Happy Victory over Japan Day!
On August 14th in 1945 Imperial Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and averted Operation Downfall, the two stage invasion of Japan. On Sept 2, 1945 the surrender was signed on the USS Missouri in Tokyo bay, This invasion would have resulted in at least a million American casualties and up to 20 millions of Japanese dead from direct effects of the invasion plus the mass starvation that would have been sure to occur in its aftermath.
Since August 2010, it has become an nine years and counting tradition (See link list at the end of this post) for the Chicagoboyz web site to commemorate the major events closing out World War II in the Pacific and address the leftist agitprop surrounding those events. Where the worst recorded war in human history became a nuclear war via the August 6th and 9th 1945 A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, followed by the Imperial Japanese acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and the Sept 2, 1945 formal surrender on the battleship USS Missouri.
This years year’s Chicagoboyz commemoration will focus on how the Imperial Japanese Military’s two nuclear weapons programs — one each for the Army and Navy — helped to obtain a surrender in an irrational polity bent on suicidal martial glory. And how their existence has been erased from the narrative of Japanese surrender by the identity issue academics in the diplomatic history community.
Historical Background – IJA Ni-Go & IJN F-Go Genzai Bakuden Programs
The Imperial Japanese Military’ s atomic bomb or “Genzai Bakuden” program had a two separate Army and Navy projects; the Army’s Ni-Go program and the Navy’s F-Go.  Neither of these programs produced a working device, despite 1946 rumors about a test near Hungnam, Korea that were later incorporated into the 1985 book Japan’s Secret War: Japan’s Race Against Time to Build Its Own Atomic Bomb. 
The bottom line is that if Imperial Japan of the summer of 1945 had a prototype atomic device. It’s first test would have been on a ship or aircraft kamikaze aimed where they thought it would hurt the American war effort the most.
THE SILENCE OF ATOMIC DIPLOMACY
The issue of the Hiroshima historical revisionists ignoring matters like the Imperial Japanese nuclear program that are counter to their thesis is very much an issue of “arguing with drunks and religious fanatics.” Hiroshima revisionists don’t want to hear or consider contrary data because of identity issue ideological conditioning.
The following is a quick thumbnail to the rise of “Atomic Diplomacy” by Gar Alperovitz, via my 2017 V-J Day post here on the Chicagoboyz web log  —
“Atomic Revisionism” started shortly after World War 2 ended with the publication of 1 July 1946 the Pacific War Summary of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS). Authored primarily by Paul Henry Nitze, this summary report claimed that without the two Atomic Bombs Japan would have surrendered by 31 December 1945.
Atomic Revisionism” was furthered by the Royal Navy’s wartime Operational Analyst P.M.S. Blackett with his 1948 book “Fear, War and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy” that debuted the point if what the USSBS said about the Japanese surrendering 31 Dec 1945, regardless of the A-bomb, then dropping the A-bomb had to be all about intimidating Stalin. This was followed in 1956 by Blackett’s Atomic Weapons and East/West Relations
These two threads of revisionism gestated for almost a decade in leftist academia and resulted in the 1965 publication of Gar Alperovitz’s “Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam“. Namely that the dropping of the Atomic bomb was all about post war diplomacy with the Soviet Union and the coming Cold War, and not defeating Japan as swiftly as possible.
The academic military historians of the 1965 to 1985 generation were drowned out by “Atomic Diplomacy” until the mass declassification of US Military war time code breaking arrived. from the early 1990’s onward they systematically demolished Alperovitz’s “Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam.”
See the following chronology of major military history efforts:
Edward Drea’s MacArthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan (1992) — It chronicled how Allied intelligence tracked the Japanese military buildup on the southernmost home island of Kyushu in the months prior to Hiroshima, a buildup that demonstrated Tokyo’s intent to fight to the bitter end and rendered all “low” casualty estimates dating from the spring and early summer of 1945––the estimates relied upon by revisionist historians––obsolete and irrelevant months before American soldiers were scheduled to land in Japan.
Robert P. Newman’s Truman and the Hiroshima Cult — It demolished the credibility of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey’s claim that Japan would have surrendered in the fall of 1945 absent both the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war,
Robert James Maddox’s, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later — It effectively dismantled what was left of the “atomic diplomacy” thesis.
