekeeper, was in the kitchen drying wine glasses. It was suggested that since Chertok didn’t like playing cards, he should help Lena fix the drinks. This involved a watermelon and lots of cognac.

    I took the enormous watermelon and two bottles of cognac out of the fridge. When everything was ready, we heard a report that U.N. Secretary General U Thant had sent personal messages to Khrushchev and Kennedy. Once again, Voskresenskiy took the initiative and proposed the first toast: “To the health of U Thant, and may God grant that this not be our last drink!” This time we all drank down our toast in silence and very solemnly, realizing how close we now were to a situation in which this cognac and this watermelon could be our last.

    Still hoping to avoid the cancellation of the Mars mission, Chertok went to another cottage and, with considerable difficulty, made a forbidden call to S P Korolev, overall head of the Soviet rocket program, who was then in Moscow. Korolev told him that things were being taken care of and not to worry.

    It was already dark when I returned to the Marshal’s cottage. On the road, a Gazik came to an abrupt halt. Kirillov jumped out of it, saw me, swept me up in a hug, and practically screamed: “All clear!” We burst into the cottage and demanded that they pour “not our last drink,” but alas! The bottles were empty. While everyone excitedly discussed the historic significance of the “All clear” command, Lena brought out a bottle of “three star” cognac from some secret stash. Once again the Mars rockets were waiting for us at the launch site and in the MIK.

    Reflecting on the crisis many years later, Chertok wrote:

    Few had been aware of the actual threat of a potential nuclear missile war at that time. In any event, one did not see the usual lines for salt, matches, and kerosene that form during the threat of war. Life continued with its usual day-to-day joys, woes, and cares. When the world really was on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe, only a very small number of people in the USSR and the United States realized it. Khrushchev and Kennedy exercised restraint and did not give in to their emotions. Moreover, the military leaders of both sides did not display any independent initiative nor did they deviate at all from the orders of their respective heads of state. Very likely, Khrushchev wasn’t just guided by the pursuit of peace “at any cost.” He knew that the U.S. nuclear arsenal was many times greater than ours. The Cubans did not know this and viewed Moscow’s order to call off missile preparation and dismantle the launch sites as a betrayal of Cuba’s interests. President Kennedy had no doubt as to the United States’ nuclear supremacy. The possibility of a single nuclear warhead striking New York kept him from starting a nuclear war. Indeed, this could have been the warhead on the R-7A missile that they didn’t roll out of the MIK to the pad at Site No. 1.

     

    4 Responses to “The Cuban Missile Crisis, as Viewed from a Soviet Launch Facility (rerun)”

    1. dearieme Says:

      “He knew that the U.S. nuclear arsenal was many times greater than ours.” That’s a point on which Kennedy had lied throughout his election campaign, and on which he continued to lie in office. His lying is presumably part of the explanation for the tendency to hysteria of the US population at the time.

    2. Mike K Says:

      Kennedy refused briefings because he knew he was lying and did not want to be held to the truth after a briefing that told him he was lying.

      Robert Caro has an interesting picture of Kennedy in his final (so far, I hope) volume of his biography of Johnson. No mention of that, however.

      The JFK files to be released may include the information that Oswald had a KGB connection. My suspicion about the long period of secrecy is that was the reason it was concealed.

      Epstein’s book makes a plausible case that he was KGB asset when in the Marine Corps.

    3. Grurray Says:

      I was flipping around this weekend between football games and caught James Woolsey on Fox discussing the JFK files. He mentioned the head of the Romanian secret police named Ion Pacepa who wrote a book about the KGB angle. I still think the Chicago Outfit somehow had a hand in it too.

    4. Andrew X Says:

      Well, it’s all a hall of mirrors, so who maybe will ever know.

      But here is a fascinating part of the literature: Operation Solo by John Barron.

      Long story short, it is the tale of Morris Childs, longtime member of the Communist Party of the USA, right hand man of longtime Chairman Gus Hall, conduit between Hall and the Soviet Politburo… and an FBI agent the entire time. One of the few staggering and unqualified successes of US HUMINT that was neither countered nor burned by the filthy likes of evil little grubs like Ames, Walker, or Hanssen.

      And Childs happened to be in Moscow at the highest levels on Nov. 22, 1963. What he reported was that the Soviet authorities were genuinely horrified by the murder of Kennedy, and terrified when they found out it was Oswald, whom they of course knew, and for the same fear of US missiles that played a role in the Cuba events. Offing each others Commander-in-Chief was playing way way way outside the boundries, and both sides would agree as justification for full-scale war. It is said that the Soviets pretty much contacted the US at the highest levels, and said “Whatever you need on this guy, say the word”.

      Now maybe this is not entirely true, maybe the Sovs did not give us everything. But it is absolute historical fact the the US government never saw fit to point the finger toward Moscow, which I find difficult to believe would be the case if many people at the Deep State level really and truly thought that the order came from there. Particularly since they would certainly rather public suspicion were pointed at least somewhat at Moscow rather than at themselves (where it in fact seemed to settle down the road). So whatever the Sovs did tell the US, it seemed to have that effect.

      Amazing read, amazing story, that Operation Solo.