Military Affairs

Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife -Book Review

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Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife
by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl
University of Chicago Press

In writing Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife, LTC John A. Nagl set out to discover the lessons learned and not learned in counterinsurgency warfare with a comparative study of the experiences of the British and American armies fighting Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. Nagl has done so, admirably and concisely; even readers familiar with the extensive literature on the Vietnam War will find many of his examples instructive. More than that, in measuring British success against American failure in waging counterinsurgency, Nagl has pointed to a larger explanation on why complex organizations succeed or fail when faced with unexpected challenges.

Well crafted comparative histories are difficult, even for accomplished historians and Colonel Nagl succeeds brilliantly. The case studies are as well chosen as comparative history might permit; the 1950s’ “Malayan Emergency” of the largely ethnic Chinese and Communist revolt against waning British rule and incipient Malayan domination, and the 1960s’ Second Indochina War that featured massive American intervention in South Vietnam to crush the Viet Cong insurgency sponsored by North Vietnam. The superficial similarities of the British and Americans armies served Nagl well in highlighting the deep organizational and cultural differences separating the two militaries.

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Vindication Is So Sweet

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Way back October of 2004 I posted a critique of a study published in the Lancet that purported to show that:

…about 100000 excess deaths, or more have happened since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Violence accounted for most of the excess deaths and air strikes from coalition forces accounted for most violent deaths.

I called foul immediately, and I ended up writing a series of posts detailing my arguments. Now I find out from Michelle Malkin (via Instapundit) that David Kane, Institute Fellow at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University has authored a paper, soon to be presented, that demonstrates using detailed statistics just how deceptive (my adjective) the original study was.

Kane shows that if the Falluja cluster is included in the statistical calculations, the confidence interval dips below zero, which is a big no-no. Since the study’s raw data remain a closely guarded secret, Kane cannot be absolutely certain that the inclusion of the Falluja cluster renders the study mathematically invalid…

…but that’s the way to bet.

In science, replication is the iron test. I find it revealing that no other source or study has come close to replicating the original study. All my original points still stand.

Ah, vindication is sweet.

Decentralization: Myths of 4G Warfare Part II

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In part one, I examined the myth that Fourth Generational Warfare Groups (4GWGs) do not depend on the resources of an integral state, or do not have a territorial base, and as such offer no target which an opponent can attack or neutralize. In this post, I examine the second myth of 4GW: the myth of decentralized forces.

The myth holds that 4GWGs lack any cohesive or centralized command structure. Instead, small autonomous units strike on their own initiative (at least until the terminal phase of the campaign). If true, this state of affairs would render 4GWGs nearly immune from most forms of military attack. Fortunately, it is not true.

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Stateless Actors: Myths of 4G Warfare Part I

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In my comments on Lex’s post on 4G warfare, I argued that Fourth Generation Warfare didn’t really exist, at least, not as usually defined. I thought I would expand on my arguments because I think that the myth of 4GW diverts attention from the reality of most modern conflicts and frustrates our ability to win such conflicts.

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Review of John Robb’s Brave New War

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Dan from Madison has written a thoughtful review of John Robb’s Brave New War.

Excerpt:

Most urgently Robb almost begs for the US to radically restructure the electricity grid. Again, those who can afford it will simply go off the grid – through the use of wind, solar and other types of generation. Another interesting point he made is that some municipalities may just go ahead and create their own power generation and distribution. A wonderful example he provides is suburbia – I think Chicago. Many suburbs are breaking apart from large cities as we speak to ensure their own safety and care. This is an excellent point. IIRC there is a suburb in Atlanta doing this exact thing right now and I would argue that many suburbs in the Chicago area will eventually break away from the black hole that is Cook County. Do you honestly think that people in places like Downers Grove will ever send their kids to the Chicago Public Schools? On the flip side, what sort of parent, if they have the resources and live in the City of Chicago wouldn’t send their kid to a private school? That would be borderline child abuse.
 
De-centralization of everything seems to be Robb’s key point.

Read the whole thing.