D. M. Giangreco , “Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications” (The Journal of Military History, July 1997) –D. M. Giangreco conclusively documented the existence of enormous casualty projections, some of which undeniably reached Truman and his top advisers.
Sadao Asada “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender––A Reconsideration” (Pacific Historical Review, November 1998) — Asada, relying on a thorough review of Japanese-language sources, exposed as untenable the contention that Japan was prepared to surrender before Hiroshima or that a modification of the Potsdam Declaration guaranteeing the status of the emperor would have produced a Japanese surrender
Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire — Frank brought together the evidence already mentioned and a great deal more, including crucial Japanese-language sources, leaving virtually every aspect of the revisionist case in tatters. It was not long before Downfall gained widespread recognition as the definitive work on the subject. Against this background, the cancellation of the Smithsonian Institution’s proposed exhibit to mark the 50th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, which relied almost exclusively on revisionist scholarship, was only the most publicized setback suffered by proponents of the revisionist case during the 1990s.
The summary of those various sources, particularly Sadao Asada’s, makes clear that the Japanese peace faction quietly got support of the Emperor during the Okinawa campaign (roughly) but no one was going to beard the Imperial Japanese Military for fear of a coup that would place the Emperor’s son in as a Imperial figurehead under a IJA Junta trying to fight to the death.
The academic diplomatic history narrative — Atomic Diplomacy — said this peace faction was much more powerful than later declassified Ultra code breaking documents showed and that using the Atomic bombs were unnecessary, especially the second one at Nagasaki. For them, this second atomic bomb use was pure Cold War driven “Atomic Diplomacy” aimed at the Soviet Union.
Actually, as Drea, Franks and Giangreco stated repeatedly, it took the triple shock of two atomic bombs and the Russian invasion of Manchuria to shock the IJA high command long enough for the emperor to enforce a surrender.
And it absolutely had to be two Atomic bombs to show that the American military had more than one.
The Imperial Japanese military evaluation of the Hiroshima Atomic bomb was that the Americans only had one bomb and it would be months or longer for a second highly enriched uranium (HEU) device would be available. The records of the Manhattan Engineering District (MED) show that this was an accurate assessment. And this meant the 2nd plutonium bomb at Nagasaki was absolutely vital to the surrender decision on multiple levels.
Since the Japanese Military’s Atomic Bomb Program in WWII (Genzai Bakuden) was split between the Army and Navy.  That meant both the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy had world class physicists that senior leaders trusted available to do independent chemical analysis of the nuclear residue of both atomic blasts and identify the different chemical compositions of the bombs. AKA America had not one but two separate atomic bomb production lines, one with HEU and the other with plutonium.
While this is speculation on my part, the singular failure of anyone in the Imperial Japanese Military High command to support the final military fanatic coup attempt against Hirohito seems to make the above an obvious but ignored fact since the 1978 surfacing of the reality of Japan’s WW2 atomic weapon programs. 
As it was, Emperor Hirohito had to sent personal emissaries known to the local commander — and flown in US Military Transports — to Singapore to get the General there to surrender Japanese forces in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.
The academic military history crowd has done a thorough job of demolishing “Atomic Diplomacy” with declassified Ultra documents since the late 1980’s, but has gone off their own “counter-factual analysis” deep end with their “Previews of Hell” narrative regards the use of Tactical Nukes for Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu.
That is, MacArthur was going to invade radioactive landing beaches in Kyushu.
Both narratives rely extensively on the US Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) to make their points, and what my co-researcher Ryan Crierie and I have found bouncing the USSBS reports against the original wartime documents in MED for the Atomic Program, the 20th Air Force files, Gen Kenney’s Far Eastern Air Force files, and the Olympic planning documents is something completely different. 
