Books That Should Exist, But Don’t: The South African Military

Millions and millions of books. Even in the history field, thousands and thousands. Usually monographs on pretty narrow topics. But amidst all that, despite the numbers, you sometimes find that a book you want just does not exist.

I got thinking about South Africa recently, due to a perusal of Ralph Peters’ remarkable essay The Lion and the Snake, hat tip Eddie. And it occurred to me that I knew less about the South African military than I’d like. It is a remote corner of the Anglosphere which I’d like to know more about, and being me, I wanted to start from the military angle. I went looking for something like Granatstein’s history of the Canadian Army, or this essay collection on the military history of Ireland. I found remarkably little. There are unit histories, and an official (or semi-official) history of South Africa in the Second World War, and some books about the South African Army from the 1980s, and a few other odds and ends, such as this short essay, and this interesting list of books (click on “literature”). So there is a fair amount of material out there, but nothing comprehensive. I want someone else to do the research, the heavy lifting, and put the whole thing together for me, with an nice annotated bibliography.

Despite substantial searching, I am forced to conclude with regret that there is no one volume history of the South African armed forces, or military history of South Africa. I think we are too close to the transition from the apartheid regime to the successor regime. Old wounds are still open.

Still, too bad. It would be a very fascinating story, told as a continuous narrative. Lots of military, political, cultural and racial drama. The Dutch settlement, the British capture of the Cape, the Zulu Wars, the Boer War, South African expeditionary forces in both world wars, the Cold War era struggles against guerillas in adjacent countries, The military’s involvement in sustaining the apartheid regime, the clandestine nuclear program, the current ambiguous situation, including the virtual privatization of important segments of the South African Army into mercenary bands for hire, and some predictions and guesses about what the future might hold. What a tale. Even if it covered only the 20th century, starting with independence, after the Boer War, it is a story which would certainly have a lot of interest and lessons. It belongs in one volume. I hope someone writes it.

I close by opening the floor to our readers: Do you have any book recommendations about South Africa, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, etc., not necessarily limited to the military angle.

Outsourcing the Dirty Work

According to a Reuters news article, Canada is petitioning NATO to send more military assets to Afghanistan.

Every government in the world has their own concerns and agenda, although the interests of two countries might well align in some cases.

NATO is subject to restrictions that member nations have on how many troops they will donate, and the governments who contribute the troops often place restrictions on how they will be used.

That is why I find it bizarre to see any country place any sort of trust in an international coalition when it comes to defense issues. All of the elements necessary for decisive military action (flexibility, a clear goal, decisiveness) are lost.

If Canada is frustrated, why don’t they just go ahead and take care of the problem themselves?

Oh, yeah. I forgot.

Lepanto: 435

Today is the memorial of Our Lady of the Rosary, formerly celebrated as Our Lady of Victory, which the Catholic Church celebrates to commemorate the victory of the Christian fleet over the Turks at Lepanto, October 7, 1571. This was the first major victory of the West against the Muslims at sea, a military, political and cultural milestone of great importance. Prior to that day, the onrush of the Ottomans had seemed unstoppable. The Turks were not similarly checked on land until 1683, at Vienna. Prior to the battle, Pope St. Pius V asked the faithful to pray the rosary for what appeared to be an unlikely victory, and the victory was attributed to her intercession. The Turkish galleys were propelled by Christian captives taken and held as slaves.

G.K. Chesterton wrote a very stirring poem about the battle.

Disproportionate Response

Famed blogger Steven den Beste asked me if I would mind posting a few of his thoughts. Not at all! And here they are.

During the recent war in southern Lebanon, one of the many complaints leveled at Israel was that its response was “disproportionate”. Care to hear the reason why the complainers wanted Israel to limit itself to “proportionate” responses?

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What the Hell Happened to the Israeli Army?

On the 32nd day of the war, Hizbullah is still standing and fighting. That by itself is a stunning feat: a small guerilla organization, with a few thousand fighters, is standing up to one of the strongest armies in the world and has not been broken after a month of “pulverizing”. Since 1948, the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan have repeatedly been beaten in wars that were much shorter. � if a light-weight boxer is fighting a heavy-weight champion and is still standing in the 12th round, the victory is his – whatever the count of points says.

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Clearly, Hizbullah has prepared well for this war – while the Israeli command has prepared for a quite different war. On the level of individual fighters, the Hizbullah are not inferior to our soldiers, neither in bravery nor in initiative.

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This war casts a dark shadow on the whole upper echelon of our army. I assume that there are some talented officers, but the general picture is of a senior officers corps that is mediocre or worse, grey and unoriginal. Almost all the many officers that have appeared on TV are unimpressive, uninspiring professionals, experts on covering their behinds, repeating empty cliches like parrots.

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� an army that has been acting for many years as a colonial police force against the Palestinian population – “terrorists”, women and children – and spending its time running after stone-throwing boys, cannot remain an efficient army. The test of results confirms this.

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Judging from the reactions of the commanders in the field, they clearly were completely unaware of the defense system built by Hizbullah in South Lebanon. The complex infrastructure of hidden bunkers, stocked with modern equipment and stockpiles of food and weapons was a complete surprise for the army. It was not ready for these bunkers, including those built two or three kilometers from the border. They are reminiscent of the tunnels in Vietnam.

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History teaches that defeat can be a great blessing for an army. A victorious army rests on its laurels, it has no motive for self-criticism, it degenerates, its commanders become careless and lose the next war. (see: the Six-day war leading to the Yom Kippur war). A defeated army, on the other side, knows that it must rehabilitate itself. On one condition: that it admits defeat.

The author’s conclusion, that Israel can cut a deal with Syria and Hezbollah is wrong. But the critique of the Israeli military’s performance seems to be accurate, unfortunately.

RTWT.

Incidentally, Hezbollah’s performance, including its use of underground positions, was foretold accurately by H. John Poole in his book Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods, which came out almost two years ago.

UPDATE: Jonathan tells me this author is a notorious Leftist. Not surprising, given some of the stuff in this article. Nonetheless, the criticisms he levels here seem to be legitimate. Also, the idea that the military would have done a bang-up job but the civilians wouldn’t let them does not seem right. We had the same myth about Vietnam. But in both wars it seems that the generals botched their part of the program badly. The Israelis have just handed our common enemies a major victory. There is plenty of well-deserved blame to go around.