Clausewitz Roundtable

It is February, 2003. There has been a fire in a Rhode Island nightclub, taking a terrible toll on life. The event moves me to check in with the only person I know in Rhode Island, Tom Barnett.

I send a brief email, a casual How are you doing? The reply was quick, something like, “Fine, Just wrote piece for Esquire magazine. Tell me what you think.”

I open the attached Word doc. It begins:

LET ME TELL YOU why military engagement with Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad is not only necessary and inevitable, but good.
 
When the United States finally goes to war again in the Persian Gulf, it will not constitute a settling of old scores, or just an enforced disarmament of illegal weapons, or a distraction in the war on terror. Our next war in the Gulf will mark a historical tipping point—the moment when Washington takes real ownership of strategic security in the age of globalization.
 
That is why the public debate about this war has been so important: It forces Americans to come to terms with I believe is the new security paradigm that shapes this age, namely, Disconnectedness defines danger. Saddam Hussein’s outlaw regime is dangerously disconnected from the globalizing world, from its rule sets, its norms, and all the ties that bind countries together in mutually assured dependence.

A historical tipping point… government takes real ownership of strategic security… why the public debate is so important… the new security paradigm, Disconnectedness defines danger. Did he just say war is not only necessary and inevitable, but good? I read on…

Read more

On my first day at the Royal Military College of Canada the professor used our scheduled three hours by asking simply one question: What is war? Three years later I still have no ready definition that satisfactorily answers this deceptively short question. Carl von Clausewitz spent twelve years and wrote an entire (unfinished) book about the topic!

Defining general terms of inquiry is essential for debate, and critical to the type of activity we of the Roundtable are trying to do: namely, analyze On War in a radically different context. A common understanding of the terms is essential to the enterprise.

Clausewitz takes a complex, multi-layered approach that some scholars have argued as Hegelian dialectic. The first book lays the basis for his definition of the word, a definition that transforms throughout the entire book — constantly being challenged, extended and refined. This suits Clausewitz’s underlying argument since the terms of war itself change from situation to situation. Spectrums and probabilities reign in his explanation. Often though, he turns to analogy as a means of explanation.

Read more

Who can forget Clausewitz’s dictum, “war is an act of policy”? The government decides to use war to achieve a policy objective. The military is ordered to fight the war. Its commanders know the part they must play and how that contributes to attaining the objective.

It sounds so simple. But as Clausewitz reminds us in Book 1, “everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult”. When it comes to war, many politicians overlook the obvious – the need to clearly establish what it is they want to achieve.

What makes for a good policy objective in relation to the use of war? I’m extrapolating a bit, but this is what I take from On War:

(1) The objective must be clear from the outset, as must the military’s role in achieving that objective.

The government must answer the following questions: “what is it that needs to be achieved?”, “how will the military help achieve this objective?”, and “are there alternatives to the use of force that will achieve the objective either as efficiently or more efficiently?”.

(2) The objective must be realistic, and in proportion to the military and other resources at the government’s disposal.

(3) It must not be open-ended. A realistic time limit should set, and regular review points set, so progress can be assessed and strategy adjusted.

(4) It should be clear that if the objective is achieved, real advantage will result.

In recent times, how many wars fought by western nations meet these basic criteria? Gaza, Afghanistan, Lebanon (2006), Iraq? It would be interesting, and perhaps instructive, to run the rule over these conflicts.

After that first post, I had in mind to apply “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” to what Israel is doing in Gaza. But Anthony Cordesman beat me to it. Looks like he’s studied Clausewitz.

This raises a question that every Israeli and its supporters now needs to ask. What is the strategic purpose behind the present fighting? After two weeks of combat Olmert, Livni, and Barak have still not said a word that indicates that Israel will gain strategic or grand strategic benefits, or tactical benefits much larger than the gains it made from selectively striking key Hamas facilities early in the war. In fact, their silence raises haunting questions about whether they will repeat the same massive failures made by Israel’s top political leadership during the Israeli-Hezbollah War in 2006. Has Israel somehow blundered into a steadily escalating war without a clear strategic goal or at least one it can credibly achieve? Will Israel end in empowering an enemy in political terms that it defeated in tactical terms? Will Israel’s actions seriously damage the US position in the region, any hope of peace, as well as moderate Arab regimes and voices in the process?

Read more