Clausewitz, On War, Book I: Art with Science

No single writer has had more influence on the professional militaries of our age than Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz nor has any writer been so often quoted while so rarely read.

The grandson of a Lutheran pastor and son of a minor functionary in the Prussian revenue service, Clausewitz enlisted in the Prussian army at the age of 12. Captured by Napoleon’s forces after the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt, he later left the Prussian army (largely in opposition to the enforced alliance with Napoleon) and served in the Russian army during Napoleon’s Russian campaign. His personal experiences from the battlefields as an opponent of Napoleon helped Clausewitz distill the Corsican’s genius into theory.

What is most significant about his magnum opus, On War, is that this volume of eight books was never finished yet its influence runs deep in the intermediate service schools and war colleges of most developed nations’ militaries. Only Book I was considered truly complete by Clausewitz before his death in 1831 at the age of 51.

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Clausewitz, On War, Book 1: Clausewitz and Herman Kahn

Herman Kahn consciously followed Clausewitz’s lead in choosing the title On Thermonuclear War.

However, whereas Clausewitz was trying to develop a general theory of war from his and others’ experiences, Kahn was trying to develop a theory of a war of a kind that had never been fought.

In Chapter 8 of Book 1, Clausewitz telescopes war down to “a single short blow” to show that this is not possible. Nuclear war moves closer to this idealization. Kahn’s analysis is that even a nuclear war does not consist of a single short blow. There can be warnings and exchanges.

Kahn was analyzing the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. There was 30 minutes warning of a strike by one on the other. Kahn died before India and Pakistan achieved approximate nuclear parity in 1998. Their warning times come much closer to Clausewitz’s “single short blow.”

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Clausewitz “On War”, Book 1: such a dangerous business

Israeli defence minister Ehud Barak recently said that “war is not a picnic”. He should know. Barak was a distinguished commander in the Israeli army, fighting in the Six Day War, the Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

Unlike Barak, most Western politicians and their officials have not served in the armed forces, let alone fought in a war. Israel, with its history of conflict and conscription, is arguably the sole exception. Yet politicians are the people who decide whether a country goes to war and for what reasons. If they haven’t seen war at first hand, then at least they should be under no illusions about what it involves.

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