Russia

Well, the Slavs Aren’t Like the Germans. . . but. . .

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This is an audacious post that is one built purely upon a moment’s connection of dots that may mean nothing. I’m hesitant to put it out there next to the high level of discussion of the ongoing posts about military strategy and history. But, then, this is blogging, too bullshitting late at night.

Lately we refer to the thirties: not just in America, but throughout the world. Times are likely to get rougher in some places than here and perhaps more here than in yet others. Parallels abound. In the twenties and thirties, we saw chaos & nihilism in Germany – humiliation, stubborn pride, fear of chaos as governments failed. But, we forget that the Cold War also ended with a defeat. Russia’s pride was insulted, its governments chaotic and then Putin took hold with a strong hand. We forget that war perhaps because it didn’t seem all that much a triumph for Russia’s foes. For one thing, Europe didn’t feel like a victor and it was their territory: our contribution to NATO and cowboy example were important. (I wonder if their disproportionate and early gut reaction to Bush comes from a lack of ease with our role in that long peace from 1945-1990 – his cowboy style, his father’s presence in 1990.) Russia isn’t all that delighted because, well, why would they be? And we well, we crow about it a bit, but it doesn’t feel like much of a triumph because by 1990 we didn’t feel we were really at war.

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Recent Reading

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Bitter Waters: Life and Work in Stalin’s Russia
by Gennady Andreev-Khomiakov

A fascinating look at the Soviet economic system in the 1930s, as viewed from the front lines of that system.

Gennady Andreev-Khomiakov was released from a labor camp in 1935, and was fortunate to find a job as a book-keeper in a sawmill. When the factory manager, Grigory Neposedov (a pseudonym) was assigned to run a larger and more modern factory (also a sawmill), he took Gennady with him.

Although he had almost no formal education, Neposedov was an excellent plant manager. As Gennady describes him:

He was unable to move quietly. Skinny and short, he moved around the plant so quickly that he seemed to be running, not walking. Keeping pace with the director, the fat chief mechanic would be steeped in perspiration…He rarely sat in his office, and if he needed to sign some paper or other, you had to look for him in the mechanic’s office, in the shops, or in the basement under the shops, where the transmission belts and motors that powered the work stations were located…This enthusiasm of his, this ability to lose himself completely in a genuine creative exertion, to give his all selflessly, was contagious. It was impossible to be around Neposedov without being infected by his energy; he roused everyone, set them on fire. And if he did not succeed in shaking someone up, it could unmistakely be said that such a person was dead or a complete blob.

With his enthusiasm and dedication to his factory, Neposedov comes across almost as a Soviet version of Hank Reardon (the steel mill owner in Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged), with this difference–Nepodesov could throw himself as enthusiastically into bureaucratic manipulation as into his technical and leadership work. All of his skills would be needed to make this factory a success.

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Recent Reading

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Since starting to blog, I’ve posted a total of five book reviews. Over that same time period, I’ve probably read at least 200 books. So maybe I’d do better to write less-comprehensive but more frequent reviews–maybe not even “reviews,” exactly, but rather notes on recent reading. Here’s an initial batch…

1)Adelsverein–The Gathering, by Celia Hayes. (The author blogs as Sgt Mom and is an occasional commenter at Chicago Boyz)

This novel, which I mentioned a couple of months ago, is based on some real but not-very-well-known history. In the 1840s, a group of socially conscious German noblemen conceived the notion of establishing a colony of German farmers and craftsmen in Texas. Over five years, the association dispatched more than thirty-six chartered ships, carrying over 7,000 immigrants, to the ports of Galveston and Indianola. The Gathering tells the story of this enterprise through the eyes of one family. I thought it was very good.

Here is the Steinmetz family, leaving home on their way to Bremen, where they will meet the ship that is to carry them to America:

At a turning in the road, Hansi’s cart halted, and Vati said, “What can be the matter already; did one of the horses lose a shoe?”

But ahead of them, Hansi was standing and lifting Anna in his arms.

“Look,” he called to them all. “Look back, for that is the very last that we wil see of our our old home!”

