Can “On War” as a book from the dustbin of history reach out and touch the technologically sophisticated future of modern warfare? Where warfare is moving from monumental armies into a post nuclear age of niggling little conflicts is a dusty tome the literature of success? In a world populated with empowered non-state actors who take enthusiastic glee in creating tottering nation states, restrained in ability to react, can a passage from some chapter bring enlightenment? Given the growing reliance of society on technology can a book from so long ago even possibly give us insight into conflicts we are only now are beginning to perceive? Where cyber warfare is not even a fully understood concept of operation and has but yet to be implemented fully can Clausewitz possibly help us define a path through a new strategic operational environment of cyber warfare? Like all truly difficult and worthwhile activities best left to the dens of moldering bar rooms filled with veterans of many conflicts and tables spattered by concoctions and spirits this is but a taste of the hangover known as Clausewitz.
Clausewitz Roundtable
Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1: the Paradoxical Trinity
One of the most fascinating parts of Book 1 is the notion of the “trinity”, a much misunderstood concept, and one that deserves a few words in examination. It occurred to me that one of the most prominent scholars to have misrepresented this most elegant formulation of Clausewitz is Martin van Creveld, and I will look at the trinity in response to van Creveld’s thesis.
In 1991, Martin van Creveld’s On Future War [aka The Transformation of War] was published, eliciting critical responses on a variety of levels. One of van Creveld’s most contentious claims in a treatise clearly intended to trump the “self opinionated” Prussian was that Clausewitz’s ideas of ‘trinitarian’ warfare were outmoded in the modern era. Subsequent analyses have shown that van Creveld’s reading of Clausewitz was itself faulty and secondly that contemporary conflict in most cases still conforms to Clausewitz’s model. There is still no overwhelming consensus on the latter point, mainly as theorising about the present is innately difficult, but most commentators agree that ‘trinitarian’ warfare persists, despite protestations to the contrary by van Creveld and others.
Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 3: Response to Capt. Lauterbach on Clausewitz on Military Genius
A comment began to grow to unreasonable length. I decided to post it separately. Nate posted here about Clausewitz’s chapter on military genius. (As ART noted, it was good to see this focus on the “personnel” question, rather than the more heavily plowed pages of Book I, Chapter 1.)
What follows are some comments in response to Nate’s piece.
Descriptive and “qualitative” analysis “Clausewitz is rather unscientific, yet precise, when he writes about military genius.” Clausewitz still lived in the era before all data was quantified, and before all non-quantified data was suspect. The method he uses of verbally breaking out the characteristics of military genius is old-fashioned. We would expect to see survey data, with pie charts. I tend to think the way Clausewitz did it still has value. But no one thinks or writes this way anymore.
Courage It is no surprise that Clausewitz says that “courage is the soldiers first requirement”. That is almost axiomatic. Soldiers march toward the sound of the guns, rather than following ordinary instinct, and running as fast as possible in the opposite direction.
Clausewitz divides courage into two parts:
Clausewitz, On War, Book 1: Dialectic, but which dialectic?
That Clausewitz used a dialectical approach is well known. Less known is that there are serious questions as to which dialectic(s) Clausewitz was in fact employing. The best known form of the dialectic is perhaps that of Plato, simple question and answer going back and forth between two sides which may not agree but who both wish to arrive at a clearer understanding of the topic under discussion. Absolute truth may not be attainable, but a better understanding can be arrived at through two minds working through the dialectic of point and counter-point.
This is the most common form of dialectic, and one finds it often in On War, Clausewitz attempting so to speak to bring us into dialogue, invite us to consider his sometimes radical statements, get us to think about the complex subject he is discussing.
It may surprise some to hear me say that the dialectic that Clausewitz uses the most in his general theory is that of the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher . . .
Clausewitz, On War, Book I: Solving for War
By request of Lex I am crossposting my admittedly “crazy formula” which captures the variables of war introduced by Clausewitz in 1/1 of On War. See the original post Solving for War for the full explanation. To keep all the discussion in one place please post any comments at CA.