There is a lot of hubub on the nets concerning the NY Times article outlining the three-year history of the relationship between the US and Ukraine militaries during the Russian invasion. It’s fascinating, and while the larger strategic issues of the war are pushed into the background in favor of tactical and operational considerations, it fills in important details. Given the length (13,000 words) and the research involved, I’m sure there is a book in the works somewhere.
Given that, there’s something strange going on.
There is little in the article that should be shocking to anyone who has been paying attention for the past three years. It doesn’t take a proverbial “leaked Signal chat” to know that we have been providing the Ukrainians not only with supply, training, and planning support but also with ISR plugged right into the kill chain. We were everything but (officially) boots on the ground.
Problems in paradise between American and Ukrainian military planners? A staple of coalition warfare. The details are interesting, but the overall tenor is not surprising
That there were opportunities on the battlefield lost through miscommunication and political meddling? These dangers are present (and realized) in every war, and it’s the mark of a general’s ability to navigate those shoals at the highest levels of policy that gives them their place in history. George Marshall was a grandmaster at it. Mark Milley, not so much.