Trade, Tariffs, and Prices

Several items:

1–At X, there’s some knowledgeable commentary on the relationship between tariffs and retail prices, from Craig Fuller @FreightAlley: “When products are imported into the US, the importer is charged a tariff based on the declared value of those imports, not the marked-up retail price consumers will eventually pay…The markup might be only 5% for big-ticket items like cars, while it could be as high as 500% for luxury goods. Most retail goods have markups of over 100% over their declared value.”  He discusses the alternatives available to importers and suppliers,  of which ‘raise retail prices’ is only one.  Link.

2–The WSJ, a while back, had several letters on tariffs in response to an article on that subject. One of them said:

Phil Gramm and Donald J. Boudreaux don’t mention the basic evil of tariffs: that they negate comparative advantage. If Product A can be produced cheaply or efficiently in Location 1 and Product B in Location 2, each location should concentrate on its speciality and trade to the benefit of both.

Imagine Massachusetts enacting a tariff on oranges to protect an industry of heated orange groves and Florida a tariff to support air-conditioned cranberry bogs. State politicians could trumpet creating a new industry, but OJ would be $25 a glass in Boston and cranberry sauce would be $10 a scoop in Miami. Tariffs amount to a “beggar thyself” policy. The Constitution’s framers recognized this and crafted the Commerce Clause to forbid restriction of trade by states. The same principle applies to trade between nations.

Trade based on relative efficiency of production, as for the orange/cranberry example, is a classic example of the advantages of trade.  But a high proportion of trade today is not of this nature: it is simply labor arbitrage, based on differentials in wages.  The primary reason why products made in China have been so much lower cost than those made in the US is because Chinese people would work for lower wages than US people. There was nothing inherent in Chinese geography or climate, or Chinese skill sets, that made assembly of iPhone more efficient in China than in Iowa.

3–In my Labor Day post for 2021, I said:

In a world with global and highly-efficient transportation and communications…and billions of people who are accustomed to low wages…is it possible for a country such as the United States to maintain its accustomed high standards of living for the large majority of its people?…and, if so, what are the key policy elements required to do this?

This question should be fundamental to discussions of trade policy, along with national defense and resilience considerations.

4–Bill Waddell, a very experienced manufacturing practitioner and consultant, who used to comment here sometimes, has a new book out:  Reclaiming American Manufacturing: Take Back the Middle Class From Globalism. A quick and worthwhile read, available on Amazon Unlimited.  Also, this post at LinkedIn.

5–Although offshoring is usually discussed in terms of its impact on manufacturing, there is also plenty of offshoring going on in service: Telemigration.

Your thoughts?

Two Views on China

Yesterday, Aron Sarin published an article at Quillette titled   Beijing in Retreat.    Also yesterday, Barrons published China’s Comeback is Getting Started.   (“Stocks Soar as China Revs Up its Reopening” in the print version)   You can read the Quillette piece for yourself, and should, but the Barrons article will require a subscription.

To summarize, the Quillette piece focuses on China’s birthrate deficit (likely to be exacerbated in the future by the memory of the bad treatment of pregnant women during the lockdowns, as well as by a pervasive feeling of gloom about the future)…China’s inability to manufacture high-end semiconductor chips…pervasive corruption…and the fact that in the modern world…the persistence of poverty….and declining trust in the CCP.   “The Chinese people learned that they can enjoy no certainty about the future and that Xi’s obsession with order leads, paradoxically, to chaos.”

The tone of the Barrons piece is rather different:

The catalyst is clear.   Policy makers in the world’s largest economy are pulling out the stops to revive the economy and get its 1.4 billion people spending more, after three hard years of stringent Covid restrictions and harsh crackdowns on technology and other industries.   Beijing has totally reversed its zero-Covid policy and had begun loosening regulations on business.   Up next: more stimulus to stabilize the residential property market.   “Domestically, all the switches that can be switched on have been moved toward growth, and there’s a lot of momentum behind it,” said David Semple of the VanEck Emerging Markets fund.    

(I’m reminded of Shakespeare’s passage in which Glendower says, “I can call spirits from the vasty deep,” to which Hotspur replies, “Why, so can I, or so can any man;   But will they come when you do call for them?)

Various metrics are cited to suggest a recovery: Subway traffic across 23 cities has returned to prepandemic levels, hundreds of millions are traveling for the Lunar New Year,   Citigroup analysts expect the domestic travel industry to recover to more than 85% of pre-Covid levels by the second half of this year.

The article notes that China is a formidable rival to the US in the ‘renewable energy’ sector, given its strengths in battery technology and rare-earth minerals.   It also notes that Chinese policy makers wanting to address the birthrate decline “might offer incentives for couples to have children, such as cash payouts or even making workplace promotions conditional on having a child.”   (Future conversation: “Mommy, why did you and daddy decide to have me?”   “Well, son….)

Abhay Desphande of Centerstone seems less optimistic about China’s future than many of the other individuals quoted:   “Xi is boxed in with multiple policy failures with his gambits with the US, his approach to the private sector and real estate, and people angry i the streets.   One lever he can pursue very aggressively is the economic lever to get people working,   get the economy going.   And even though he may change his attitude toward private enterprises in a few years, for now, he needs that part of the economy to work.

My question would be whether Xi can really step back from his highly centralizing worldview enough to truly reignite sustainable economic growth, however much he wants to.

China remains, of course, a formidable economic power, and there are many, many important products required by the US and other countries whose supply requires Chinese participation, either for the complete products or for essential components and materials.   Semiconductors are far from being the only items that are essential to the US economy and to the welfare of its people.   And the US economy, especially in manufacturing but by no means limited to that industry,   is being hampered by the worldview of the present administration, which is itself very centralizing in its orientation.

Your thoughts?