In short, the USSBS was a completely political document that had nothing to do with the impending Cold War with Russia. There was a whole lot of lyin…”narrative adjustment”…going on related to the unification of the services under the Department of Defense. [See Robert P. Newman’s “Truman and the Hiroshima Cult” for the take down of the USSBS]
The complete defenestration of SHORAN from the USSBS is the prime example of this as the 20th Air Force was going to have 1/5th of all its B-29, plus all Tall boy/Grand Slam bomb equipped B-29’s and all it’s “Silver Plate” A-bomb equipped B-29 get SHORAN. And that there were SHORAN beacon submarines were going to be supporting all of the above. 
Understanding who controlled 20th Air Force for Olympic and the ability of A-bomb carrying “Silverplate” B-29 to lay an A-bomb within 500 feet of a target at night and in bad weather using submarine-beacon SHORAN radio-navigation utterly invalidates both narratives. 
Between Ultra code breaking and radio direction finding the American military had pinpointed all the major Area Army (AKA Army Group), Army (AKA Corps) and Divisional HQ on Kyushu. With that and and SHORAN guided photo reconnaissance, MacArthur and 20th Air Force were in a position to use nukes to decapitate all Japanese high command on Kyushu near-simultaneous with the invasion landings to keep the Japanese reinforcements against the landings disorganized for the 3-to-5 days they needed to get established.
Nuking the various Japanese HQ would serve the same purpose as the Normandy airborne landings in keeping the major enemy reserves off the beachhead while the landing forces were chewing through the initial line of defense and getting heavy weapons ashore.
There was no way that MacArthur would not go there, as replacing people with firepower is the heart of the American way of war.
See the link enabled list of past commemorative blog posts below —
2017 — Happy VJ-Day, Plus 72 Years
2012 – Nagasaki Plus 67 Years
2011 – Happy V-J Day!
Sources and Notes:
 See the following sources on the WW2 Japanese Nuclear Programs:
Mr. Robert Pfeffer, Physical Scientist, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency, “Japan Had an Atomic Bomb (Genzai Bakuden) Program in WWII?”, Combating WMD Journal Issue 7, [Spring/Summer 2011] pages 16 – 19
New evidence of Japan’s effort to build atom bomb at the end of WWII By JAKE ADELSTEIN AUG 05, 2015 | 3:30 AM | TOKYO
Japanese Atomic Bomb Project
Date: Wednesday, May 25, 2016
Japanese nuclear weapon program
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 Ibid Wiki article, see text at “Reports of a Japanese weapon test”
 Happy VJ-Day, Plus 72 Years, Posted by Trent Telenko on September 2nd, 2017 https://chicagoboyz.net/archives/55768.html
 &  See Robert Pfeffer, page 19, note #1
 “Happy V-J Day, Plus 71 Years and a Few Days”, posted by Trent Telenko on September 6th, 2016 . https://chicagoboyz.net/archives/53760.html See section headed by “EXPERT SHORAN CONSULTANT DAVID GRIGGS…ARRIVING.”
, Ibid, see photo of “August 1945 20th Air Force memo to Major General Norstad, Deputy Chief of Staff of the USAAF, concerning the use of “Lifeguard” submarines as beacons for SHORAN guided B-29 raids on Japan.”
 Ibid, See text section headed by “NUKES, SHORAN AND GRAVITY’S RAINBOW”
 Ibid, See photo of “FEAF Operation Olympic Phase I and II SHORAN Employment Map dated 19 JUN 1945, found in the David Griggs secret files of Record Group 107, NARA’s Maryland archives.”
Background on notes above
The “Happy V-J Day, Plus 71 Years and a Few Days” Chicagoboyz post covers how the USAAF institutional leadership, Chief of Staff of the USAAF, General Arnold; operational commander US Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF) General Spaatz and Far Eastern Air Forces (FEAF) General Kenney were trying to win the war with conventional bombing via
- The Small City Target Plan — Bombing out the smaller, 100,000 person or less, Japanese cities within range of Saipan to ‘induce’ a surrender;
- The Transportation Plan — A massive two month (1 Oct – 30 Nov 1945) long campaign intended to destroy Japan’s rail system; and
- Beach Preparations on Kyushu — The proposed B-29 carpet bombing of Kyushu beaches on 29, 30 and 31 October with 100 B–29 delivering 1000 tons of conventional bombs per beach per day for a total of nine kilotons of conventional high explosive bombs.