An interesting thread by Kamil Galeev:
Why the USSR failed? There are two ways for a poor, underdeveloped country to industrialise: Soviet vs Chinese way. Soviet way is to build the edifice of industrial economy from the foundations. Chinese way is to build it from the roof. 1st way sounds good, 2nd actually works.
To proceed further, I need to introduce a new concept. Let’s divide the manufacturing industry into two unequal sectors, Front End vs Back End: Front End – they make whatever you see on the supermarket shelf Back End – they make whatever that stands behind, that you don’t see
Front End industries are making consumer goods. That is, whatever you buy, as an individual. Toys, clothes, furniture, appliances all falls under this category. The list of top selling amazon products gives a not bad idea what the front end sector is, and how it looks like.
Still, the production of ready consumer goods comprises only the final, ultimate element of manufacturing chain. The rear part of the chain remains hidden from our sight. We call it the Back End Back end products are not recognisable. You never bought an SMX 700 radial forge.
Read the whole thing.
I’m reminded of something Peter Drucker wrote in 1969:
In any aid program, the economist, especially the development economist employed by government, tends to impose his own values on the choice of priorities and projects. Understandably he likes things that look big, impressive, and “advanced”: a petrochemical plant, for instance. He likes the things he knows the poor “ought” to have. He has nothing but contempt for the “frivolous,” e.g., small luxuries. In this respect there is amazingly little difference between the Russian planners and the economists in the governments of the most “capitalist” nation.
The factory girl or the salesgirl in Lima or Bombay (or the Harlem ghetto) wants a lipstick. She lives in a horrible slum and knows perfectly well that she cannot, in her lifetime, afford the kind of house she would like to live in—the kind of house her counterpart in the rich countries (or the white suburbs) can afford. She knows perfectly well that neither she nor her brothers can get the kind of education they would like to have. She probably knows perfectly well that—if lucky—she will marry some boy as poor as herself and as little educated who, within a few years, \vill start beating her out of sheer despair. But at least she can, for a few short years, try to look like the kind of human being she wants to be, respects, and knows she ought to be. There is no purchase that gives her as much true value for a few cents as cheap cosmetics.
A cosmetics plant gives more employment per dollar of investment than a petrochemical plant. It trains more people capable of developing and running a modem economy. It generates managers, technicians, and salesmen. Yet the economist despises it. And the reliance on aid makes it possible for his moralism to prevail over economics and for his desire for control to prevent development.
(The Age of Discontinuity)
Of course Drucker understood the importance of the petrochemical plant; his argument is that things work better when the petrochemical plants are called forth by the cosmetics factories and other consumer-facing businesses, rather than planned from the top.
I don’t think the above points just apply to poor & undeveloped nations. In the US, the development of the computer and semiconductor industries benefited greatly from the sales volumes and technical challenges created by the computer game field…which is not the kind of thing that a central planner would be likely to earmark as a critical industry for the future.
In a market economy, ‘industrial policy’ intended to spur vital industries via subsidies and tax incentives will often seem to make sense–the US certainly does need it own ability to produce high-end chips, for example–but carries the danger of starving other industries of investment dollars and talent. And some of those industries may turn out to have been just as critical, or more critical, than the ones focused on by the industrial policymakers.