Clausewitz, On War, Book 2: No One-Size-Fits-All Solution

In book II, Clausewitz goes into great detail about the formation and application of theory. While he espouses little actual theory here, he does hammer home one extremely important idea.

The most prominent point, in my mind, is that there is no one-size fits-all solution. Clausewitz discusses the use of “routine“ as necessary for ancillary functions and training, as it provides basic knowledge on a tactical level for troops in the field, and provide the junior officer with “brisk, precise, and reliable leadership, reducing natural friction and easing the working of the machine” (p. 153).

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Clausewitz, On War, Book 2: The Oblique Order, the Road Not Taken, and the Black Swan

Themes and passages scattered throughout Book 2 reminded me of themes and passages scattered throughout mad prophet Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s The Black Swan. Both Book 2 and the The Black Swan detail the ways humans fool themselves, sometimes in disproportionately disastrous ways. Both preach a critical and conservative empiricism in the face of a baffling and shifting world. Both use some of the same empirical techniques, in Clausewitz’s case two hundred years too early.

One of Taleb’s main themes is the tendency for specialists in any field to develop physics envy and attempt to reduce the horrifically complex phenomena they study to a deterministic and mechanistic model complete with grand and complex equations. This envy doesn’t lead to a higher level of truth and accuracy. It leads to a higher level of systemic self-deception and delusion. It creates financial weapons of mass destruction such as an MBA armed with a spreadsheet and the belief that manipulating rows and columns bestows the ability to prophesy. Vain dreams.

Clauswitz joins Taleb in explaining why this delusion will lead to ruin:

The essential difference is that war is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter, as is the case with the mechanical arts, or at matter that is animate but passive and yielding, as is the case with the human mind and emotions in the fine arts. In war, the will is directed at an animate object that reacts. It must be obvious that the intellectual codification used in the arts and sciences is inappropriate to such an activity. At the same time it is clear that continual striving after laws analogous to those appropriate to the realm of inanimate matter was bound to lead to one mistake after another. Yet it was precisely the mechanical arts that the art of war was supposed to imitate. The fine arts were impossible to imitate, since they themselves do not yet have sufficient laws and rules of their own. So far all attempts at formulating any have been found too limited and one-sided and have been constantly been undermined and swept away by the currents of opinion, emotion and custom.

You can see Clausewitz calling out Jomini here, since Jomini tried (and failed) to reduce war to a science that followed predictable and universal principles (see Clausewitz’s picking on Jomini’s beloved interior lines for a specific example). Many died in the Civil War because of Jomini and his perverse inspiration (they may also have been killed by a second generation of warfare but rifles, Minié balls, and Napoleon guns are a poor defense against an out-of-control theory straining for relevance or killer generations). For those that disbelieve that military theory can’t kill, Clausewitz provides warnings a plenty.

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Clausewitz, On War, Book II: Inducing a General Theory of War

In 1916, Albert Einstein published the General Theory of Relativity. As its name implies, the “general” theory was a broader ostensibly more strategic application of his Special Theory of Relativity from 1905. After starting with the descriptive, Einstein then broadened his perspective to induce a general theory that could be used to describe the nature of all universal forces.

Carl von Clausewitz followed this same path nearly a century earlier, first formulating his “Special Theory of War” in Book I a descriptive text that defined “what” war is before inducing a “General Theory” of how war applies across time and space.

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Clausewitz, On War, Book 2: Chapter 1 Comments

The probing of the theorist of the moral pretension of the national interest puts him in an awkard position by making him suspect of being indifferent to all truth and morality.   This is why there are so many ideologies and so few theories.

Hans Joachim Morgenthau, 1962

The first chapter of Book 2 has some interesting points which lead to a fuller understanding of Clausewitz’s intent and the various falacies that he sees associated with theory.   I will comment on four points, but this is not meant to indicate that there are not others present in this chapter.  

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“U.S. Army Lt. Col. Clausewitz”

Many thanks to our esteemed colleague, Lord Curzon, who is not only the former Viceroy of India, but he apparently knows how to use Photoshop, too. He has put up a picture he made over at the terrific Coming Anarchy blog, which he says is his “one contribution to the Clausewitz Roundtable“:

Clausewitz, US Army

Clausewitz in camo, instead of sword, shako and epaulettes. If you squint a little, it works. The picture captures the spirit of our ongoing Clausewitz Roundtable, which is not meant to be an exercise in antiquarianism. What does Clausewitz have to say to us today? How do we better understand current issues, by looking at them through a “Clausewitzian lens”? What would it take to do a “critical analysis” of America’s defense challenges, along the lines Clausewitz suggests? The only way to get his perspective, without a ouija board or going to Heaven and asking him, is to read his book, as carefully as circumstances permit, and try to apply whatever remains of value in it to our current situation.