Magda’s breath caught in her throat. She turned in the seat, as Hansi said, and looked back at the huddle of roofs around the church spire, like a little ship afloat in a sea of golden fields. All they knew, all that was dear and familiar, lay small in the distance behind their two laden carts. Really, she would slap Hansi if that started Mutti crying again. Even Vati looked sobered; once around the bend of the road, trees would hide Albeck from their sight, as if it had never been a part of them or they of it.

The Gathering is the first book of a trilogy; I look forward to reading the other two in the series.

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Even Russian Admirals Have to Take on Odd Jobs to Make Ends Meet

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A recent post at Strategypage.com tells a sordid tale of double dealing.

“Russian police caught a group of naval officers (including at least two admirals) trying to smuggle 30 anti-submarine missiles and 200 bombs to China.”

The idea was to mislabel currently used weapons as obsolete, and then sell them to China so Beijing could reverse-engineer the technology. This news article gives us some more details.

It would seem that the Russians have been uncovering various criminal plots in their military with astonishing regularity over the past few years. While they have always struggled with corruption and graft, it would appear that things have really taken off.

“Over 400 Russian military officers were convicted of criminal offenses in 2008, army prosecutor Sergei Fridinsky reports in an interview with the Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper (Rus). The offending officers included 76 base commanders, and around 300 were senior staff, including 20 generals.”

The Russian military took it on the chin after the fall of the USSR in the early 1990’s. The economy was in turmoil, and funding for the troops was pretty much non-existent. Stories of how the armed forces were crumbling, such as how army bases would go dark because the electric bill wasn’t paid, were legion.

But that was supposed to be all in the past, as Russian oil and natural gas sales to an energy starved Europe revitalized the ruble and brought the good times back. Those who think that the recent US economic turmoil is forcing Russian generals to turn to crime as a desperate measure to stave off starvation should consider that the internal investigations to root out corruption started well before our own recession. And, as this op-ed from the UK Telegraph explains, Russia certainly had so much cash as late as October of 2008 that they offered a huge bailout loan to Iceland. A recent post at Strategypage.com reinforces the impression that the Russian government is going to keep spending money on the military, no matter how bad the global economic downturn.

This is probably the barely visible signs of a massive bureaucratic conflict that is raging between entrenched officers in the military, and the government at large. This essay mentions in passing that Putin has been trying to forcibly retire officers who are left over from an antiquated mobilization system, but the generals are refusing to go.

“The Army officer corps has stalemated the massive Defense Ministry reforms. This has delayed the forced retirement of thousands of senior officers. The officer corps wants to retain the 19th century “mobilization army” system. This requires conscription of most of the male population, and maintaining those men in reserve units (which are commanded by thousands of well paid senior officers). Russian leader Vladimir Putin sees this system as unworkable. Too many young men evade the draft and the country cannot afford to equip up to a hundred reserve divisions. Moreover, Russian nuclear weapons protect the country from invasion, and what the country needs is a smaller armed forces manned by professionals. But the officer corps is having none of it, and are digging in their heels, and calling in political favors.”

It seems to me that this is a case of “Use it or lose it”. The officers facing forced retirement, looking at their remaining decades spent as poor pensioners clipping coupons for dog food, realize that they only have a limited time to use their positions to cash in. Sell military technology to the Chinese and become a traitor to The Motherland? As long as a big pile of cash is on the table, then sign them up!

(Cross posted at Hell in a Handbasket.)

Youth Wingers?

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From a Telegraph story [h/t Instapundit]:

The biggest display of public disaffection with Mr Putin prompted a violent response in Moscow. Pro Kremlin youth wingers brutally beat some protestors, while others were detained, including Eduard Limonov, a prominent Kremlin critic and leader of the outlawed National Bolshevik Party.[emp added]

What the hell are “youth wingers”? How does that even make sense? You have right and left wingers because they represents opposite sides of a spectrum. Does “youth wingers” imply a division between young and old?

More likely they just couldn’t figure out whether to call the bullies “left” or “right”.